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Abstract
In an effort to spur development and entrench democratization in the late-twentieth century, many devel-
oping countries decentralized various central government functions. As countries devolved power to smaller
political units, some experienced subnational fragmentation - a process in which some local communities split
into multiple new communities. A fledgling literature assesses both the causes and the effects of subnational
fragmentation in the developing world and provides insight into the effects of the facet of decentralization
that reduces the size of political units. In my dissertation, I extend the knowledge accumulated on the
subject to the Brazilian case. The intense fragmentation in Brazil and the multi-stage process governing
fragmentation in the country offer a unique opportunity to precisely explain the causes of and roadblocks
to subnational fragmentation in Brazil and to uncover its effects on political participation in local elections
and public goods provision. Using archival research conducted in the Legislative Assembly of the most
municipality-dense Brazilian state, Minas Gerais, and fragmentation plebiscite results, I empirically assess
the motivations underlying local leaders’ submissions of fragmentation proposals and the factors leading
state legislatures and voters to subsequently approve or reject submitted proposals. I find that a combina-
tion of local grievances, state and local political alignments, and the number of municipal districts involved
in fragmentation differentiate municipalities that fragment from municipalities that do not fragment. Con-
trolling for these causes with matching, I use difference-in-difference analyses constructed with original
datasets on municipality creation to assess the consequences of fragmentation for political participation and
public goods provision. I learn that subnational fragmentation enhances political participation in the first
post-fragmentation local elections but that this positive participatory effect is short-lived. I attribute this
short-lived uptick in political participation to enduring effects of political mobilization from the subnational
fragmentation process. Additionally, I find that fragmentation helps underperforming municipalities to im-
prove the quality of services, specifically, education infrastructure that they provide to their constituents.
Municipalities created as a product of fragmentation are especially benefitted through the enhanced admin-
istrative attention afforded by subnational fragmentation. Jointly, I interpret my results as evidence that
decentralization can live up to some of its promises, especially in the provision of public goods.
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In 1991, Santo Antônio de Retiro was a municipal district in the Brazilian municipality of Rio Pardo de
Minas. The United Nations Development Programme calcuated that Santo Antônio de Retiro would have
earned a score of 0.419 on the municipality human development index1 had it existed as an independent
municipality in 1991. This score was almost a whole point lower than the score earned by the municipality
comprising Santo Antônio de Retiro, Rio Pardo de Minas, in the same year. Disaggregated into more tangible
indicators, in 1991, only 35.47% of Santo Antônio de Retiro’s population over the age of 15 was literate and
only 55.64% of those in the municipal district were expected to live until the age of 60. By comparison,
45.58% of Rio Pardo de Minas’s population over the age of 15 was literate, and 64.17% of the municipality’s
residents were expected to reach the age of 60. By each of these indicators, the municipal district of Santo
Antônio de Retiro underperformed in comparison with the entirety of Rio Pardo de Minas.
In the year prior to the release of these 1991 indicators, Santo Antônio de Retiro attempted to fragment
Rio Pardo de Minas and to become its own municipality. The municipal district gathered local political
support for political and administrative restructuring and submitted a fragmentation proposal to the State
Legislative Assembly of Minas Gerais on January 16, 1990. This fragmentation proposal argued that it
would be viable for Santo Antônio de Retiro to exist as an independent municipality and demonstrated local
political support for the proposed restructuring. For undisclosed reasons, the State Legislative Assembly
rejected the proposal. Fragmentation did not occur and Santo Antônio de Retiro remained a municipal
district of Rio Pardo de Minas.
However, Santo Antônio de Retiro was persistent and re-introduced the possibility of fragmentation in
the subsequent electoral period. Led by Jaci Fernandes Ribeiro and supported by local political leaders in
Rio Pardo de Minas,2 Santo Antônio de Retiro submitted another more detailed fragmentation proposal to
the State Legislative Assembly in 1995. This time, the State Legislature of Minas Gerais approved Santo
Antônio de Retiro’s proposal and recommended that a fragmentation plebiscite be held in the municipal
1This index is comprised of three sub-dimensions - health, education, and income. An index score of 0 is extremely
underdeveloped, and an index score of 1 is extremely developed.
2Jaci Fernandes Ribeiro served as the Fragmentation Initiation President, or Emancipation Commission President, for the
municipal district of Santo Antônio de Retiro in 1995.
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district. The purpose of this plebiscite was to gauge broad popular support for the fragmentation of Rio
Pardo de Minas and for the elevation in status of Santo Antônio de Retiro from a municipal district to a
municipality. According to records from the state’s Tribunal Regional Eleitoral (TRE), 1,636 voters from
Santo Antônio de Retiro (out of an eligible electorate of 2,707) participated in the plebiscite. These same
records suggest that 1,534 of those participating voted in favor of fragmentation, and 67 voted against
fragmentation.3 The plebiscite results satisfied the requisites necessary for a fragmentation plebiscite to
pass,4 and after both the state legislature and governor formally granted their approval of the creation of
the municipality of Santo Antônio de Retiro, the new municipality held its first local elections on October
3, 1996. The elected municipality government was inaugurated at the beginning of the following year.
After the fragmentation of Rio Pardo de Minas and the installation of the municipality of Santo Antônio
de Retiro, Santo Antônio de Retiro developed rapidly. By 2000, Santo Antônio de Retiro’s municipality
human development index score soared to 0.601, resulting in an index increase of approximately 0.182
points. At the turn of the century, Santo Antônio de Retiro’s 2000 index score fell just shy of that earned by
Rio Pardo de Minas. Additionally, by 2000, approximately 63.35% of Santo Antônio de Retiro’s population
was literate and 72.28% of its population was expected to live until the age of 60. Per these indicators, too,
Santo Antônio de Retiro closely resembled the municipality from which it fragmented; in 2000, approximately
65.54% of Rio Pardo de Minas’s population was literate and 73.84% of the municipality’s population was
expected to live until the age of 60. Each of these comparisons signal significant development in Santo
Antônio de Retiro over the nine-year period. Is subnational fragmentation to credit for the developmental
growth observed in Santo Antônio de Retiro?
In my dissertation, I investigate the dynamics surrounding subnational fragmentation. Broadly speaking,
subnational fragmentation is the division of an existing subnational unit into two (or more) new subnational
units. In the example presented above, Rio Pardo de Minas experienced subnational fragmentation in 1995.
This fragmentation resulted in the territorial restructuring of the ‘parent’ municipality, Rio Pardo de Minas,
and the creation of the ‘child’ municipality, Santo Antônio de Retiro. My dissertation is motivated by dual
desires to 1) understand what causes some subnational units, like Rio Pardo de Minas, to fragment and
others to remain intact and to 2) discern whether reducing the size of some local political units generates
improvements in the areas of political participation and public goods provision.
Subnational fragmentation is not a phenomenon unique to Brazil. It is dramatically reshaping local
politics across the developing world. For example, almost half of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa have
witnessed a 20% increase in their numbers of subnational units since the 1990s; the number of districts in
3An additional eight voters left their ballots blank, and 27 cast null votes.
4A majority of eligible voters are required both to turn out and to vote in favor of fragmentation.
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Indonesia increased by 58.6% from 1999 to 2009; and the number of municipalities in Brazil has increased by
more than just the addition of Santo Antônio de Retiro. The number of Brazilian municipalities has grown
by approximately 25% since 1988.
Several scholars have become intrigued by this local territorial restructuring, referred to by some as ad-
ministrative unit proliferation, and have made important strides in documenting not only its manifestation
but also its underlying causes. Paramount among proposed explanations of fragmentation is incumbent
political power-seeking (Green, 2008, 2010; Pierskalla, 2014; Ayee, 2012; Grossman and Lewis, 2014; Hassan,
2016; Dahlby, 2011; Magalhães, 2007; Hassan and Sheely, 2016) but some scholars recognize that strong
local economic activity (Cigolini et al., 1999; Noronha, 1996; Bremaeker, 1993) and heterogenous local
preferences (Brink, 2004) can also motivate fragmentation. Moreover, extant work finds that coalitional ar-
rangements (Kimura, 2013; Tomio, 2002, 2005) and institutional permissiveness (Tomio, 2002, 2005; Cigolini
and Cachatori, 2011) can influence the propensity that fragmentation motivations actually yield territorial
restructuring.
While scholars have begun to document where, when, and why subnational units multiply, we know little
about the consequences of subnational fragmentation. This dearth of knowledge has not gone unnoticed.
Kiwanuka (2012) claims, “In recent years, districts have been created without any systematic assessment
of their viability. There is no evidence to suggest that this increased award of district status will facilitate
realization of the policy objectives in Uganda” (Kiwanuka, 2012). Though speaking directly on the Ugandan
experience, Kiawanuka’s (2012) comments are emblematic of the state of knowledge accumulated on the
effects of fragmentation in other developing contexts similarly exposed to fragmentation.
In spite of this lacuna, politicians and some academics boast of the positive effects of fragmentation.
For example, Brazilian Senator Inácio Arruda (PC do B-CE) claimed that he had never seen a municipality
whose conditions worsened in the aftermath of fragmentation5 (Jungmann, N.d.), and Noronha (1996) went
so far as to claim that “emancipation is a condition for promoting development.” Content aside, the very
language that Jungmann (N.d.) and Noronha (1996) use to describe subnational fragmentation in Brazil -
emancipation - exudes a positive connotation that is worth trying to substantiate.
Although there is minimal systematic evidence demonstrating that subnational fragmentation does, in
fact, generate positive developmental and/or political outcomes, there are compelling anecdotal examples
(i.e. the case of Santo Antônio de Retiro) that suggests that it does and convincing theoretical reasons to
expect that it should. Theories of decentralization suggest that the redistribution of political, administrative,
and/or fiscal power across levels of government and the reduction in size of the empowered unit jointly en-
5Arruda stated, “nunca viu um munićıpio emancipado piorar as suas condições” (Jungmann, N.d.).
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hance democracy, development, and security through dismantling authoritarian legacies, increasing political
participation, enhancing political representation, improving the provision of public goods and services, en-
couraging growth-promoting behaviors of subnational actors and mitigating conflict (Tiebout, 1956; Oates,
1972; Weingast, 1995; Diamond and Tsalik, 1999; Gibson, 2004; Falleti, 2005; Bland, 2007; Brinkerhoff,
2007; Connerley, Eaton and Smoke, 2010; Dickovick, 2011; Goldfrank, 2011; Veliz, 2014; Pierskalla, 2014;
Rosenblatt et al., 2015). The optimal political unit size literature suggests that the facet of decentralization
relating to the reduction of political unit size should play an especially integral role in generating some
of the aforementioned outcomes. Optimal political unit size literature suggests that smaller political units
- which subnational fragmentation, by definition, generates - have advantages over larger political units.
Specifically, smaller political units are believed to better provide public services that are tailored to meet the
needs of local communities, represent heterogeneous populations, and breed sentiments of political efficacy
and, similarly, desires to participate politically (Oates, 1972; Blom and Serritzlew, 2014; Tiebout, 1956;
Alesina and Spolaore, 2005; Blom and Serritzlew, 2014; Lassen and Serritzlew, 2011). The insight from
the decentralization and optimal political unit size literatures provide compelling reasons to suspect that
subnational fragmentation would generate similar positive outcomes.
To the extent that fragmentation generates these theoretically-expected outcomes, scholars, politicians,
and development and policy practitioners ought to learn more about the nuances surrounding it and to con-
sider promoting cautious local restructuring as a political- and/or development-enhancing strategy. However,
to the extent that fragmentation does not yield theoretically expected outcomes or, conversely, hampers the
realization of normative political and/or development goals, the consequences of fragmentation could be dire.
For instance, if fragmentation empowers subnational units lacking in sufficient administrative capacity, frag-
mentation could reduce the quality of service provision. In this case, scholars, politicians, and development
and policy practitioners ought to conscientiously curb fragmentation initiatives. In my dissertation, I assess
the realization of theoretical propositions relating to fragmentation and adjudicate between two possible
outcomes of fragmentation.
Achieving these goals requires me to 1) analyze the causes of subnational fragmentation and to 2) assess
the consequences of subnational fragmentation in a way that controls for the factors differentiating frag-
menting and non-fragmenting subnational units. By studying subnational fragmentation in this fashion, my
dissertation paints a holistic picture of the dynamics surrounding subnational fragmentation and generates
policy and institutional recommendations for local development. Additionally, the rich in-country compari-
son units afforded by subnational fragmentation allow me to weigh into the intimately related debates over
the advantages and disadvantages of large and small political units as well as of centralized and decentralized
4
forms of governance.
In the chapters that follow, I extend the limited knowledge accumulated on subnational fragmentation to
a largely unchartered region, Latin America, by studying both the causes and the consequences of subnational
fragmentation in the case of Brazil. Brazil is one of the most decentralized countries in the world in which
the number of municipalities has increased by approximately 25% in the current democratic period. In
spite of this intense proliferation of Brazilian municipalities, few have systematically studied the causes, let
alone the consequences, of fragmentation in the country. This is especially surprising given the country’s 1)
nuanced subnational data not only at but below the level of the municipality, 2) absence of divisive ethnic
cleavages (which are pervasive in many other developing countries exposed to subnational fragmentation and
can confound studies on the effects of fragmentation with the effects of partitioning ethnically-heterogeneous
local societies insofar as ethnic divisions map onto fragmentation lines), and 3) multi-stage, locally-led
process of fragmentation (which makes it possible to differentiate between requests for and approvals of
fragmentation and to, therefore, reduce the potential bias of treating sets of areas that fragmented as if they
are equal to the set of areas that requested fragmentation, as studies of subnational fragmentation in other
contexts tend to do). These features provide me with a unique opportunity to introduce novel evidence into
the causes and, especially, into the effects of subnational fragmentation.
I draw upon multiple methods to study the causes of subnational fragmentation in Brazil and its con-
sequences for two areas that decentralization theories expect to see influenced when the distance between
governments and constituents is reduced - political participation and public goods provision. My primary
quantitative strategies include regression, matching, and difference-in-difference analyses and rely primarily
on original datasets on municipality creation. The primary dataset is informed by Brazilian legal sources,
municipality histories, and pre-existing secondary data6 and traces the administrative, political, fiscal, demo-
graphic, and education histories of all Brazilian municipalities (currently numbering 5,570) over a twenty-
eight year period (1988-2015). A smaller supplementary dataset on municipality creation is informed by
original archival research conducted in the State Legislative Assembly of Minas Gerais and in the state’s
Regional Electoral Court (TRE). This dataset contains nuanced information on the successes and failures
of municipal districts’ fragmentation proposals at each of three critical stages in Brazil’s fragmentation pro-
cess.7 Interviews and archival research conducted during my six months in residence in Brazil supplement
6This secondary data was obtained from sources including the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), the
Applied Economic Research Institute (IPEA), the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), the Regional Electoral Courts (TRE), Atlas
Brasil, and the Brazilian School Census.
7Though limited in geographic scope to the most municipality-dense Brazilian state, Minas Gerais, the advantage of this
secondary dataset is that it permits me to study not only the characteristics that motivate municipal districts to pursue
fragmentation in Brazil but to assess the conditions that allow for its actual realization. This data allows for both a more
complete understanding of fragmentation than other studies on the causes of fragmentation have uncovered to date and for a
more precise estimate of the effects of subnational fragmentation.
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the quantitative research conducted with the municipal creation data. In what follows, I provide a struc-
tural overview of the dissertation that discusses, in brief, the findings uncovered with these various research
methods.
I begin Chapter 2 with an overview of the decentralization literature and a discussion of the relationship
between decentralization and subnational fragmentation. I, then, proceed to review theoretical expectations
of political unit size (emphasizing the expectations of small political units such as those generated via
processes of subnational fragmentation) and to describe the way in which subnational fragmentation serves as
a testing ground to assess both these hypotheses and the facet of decentralization pertaining to the reduction
in size of political units. I introduce and evaluate scholars’ recent studies of subnational fragmentation and
conclude this chapter by using these to inform expectations relating to the consequences and causes of
subnational fragmentation that I assess in my dissertation.
In Chapter 3, I provide some general contextual background on local politics and subnational fragmen-
tation in Brazil, discuss the benefits of adding Brazil to the repertoire of countries in which subnational
fragmentation is studied, and document both the multi-stage process by which fragmentation occurs in
Brazil as well as the federal and state-specific institutional regulations governing it. Considered jointly,
the information covered in this chapter documents the compelling reasons to study subnational fragmenta-
tion in Brazil; paramount among these is the ability to distinguish between municipal districts that pursue
but do not realize fragmentation and municipal districts that pursue and do realize fragmentation. These
comparisons permit me to more carefully isolate the effect of subnational fragmentation on political partic-
ipation and public primary education than other studies have done to date. The following chapters identify
and subsequently use these optimal comparisons to introduce new evidence into debates over the effects of
subnational fragmentation and, more broadly, political unit size and decentralization.
In Chapter 4, I study the causes of subnational fragmentation in Brazil using archival research conducted
in the Legislative Assembly of the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais and plebiscite results obtained from the
state’s Regional Electoral Court (TRE). I begin this chapter by reexamining the conventional wisdom that
intergovernmental transfer incentives are the primary motivations underlying subnational fragmentation in
Brazil and, using regression analyses, find that grievances stemming from administrative neglect, widely-
dispersed local political competition, and a persistent lack of desired change under the status quo spark
the initiation of fragmentation proceedings. Through archival research, though, it becomes apparent that
not all municipalities that pursue fragmentation actually realize their end goal of dividing into new poli-
ties. After local leaders initiate fragmentation proceedings by submitting fragmentation proposals to their
respective state legislatures, state legislatures and local voters evaluate and pass judgement on proposals.
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Put differently, these actors have veto power over fragmentation.
In the second part of the chapter, I empirically study the conditions that predict proposal “success” in
state legislatures and with voters. In doing so, I provide more comprehensive insight into fragmentation in
Brazil than others have done to date, identify comparison units that help me to better isolate the effects
of fragmentation, and contribute to broader literatures on legislative behavior and participation in direct
democracy. I find that state governments are more likely to approve of fragmentation proposals submitted
by politicians with whom they are politically aligned and from within municipalities of non-aligned mayors
and that plebiscites are more likely to pass when voters have sufficient information to make inferences about
their future under new political arrangements. I suggest that the fragmentation-related information available
to voters exists as a function of the number of districts involved in proposal initiation. Taken together, the
findings from this chapter suggest that administrative neglect, grievances surrounding dispersed political
competition, and disaffection with the persistent lack of change under the status quo prompt local leaders
to pursue fragmentation but that fragmentation is only realized in these municipal districts when the state
legislature is aligned with the local leaders initiating fragmentation and unaligned with the mayor of the
fragmenting municipality and when fragmentation proposals are compiled by a single municipal district.
Thus, the factors predicting successful fragmentation are more complicated and multi-faceted than previously
believed.
In Chapters 5 and 6, I leverage the within-country comparison units afforded by subnational fragmen-
tation in Brazil to assess the consequences of subnational fragmentation for political participation in local
elections and for the quality of public primary education infrastructure, respectively. In these chapters, I
assess classic theories underlying the decentralization and optimal political unit size literatures and analyze
whether small local governments live up to anticipated promises in the realms of participation and service
delivery. Specifically, I ask: Does subnational fragmentation increase turnout and reduce the proportion of
null and blank ballots cast in local elections? Does reducing the distance between local governments and
constituents improve public primary education infrastructure? Are observed effects similar across ‘parent’
and ‘child’ municipalities?
My empirical approach to addressing these questions involves pre-processing original data on municipality
creation via matching to account for pre-fragmentation characteristics that differentiate fragmenting and non-
fragmenting municipalities8 and implementing difference-in-difference analyses with this subsetted data.
In Chapter 5, I use this approach to study the effects of fragmentation on political participation in
Brazilian municipality elections. In doing so, I assess theories of decentralization and optimal political unit
8The results from Chapter 4 inform the characteristics on which fragmenting and non-fragmenting municipalities are matched.
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size that hypothesize that bringing governments closer to voters will enhance political participation. My
study provides some, but limited, support for these theoretical expectations. My strongest results show that
fragmentation initially increased the valid vote share and decreased the null vote share in local Brazilian
elections but that these positive effects did not unanimously persist beyond the first local elections in the
post-fragmentation period. I reason that the political mobilization involved in the fragmentation process
may explain the observed short-lived spikes in political participation. As fragmentation becomes a more
distant memory and the electorate demobilizes, participation also subsides. This suggests that a reduction
in distance between local governments and constituents, alone, is likely insufficient to enhance political
participation.
In Chapter 6, I exploit this same empirical strategy to study strong theoretical expectations of decen-
tralization and optimal political unit size literatures that reducing the distance between local governments
and voters enhances the quality of public goods supplied by local governments. Specifically, I study the
relationship between subnational fragmentation and the quality of public primary education infrastructure.
I argue that public primary education is an especially attractive public good to consider for this analy-
sis given that Brazilian municipalities are chiefly responsible for its provision. On this front, my study
provides support for theoretical expectations. I find that bringing governments closer to voters (through
subnational fragmentation) enhances the quality of education infrastructure in municipalities involved in
fragmentation as compared with municipalities not involved in fragmentation. Moreover, I find that the
quality of education infrastructure in ‘child’ municipalities that were created as a product of fragmentation
was especially benefited under new political arrangements. I suggest that these findings stem from increased
administrative attention post-fragmentation and argue that disparities in municipality education councils
across municipalities differentiated on the basis of exposure to fragmentation serve as observable indicators
of this mechanism.
In Chapter 7, I summarize the purview of my dissertation and conclude that fragmentation and the facet
of decentralization that reduces the distance between local governments and constituents can yield some, but
not all, of its promises. Specifically, the results of this dissertation suggest that, in the long run, fragmen-
tation achieves some anticipated improvements in service delivery but does not sustain enhanced political
participation. I propose directions for future research that would build upon the findings of this dissertation
both substantively and geographically and provide preliminary institutional and policy recommendations for
developing countries on the basis of this work.
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Chapter 2
Does Decentralization Live Up to its
Promises? Territorial Restructuring
Sheds New Perspective
The demise of dictatorships, termination of internal civil wars, and the fall of communism in the late-
twentieth century created an opening for political change in the developing world. Due to the perceived
normative benefits of democratic regimes, politicians, policymakers, international financial institutions, and
scholars advocated a global commitment to democratic forms of government. Their pleas, however, ex-
tended beyond regime type to include additional reforms and institutional arrangements that were expected
to enhance political representation, participation, and development. This group of actors encouraged de-
veloping countries to adopt decentralized forms of governance that politically, administratively, or fiscally
created and/or empowered subnational political units due to theoretical expectations that reducing the dis-
tance between governments and constituents would increase political participation, improve the provision of
public goods and services, and enhance political representation (Falleti, 2005; Veliz, 2014; Dickovick, 2011;
Goldfrank, 2011; Tiebout, 1956; Weingast, 1995; Pierskalla, 2014; Rosenblatt et al., 2015; Gibson, 2004).
Consequently, many developing countries around the world decentralized.
As a product of their promise to engender desired political and economic outcomes, decentralization
reforms emerged, first, in Latin America and, later, in other regions including Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern
Europe, and East Asia (Falleti, 2005; Dickovick, 2011). As decentralization spread, scholars, economists,
and researchers alike devoted their agendas to evaluating whether decentralization reforms were successful in
yielding outcomes promised by classic theories of political unit size. These studies have produced conflicting
evidence, suggesting that the effects of decentralization are, at best, mixed (Treisman, 2002; Bardhan and
Mookherjee, 2006; Connerley, Eaton and Smoke, 2010; Channa and Faguet, 2012; Córdova and Layton,
2016).
One of the reasons why studies on decentralization may produce such disparate findings is because the
phenomenon is often insufficiently disaggregated into its various forms. In recent research, some scholars
have begun to unpack decentralization into political, administrative, and fiscal forms and to study the
heterogenous effects of these types of decentralization. Escobar-Lemmon and Ross (2014) takes this approach
in her study of the relationship between administrative, fiscal, and political decentralization and perceptions
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of accountability in Colombia. She finds that administrative and fiscal decentralization positively effect
perceptions of accountability; political decentralization, by contrast, has no effect. Niedzwiecki and Stoyan
(2017) also argue that it is critical to unpack decentralization. They divide decentralization into ten different
dimensions and find that forms of decentralization associated with self-rule increase political participation
in national elections but that fiscal forms of decentralization, for example, will not (Niedzwiecki and Stoyan,
2017).
Insufficient disaggregation of decentralization into its various forms may not be the only issue contributing
to disparate conclusions about the effects of decentralization. Instead, studies on decentralization may
produce diverging results due to the conflation of two unique facets of decentralization. Decentralization
both redistributes political, administrative, and/or fiscal power across levels of government and reduces the
size of the empowered unit. To my knowledge, extant studies do not consider which of these elements is
or would need to be at work in order for decentralization to deliver expected improvements in political
participation and public goods provision, for example. Subnational fragmentation - a process by which
subnational political units fragment into two (or more) new subnational political units - affords me an
opportunity to isolate the reduction in political unit size facet of decentralization and to study the effects
attributable to this element. This unconventional approach to the study of decentralization has the potential
to shed light on ill-understood elements of the phenomenon.
2.1 Subnational Fragmentation
Accompanying the late-twentieth century adoption of decentralization reforms and commitment to the
political, fiscal, and administrative empowerment of local communities, many developing countries experi-
enced subnational fragmentation. This coincidence has led some, including Magalhães (2007) and Fitrani,
Hofman and Kaiser (2005), to claim that subnational fragmentation is an integral part of the decentralization
process and others, including Grossman and Lewis (2014), to claim that decentralization reforms triggered
the demand for territorial secession. Decentralization and subnational fragmentation may be further con-
flated as they both reorganize political power, empower local political units, and reduce the distance between
elected officials and voters. Despite similarities and cointegration, there are important differences between
decentralization and subnational fragmentation.
The primary difference between decentralization and subnational fragmentation stems from the nature of
the reorganization of political power. Decentralization redistributes political, administrative, fiscal, and/or
other power across levels of government, and fragmentation reorganizes power within a solitary subnational
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level of government. This means that the actors presiding over decentralization reforms and subnational
fragmentation may also be distinct. Decentralization reforms necessarily originate in the central government
and, thus, involve actors from the central government. Subnational fragmentation, by contrast, may be
administered by local actors without explicit approval of the central government. Additionally, differences
in the nature of power redistribution mean that decentralization is generally applied to all subnational units
in a country at a single moment in time while subnational fragmentation may affect some subnational units
but not others.
The features unique to subnational fragmentation make compelling causal assessments of its effects pos-
sible, and the intricate similarities between subnational fragmentation and decentralization permit crude
inferences about decentralization to be drawn from these evaluations. In this dissertation, I assess the re-
lationship between subnational fragmentation and both political participation and public goods provision
in an effort to enhance our understanding of the effects of decentralization. As aforementioned, theories of
decentralization expect the devolution of political, administrative, and/or fiscal power to increase participa-
tion and enhance public goods provision. In the forthcoming chapters, I assess whether an integral facet of
decentralization - the reduction in size of political units - generates these expected outcomes. Theories of
optimal political unit size, assessments of the effects of recent fragmentation and amalgamation reforms, and
contextual and temporal knowledge of the Brazilian case under consideration inform my specific expectations.
2.1.1 The Tradeoffs of Small and Large Political Units: Sometimes, Smaller is
Better
Scholars of political science and political theory have long been intrigued by the size of political units
and the consequences of political unit size for performance, broadly conceived. Debates over whether and
how the size of political units affects representation, the quality of government, and the provision of public
services date back to the musings of Plato and Aristotle and continue to shape both academics’ research
agendas and the actual territorial composition of political units in the present day.
In their prolific work, The Size of Nations, Alesina and Spolaore (2005) describe the dispute over optimal
political unit size as it relates to the size of countries. They posit that the size of political units encompasses
a vicious tradeoff between capitalizing on economies of scale and satisfying heterogenous preferences and
representation. This tradeoff divides scholars and political practitioners weighing in on the size of both
national and sub-national political units into two camps - one which privileges representing and responding
to heterogenous preferences and supports smaller political units and one which privileges economies of scale
and supports larger political units.
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Those championing the political virtues of small units suggest that these units have an advantage over
larger political units in representing heterogenous populations and in breeding sentiments of political efficacy
and, relatedly, desires to participate politically. Blom and Serritzlew (2014) argue that larger political
units are more susceptible to heterogeneous unit composition and that this heterogeneity can yield diverse
preferences that are not adequately represented in government. Smaller units are dispositioned to be more
homogeneous. They infer that this uniformity makes it easier for elected officials to perceive and represent
the will of their communities and for communities to hold their representatives accountable on the basis of
their actions.
Blom and Serritzlew (2014) also claim that “smallness facilitates citizens’ participation in politics, en-
hances their trust in their own political competence, and breeds civic consensus. It makes politics less
abstract and increases politicians’ responsiveness to citizen views. It spreads political power, furthers con-
trol over government, increases political accountability, and facilitates exit-based empowerment of citizens”
(Blom et al. 2014; 790). Lassen and Serritzlew (2011) reason that small political units breed sentiments of
internal political efficacy among the citizenry and that enhanced efficacy explains increased participation.
Classic political unit size theories (Dahl and Tufte, 1973) and rational choice theories of voting support
these ideas (Downs, 1957). From the logic presented in Downs’s (1957) seminal work, it follows that insofar
as smaller political units increase the likelihood that any individual voter will be the pivotal voter, voters
residing in smaller political jurisdictions will be more likely to perceive their vote as relevant and to express
enthusiasm about participating politically (Downs, 1957). Logically, these sentiments of efficacy would
influence participation in elections, one of the most integral forms of political participation in democratic
governments.
Aside from but related to the purported political benefits of small political units, economists argue
that smaller entities enable the provision of public services that can be tailored to meet the needs of local
communities and/or that citizens strategically locate themselves in communities offering optimal tax-service
packages (Oates, 1972; Blom and Serritzlew, 2014; Tiebout, 1956; Alesina and Spolaore, 2005).
Those promoting larger political units generally posit that larger units exhibit greater system capacity to
provide public goods and services, adequate media coverage of local politics (which facilitates accountability),
and security advantages. Proponents of this camp claim that larger political units have more organizational
activity and foster attractive community groups, interest organizations, and political parties (Dahl and
Tufte, 1973; Blom and Serritzlew, 2014; Charron, Fernández-Albertos and Lapuente, 2012). Economists
supplement these political rationales with arguments that larger political units are desirable due to their
greater system capacity and, relatedly, their abilities to capitalize on economies of scale and to cheaply
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and efficiently provide public goods and services (Lassen and Serritzlew, 2011; Alesina and Spolaore, 2005;
Charron, Fernández-Albertos and Lapuente, 2012). Specifically, they posit that increasing scale allows for
specialization, an improved division of labor, fixed costs to be widely distributed, and negative spillovers
(Allers and Geertsema, 2016).
Proponents both of small and of large political units make compelling arguments in favor of their re-
spective positions. Ultimately, countries’ vantage points with respect to the size of political jurisdictions
within their borders may reflect levels of stability as well as political and/or economic priorities. Given stark
differences in these areas across countries at different levels of democratic and economic development, it is
unsurprising that developed and developing countries have adopted different approaches to local political
unit size. In recent years, many developing countries have encouraged or allowed for the fragmentation of
subnational political units, and many developed countries have promoted or allowed for the amalgamation,
annexation, or merging of subnational units. Insofar as fragmentation promotes concentrated, short-term
political victories, clarifies the attribution of responsibility, and cultivates support for fledgling political sys-
tems - all of which are, presumably, political priorities of developing countries - and amalgamation facilitates
the undertaking of risky projects with potentially high rewards - which is, presumably, a political priority
of developed countries - it is prudent to observe these patterns. Both forms of territorial restructuring have
afforded scholars opportunities to assess the theoretical expectations of political unit size. In what follows,
I review the scant accumulation of literature addressing the effects of recent subnational fragmentation and
amalgamation efforts and discuss the implications of insights generated from these research agendas for
understandings of the effects of political unit size and decentralization.
2.1.2 Subnational Fragmentation as a Testing Ground: What We Know
About the Consequences
Local political restructuring has afforded scholars unique opportunities to assess the effects of the size
of political units, but data limitations and methodological obstacles have made these studies challenging.
In his review of the subnational fragmentation literature, Pierskalla (2016a) identifies the most pressing
challenges as non-random assignment of fragmenting units, unclear direction on how to construct units post-
restructuring in order to make comparisons to pre-restructuring units (i.e. whether to compare the newly
created ‘child’ unit to the newly created ‘parent’ unit or to the old aggregate unit comprising both the new
‘parent’ and ‘child’ components), minimal transparency, and insufficient data at the desired level of analysis.
Nonetheless, some scholars have worked around data limitations and methodological challenges to the
best of their abilities and have provided preliminary insights into the effects of subnational fragmentation.
13
The majority of these contributions have worked to shed light on the effects of subnational fragmentation
on the provision of public goods and services and economic activity. In these assessments, scholars test
classic theoretical expectations of optimal political unit size that small governments can better provide
public goods that meet the unique needs of local communities than their larger counterparts. In addition
to directly assessing objective public goods outputs, some of these contributions seek to explain whether
fragmentation generates positive changes in more subjective measures of well-being that, presumably, stem
from enhanced public goods provision. To preview, the findings in this area are mixed.
Some scholars’ empirical analyses deduce that subnational fragmentation enhances the quality of provided
public goods, in line with theoretical expectations. From their border regression discontinuity assessment of
state splitting in India, Asher and Novosad (2015) conclude that fragmentation increases economic activity
and children’s educational attainment in the border regions of new Indian states. Wanderley (2008) also
finds that fragmentation generated positive outcomes in terms of public goods provision in the context of
Brazil. Specifically, his regression analyses suggest that municipality proliferation in the Brazilian state of
Minas Gerais notably improved income levels and life qualities of inhabitants of the new municipality (albeit
at the detriment of the municipality of origin). Favero (2004) also suggests that the post-fragmentation
life qualities of municipalities in the Brazilian state of São Paulo dramatically improved from their pre-
fragmentation levels and substantiates this claim with basic descriptive evidence.
Others, however, find that newly created political units suffer in the way of public goods provision
(Lewis, 2014; Kiwanuka, 2012; Mensah, Adamtey and Mohammed, 2015; Mattos and Ponczek, 2013; Lewis,
2017). Those comprising this group generally attribute poor public goods provision in light of subnational
fragmentation to recentralization under a guise of local political empowerment, weak local administrative
and management capacity, and/or blurred responsibilities of national and local governments. Some scholars
provide empirical evidence in support of these claims in their studies of subnational fragmentation in Uganda,
Ghana, Brazil, and Indonesia (Lewis, 2014; Kiwanuka, 2012; Mensah, Adamtey and Mohammed, 2015;
Mattos and Ponczek, 2013; Lewis, 2017).
It follows from Grossman and Lewis’s (2014) and Lewis’s (2014) interpretation of administrative unit
proliferation (a term synonymous with subnational fragmentation) in Uganda as a recentralization tactic1
that fragmentation would be unlikely to generate improvements in service provision (Lewis, 2014; Grossman
and Lewis, 2014). Kiwanuka’s (2012) research substantiates this expectation. He claims that subnational
fragmentation, while projecting a guise of local empowerment, allows the national government to shirk
1Lewis (2014) argues that administrative unit proliferation “allows for recentralization by reducing intergovernmental bar-
gaining power and administrative capacity of each subnational unit, as well as by substantially expanding both the reach of
the national executive’s patronage network and its ability to monitor emergent security threats on its periphery.”
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responsibilities in service provision. Specifically, Kiwanuka (2012) argues the following:
[T]he proliferation of subnational governments has only transferred and replicated, several-fold, the point
at which development inhibiting factors operate... Most of the newly created districts still find it difficult
to fulfill their duties of effective and efficient service delivery... They are not in a position to generate
adequate local revenue to supplement the central government transfers, due to limited revenue sources,
weak collection capacity and political interventions that counter effective mobilization and collection.
(Kiwanuka, 2012)
Through interviews conducted with high profile officers from the District Assembly and various decentral-
ized departments in the Asante Akim North District in Ghana, Mensah, Adamtey and Mohammed (2015)
determine that new Ghanian districts, like their counterparts in Uganda, are unable to live up to their
mandate of improving service provision. They, too, attribute this finding to inadequate human resources,
fiscal capacity, and poor management.
Mattos and Ponczek (2013) argue that the Brazilian experience resembles that of Uganda and Ghana.
In their work, Mattos and Ponczek (2013) empirically evaluate the effects of ‘municipality emancipations’
(other terminology used to describe subnational fragmentation) for public goods provision as well as for
social indicators. They use regression analyses to compare Brazilian municipalities that fragmented with
Brazilian municipalities that did not fragment and find that fragmentation negatively impacted proxies
of garbage collection, sewage, lighting, GDP per capita, municipality human development indices, years of
schooling, illiteracy rates, and municipality-level gini indices.2 They reason that the loss of economies of scale
accompanying subnational fragmentation may explain poor service delivery in the aftermath of territorial
restructuring.
In a recent article, Lewis (2017) studies the effects of local government proliferation in Indonesia on
education and infrastructure service access. He exploits plausibly exogenous timing of local fragmentation
in the country and, with difference-in-difference analyses, finds both that the creation of new governments
does not influence school enrollments and that it negatively affects water and sanitation access. Lewis (2017)
attributes these results to inadequate governance in the new districts.
Finally, in what is, to my knowledge, one of the few cross-national studies of subnational fragmentation,
Grossman, Pierskalla and Dean (2015) suggest that the relationship between subnational fragmentation
and public goods provision may not be linear. Using difference-in-difference assessments of micro-level, geo-
referenced data on health outcomes in Malawi, Nigeria, and Uganda, they investigate whether changes in the
number of existing top-tier regional government units impact public goods and service delivery (Grossman,
Pierskalla and Dean, 2015). Grossman, Pierskalla and Dean (2015) find that increasing the number of
jurisdictions should have an inverted U-shaped effect on quality of service provision and that there may be
2My forthcoming analysis builds upon this work by better accounting for differences across fragmenting and non-fragmenting
units, using more appropriate outcome indicators, and assessing longer and more disaggregated time periods.
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diminishing returns to fragmentation. This mixed conclusion is emblematic of the state of the field, more
broadly.
To summarize, the results of studies assessing the relationship between subnational fragmentation and
public goods provision are conflicting. Some studies suggest that subnational fragmentation positively im-
pacts the quality of public goods provision, and others suggest that subnational fragmentation negatively
impacts the quality of public goods provision. I interpret this as a signal that small political units gener-
ated by fragmentation, in and of themselves, are incapable of providing high quality public goods. Rather,
in order for small political units to produce high quality public goods that speak to the unique needs of
local communities, they need to also exhibit adequate state capacity and sufficient administrative reach. If
fragmentation enhances state capacity and entrenches administrative attention, in addition to reducing the
size of political units, it is reasonable to expect an improvement in public goods provision. However, insofar
as fragmentation reduces the size of political units without simultaneously empowering them, it is illogical
to expect public goods provision to improve. In this dissertation, I further probe the relationship between
subnational fragmentation and public goods provision and consider whether and how state capacity and
administrative attention are influenced by the territorial restructuring.
Moreover, I consider that the relationship between political unit size and public goods provision may
be elastic. Manipulating the size of subnational units may not instantaneously generate improvements
or declines in public goods provision. Rather, changes in the quality or quantity of public goods in the
aftermath of territorial restructuring may require time. This caveat may help to reconcile some of the
described heterogeneous findings. In this dissertation, I study subnational fragmentation in late-twentieth
century Brazil. The passage of several decades since the most prominent waves of fragmentation in the
country allows me to disentangle dynamic temporal effects of the relationship between political unit size and
public goods provision.
While much work on the effects of subnational fragmentation has focused on implications of territorial
restructuring for public goods provision, some scholars have begun to study other related effects including,
but not limited to, per capita expenditures, deforestation, ethnic polarization, and conflict. Some work on
the fiscal consequences of subnational fragmentation suggests that fragmentation may increase per capita
expenditures; this implies that any observed benefits in service delivery, to the extent that they exist, may
be costly. Through comparing the experiences of fragmenting and non-fragmenting municipalities in Brazil,
de Andrade Lima and Neto (2015) and Mattos and Ponczek (2013) deduce that the proliferation of Brazilian
municipalities generated losses in economies of scale and higher per capita expenditures. Though a World
Bank Report finds that subnational fragmentation in Uganda had not, at the time of the writing, had any
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major adverse effects on public finances, it suggests that there are compelling reasons to suspect that the
proliferation of districts may prove to be a financial drain in the future (Bank, 2013).
Aside from speculating about and assessing the fiscal effects of fragmentation, some recent contributions
have begun to learn about other downstream consequences of territorial restructuring. For example, Burgess
et al. (2012) use fixed-effects Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood count models estimated with a novel
satellite-based dataset to study the effects of the proliferation of districts in Indonesia on deforestation
(Burgess et al., 2012). They find that district proliferation contributed to increasing deforestation (Burgess
et al., 2012). More precisely, they find that the annual rate of deforestation increases by 3.85% with the
addition of one district within a province. Additionally, Bazzi, Gudgeon et al. (2015) exploit the exogenous
timing of new district creation in Indonesia to study the effects of territorial restructuring on violent conflict
with difference-in-difference models. They claim that district proliferation can serve as a vehicle to reduce
conflict insofar as district proliferation generates more ethnically homogenous societies. However, if territorial
restructuring furthers ethnic heterogeneity, the effects on violent conflict may be less desirable.
In closing, research on the consequences of subnational fragmentation remains in its infancy, and many
studies on this topic assess the effects of subnational fragmentation on public goods provision. This research
agenda has produced mixed findings which, I propose, may be reconciled when heterogeneous effects are
considered. Specifically, subnational fragmentation may enhance the quality of public goods when the re-
duction in size of the political unit is accompanied by enhanced state capacity and entrenched administrative
attention. To my knowledge, this caveat remains to be rigorously tested.
Beyond public goods provision, recent research has considered other effects of subnational fragmentation
including per capita expenditures, deforestation, and ethnic polarization and conflict. These studies deduce
that fragmentation may generate higher per capita expenditures, increase deforestation, and reduce conflict.
Studies of subnational amalgamation further weigh in on the relationship between political unit size and per
capita expenditures, for example. These studies largely support the results derived from the related studies
of subnational fragmentation. They find that subnational amalgamation reduces per capita expenditures and
administrative costs. Additionally, studies of subnational amalgamation profitably extend our understanding
of the effects of political unit size to the realm of political participation - an outcome which, like tailored
public goods provision, is expected to improve as the size of the political unit in which voters reside is
reduced. To preview, this research finds that subnational amalgamation or merging weakens participatory
sentiments. In what follows, I introduce the phenomenon of subnational amalgamation and briefly review
the knowledge accumulated from the phenomenon about the effects of political unit size.
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2.1.3 Subnational Amalgamation as a Testing Ground: What We Know
About the Consequences
In recent years, many developed countries have promoted the creation of larger and fewer local gov-
ernments through encouraging district amalgamation, annexation, and/or merging. For instance, Belgium
consolidated the number of its municipalities from 2,359 to 596 in 1977; New Zealand reduced the number
of its local government units from 230 to 74 in 1989; and Denmark amalgamated 270 municipalities into 98
new municipalities as a part of the Danish administrative reform of 2007. While each of the aforementioned
examples of amalgamation were compulsory, voluntary amalgamation has also manifested in England, for
example, with the publication of the 2006 Local Government White Paper for England.
This restructuring and amalgamation of local political units in the developed world is generally under-
stood to be motivated by concerns with productive efficiency, scale, spending, and management costs and
efforts to exploit economies of scale (Hansen, Houlberg and Pedersen, 2014; Hanes, 2015; Teles, 2016; Allers
and Geertsema, 2016; Bruno, Genovese and Piccolo, 2017).3 These motivations have been made explicit
in conversations surrounding provincial merging in Italy (Bruno, Genovese and Piccolo, 2017), municipal
amalgamations in Denmark (Hansen, Houlberg and Pedersen, 2014), and municipal consolidation in the
Netherlands (Allers and Geertsema, 2016) and clearly map onto theoretical expectations about the benefits
of large, as compared with small, political units.
However, empirical studies assessing the effects of political unit size and the realization of theoretically-
grounded expectations of large political units in the aftermath of amalgamation are still in their infancy.
Hansen, Houlberg and Pedersen (2014) substantiate this position, stating “improved fiscal management is a
frequent justification for promoting boundary consolidations. However, whether or not this is actually the
case is rarely placed under rigorous empirical scrutiny” (Hansen, Houlberg and Pedersen, 2014).
Although much of the extant work on the effects of amalgamation relies integrally on case studies and
descriptive inferences,4 some scholars have started to leverage recent reforms to local governments that yield
experimental-like conditions to make causal claims about the effects of amalgamation, annexation, and/or
merging. These reforms have provided scholars with opportunities to address non-random assignment of the
territorial redistricting of some subnational units and to come as close to random assignment as possible in its
absence. Specifically, they study the effects of consolidation on administrative spending, tax revenue, service
provision, efficiency, and political behavior. This subset of scholars convincingly claim that their econometric
analyses overcome endogeneity concerns that limit the rigor of descriptive work. In what follows, I briefly
3Though countries in the developing world likely also share these goals, they may privilege short-term and/or more man-
ageable projects that yield quick, identifiable political victories.
4See Holzer et al. (2009) and Fox (2006) for a review of some of these studies.
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review some of these recent contributions and put this research into conversation with the political unit size
and subnational fragmentation literatures.
Blom and Serritzlew (2014) exploit a 2007 reform of Danish municipalities, the Structural Reform (SR),
that merged some previously existing municipalities into new, larger political units5 to study whether in-
creasing the size of political units yields expected benefits in economies of scale. Using the quasi-experiment
afforded by the reform, Blom and Serritzlew (2014) estimate difference-in-difference analyses and, from
their results, learn that scale effects are considerable. They find that amalgamation contributes to signif-
icant reductions in administrative costs; they calculate that over the course of four years, amalgamated
Danish municipalities were able to save 10.4% of the funds that they would have needed to spend on ad-
ministrative costs had they not amalgamated (Blom and Serritzlew, 2014). Reingewertz (2012) also uses
difference-in-difference analyses to study the relationship between amalgamation and municipal expenditures
and considers the context of Israel. He, too, uncovers a negative relationship between amalgamation and
municipal expenditures; Reingewertz (2012) finds that amalgamations in Israel decreased municipal expen-
ditures by approximately 9%. Leveraging local political amalgamations in the Netherlands and Sweden,
Allers and Geertsema (2016) and Hanes (2015), respectively, substantiate these findings that amalgamation
reduces administrative spending.6 Overall, these studies find that large political units created as a product
of amalgamation or merging minimize local government spending.
There are, however, several exceptions to this prevailing belief. Through examining the effects of munic-
ipal mergers in Finland on municipal expenditures with matching, Moisio and Uusitalo (2013) deduce that,
outside the area of general administration, municipal mergers actually increased local government spending.
They posit that increased expenditures are not a result of transactional costs accompanying mergers but
are, in fact, a product of local government consolidation itself. In addition, Allers and Geertsema (2016)
find that amalgamation did not reduce aggregate spending. Moreover, they find that it did not improve
taxation nor enhance the provision of public services (Allers and Geertsema, 2016).
Barring these anomalies, research on the effects of subnational amalgamations in the developed world
generally finds that amalgamation reduces local government spending. This corroborates the finding from the
subnational fragmentation literature that smaller political units increase spending per capita and generate
spending inefficiencies and confirms theoretical expectations. Other related research finds that amalgamation
does not translate into improvements in tax collection or in the provision of public services. This latter
finding, again, substantiates theoretical expectations from the optimal political unit size literature. Future
5Municipality population size informed merging.
6Hanes (2015), however, adds a caveat to this statement, claiming that this uncovered relationship persists as long as
amalgamated Swedish municipalities did not exceed a critical size.
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work would benefit from further probing these relationships.
In addition to fiscal outcomes, research on subnational amalgamation has also considered the political be-
havioral effects of territorial restructuring. The knowledge generated on this front suggests that the positive
effects of subnational amalgamation on government spending may come at the cost of normatively-desirable
democratic attitudes and participatory practices. Lassen and Serritzlew (2011) exploit the Danish Structural
Reform (SR) to study political behavior, as opposed to fiscal, outcomes. Specifically, they study the effect
of the size of political units on internal political efficacy. Surveys soliciting public opinion make compar-
isons of sentiments of political efficacy pre- and post-merging across merging and non-merging municipalities
possible. Using difference-in-difference analyses and matching estimators, they find that there is a causal,
negative relationship between the size of political units and expressions of Danish citizens’ internal political
efficacy. Similarly, Hansen (2015) leverages recent municipality mergers in Denmark to study the effect of
local government size on citizen political satisfaction. Also using a difference-in-difference approach, he finds
that larger local governments reduce citizen satisfaction with both the input and output side of local govern-
ment (Hansen, 2015). To the extent that these attitudes and participation are related (as Campbell et al.
(1966); Miller and Miller (1975); Abramson and Aldrich (1982); and Karp and Banducci (2008) suggest),
these studies suggest that larger political units may have deleterious consequences for participation.
Overall, studies assessing the relationship between political unit size and political attitudes find that large
political units generated by subnational amalgamation or merging weaken political participatory sentiments.
Put differently, smaller political units (i.e. units unaffected by amalgamation or merging) invoke stronger
political participatory sentiments. To my knowledge, it remains to be tested whether reducing the size
of political units through fragmentation, for example, further enhances democratic and/or participatory
attitudes.
While preliminary evidence on the relationship between political unit size and political participation
confirms theoretical expectations of the optimal political unit size literature (i.e. small political units invoke
stronger participatory sentiments), it is plausible that this relationship may not be universal. As with the
relationship between political unit size and public goods provision, it is reasonable to think that manipulating
the size of the political unit in and of itself may be insufficient to enhance participatory sentiments. In new
democracies, for example, it may be illogical to expect that changing the size of the political unit, alone, would
activate democratic sentiments. Rather, political mobilization and engagement may need to accompany the
reduction in political unit size in order for fragmentation to produce expected effects. In this dissertation,
I extend studies of the relationship between political unit size and participation to consider subnational
fragmentation. In this endeavor, I consider whether size, alone or paired with political mobilization, can
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effectuate expected changes.
In conclusion, developed countries have recently enacted a series of reforms to amalgamate, merge, or an-
nex existing subnational units. These reforms were often motivated by beliefs that this restructuring of local
units would enable countries to better capitalize on economies of scale, for example. A fledgling literature
has emerged that uses econometrics techniques to assess whether the motivations underlying restructuring
reforms were realized in the aftermath of amalgamation. Many studies addressing this relationship find that
large political units generated by subnational amalgamation reduce local government expenditures. How-
ever, other studies find that the reduction in spending accompanying amalgamation may come at a political
cost; specifically, the merging of local political units may weaken sentiments of political efficacy and trust
in local governments. Though the latter results bode well for small political units created as a product of
fragmentation in developing countries, they remain to be rigorously assessed.
2.1.4 Decentralization, Political Unit Size, and Local Political Restructuring:
A Summary and Outline of Expectations to be Tested
Since the late-twentieth century, developing countries have increasingly adopted decentralized forms
of governance under the presumption that devolving political, administrative, and/or fiscal power would
facilitate political and economic objectives. Many studies have considered whether decentralization actually
generated expected outcomes, and the results of these studies are mixed. I argue that this is, in part, because
decentralization is multi-faceted. Not only are there disparate forms of decentralization that may produce
varied outputs but decentralization both redistributes political, administrative, and/or fiscal power across
levels of government and reduces the size of empowered subnational units. It is unclear which of these facets
or whether both of these facets combined are expected to bring about anticipated improvements in political
participation and public goods provision, for example. In this dissertation, I study whether the facet of
decentralization that reduces the size of the political unit contributes to improvements in these two areas.
The literature on optimal political unit size suggests that smaller political units ought to enhance political
participation (and, relatedly, political participatory sentiments) and to provide higher quality public goods
and services that reflect specific community needs. Local political redistricting in the forms of subnational
fragmentation and amalgamation provides unique comparison units to uncover whether the theoretically-
anticipated effects of large and small political units for political participation and public goods provision are
borne out. In recent years, scholars have started to leverage these local redistricting initiatives to understand
their implications for political participation and public goods provision.
Studies of subnational amalgamation provide preliminary evidence that large political units created as
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a result of subnational amalgamation weaken political participatory sentiments including political efficacy
and satisfaction. These results imply that small political units empowered through decentralization or
created as a result of subnational fragmentation would strengthen political attitudinal sentiments. However,
generalizing from this result and making inferences about the relationship between political unit size and
political attitudes in dissimilar contexts may be inappropriate. It may be the case that political unit size,
in and of itself, is insufficient in influencing political participatory attitudes. For example, in developing
countries with fledgling political institutions, it may illogical to expect a mere reduction in political unit
size to stimulate participation in the political system. Though reducing the size of the political unit may
bring governments closer to constituents and increase the prospects for oversight and accountability in these
contexts, unless voters understand and are mobilized to participate in the system, local redistricting may
not catalyze political change. I test this expectation in my study of subnational fragmentation and political
participation in Chapter 5.
In my attempt to reconcile the subnational fragmentation literature’s disparate findings regarding the
relationship between political unit size and the quality of public goods provision, I also speculate that a
reduction in the size of political units may, in and of itself, be insufficient in generating expected improvements
in public goods provision. Rather, reductions in political unit size may need to be accompanied by additional
transformations that make it possible for political units to better deliver public goods. In Chapter 6, I
introduce a new study of subnational fragmentation and the quality of public goods provision and consider
that this relationship may be moderated by transformations in state capacity and administrative attention
that accompany fragmentation.
As fragmentation is not randomly assigned, testing the aforementioned hypotheses empirically neces-
sitates an in-depth understanding of the causes of subnational fragmentation. Insofar as the causes are
adequately understood and accounted for in studies of the effects of fragmentation, reliable results can be
obtained. In what follows, I review the knowledge accumulated on this topic, speculate about the general-
izability of identified causes, and introduce testable expectations.
2.2 Causes of Subnational Fragmentation
Major political and economic reforms imposed upon and undertaken by developing countries in the
late-twentieth century uprooted traditional means by which politicians acquired and/or retained political
power. In transitory political environments, politicians invited or allowed for subnational fragmentation as
a strategy to enhance their political power while, simultaneously, projecting a façade of compliance with
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the international community’s demands to decentralize and transfer power to local governments (Grossman
and Lewis, 2014). Aside from documenting the multiplication of subnational units in developing countries
(including, but not limited to, Kenya, Ghana, Uganda, Brazil, Indonesia, and Vietnam), the bulk of the
literature on subnational fragmentation seeks to explain its underlying catalysts. Through this work, several
explanations have emerged.
The most common explanation relates to incumbent political power-seeking (Green, 2008, 2010; Pier-
skalla, 2014; Ayee, 2012; Grossman and Lewis, 2014; Hassan, 2016; Dahlby, 2011; Magalhães, 2007; Ribeiro
and Pinto, 2009; Hassan and Sheely, 2016). Scholars posit that incumbent politicians presiding over territo-
rial rearrangements pursue subnational fragmentation as a vehicle to give them political advantages that, in
turn, help to entrench their political power. Specifically, many point to the increased opportunities for the
provision of patronage afforded by subnational fragmentation as a motivation for territorial restructuring.
Insofar as fragmentation provides political elites with access to monetary resources, chances to sell valuable
licenses, and opportunities to hand out highly sought after jobs in the bureaucracy to political supporters
(Pierskalla, 2014), it serves to benefit incumbent politicians.7
Aside from patronage opportunities, some scholars point to fragmentation as vehicle to address grievances
from minority groups or peripheral districts. Grossman and Lewis (2014) argues that decentralization reforms
implemented in the late-twentieth century increased the value of local government units and, consequently,
contributed to heightened sentiments of marginalization among citizens living in peripheral areas of local
governments. Grossman and Lewis (2014) posit that citizens’ sentiments of marginalization, accompanied
by elites in marginalized areas who seek job opportunities and greater control of public resources and by
an electoral support-seeking national executive, drive subnational fragmentation and use random intercept
multi-level models to provide supporting evidence that these factors explain subnational fragmentation in the
case of Uganda. Fitrani et al.’s (2005) logistic regression results show a positive and statistically significant
relationship between large geographic areas and local government splits in Indonesia and lend further support
to these claims (Fitrani, Hofman and Kaiser, 2005).
Hassan (2016) extends the conceptualization of aggrieved groups beyond outlying peripheral regions to
indigenous local ethnic minorities. Hassan (2016) argues that in electorally-competitive contexts, such as
Kenya, subnational fragmentation is costly. Thus, political leaders, specifically the national executive in the
Kenyan case, need to be calculating in deciding which political units to fragment and create. Hassan (2016)
7With respect to the Kenyan case, Hassan and Sheely (2016) argues that the president benefits politically from fragmentation,
even if fragmentation is not accompanied by increased fiscal flows, due to a complex interweaving of neopatrimonial relations.
Elsewhere Hassan (2016) claims that district creation, in and of itself, is a distinct form of patronage and that voters in newly
created districts were “free” and “should thus reward Moi electorally, the patron who first granted them a district” (Hassan
2016, 515).
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posits that ethnicity serves to guide decisions about which subnational units to fragment and empirically
demonstrates that fragmentation in Kenya is undertaken as a political strategy to symbolically attend to and
capture the political support of politically-unaligned local ethnic minority groups. Insofar as fragmentation
addresses administrative grievances and appeases minority populations, it can clearly serve as a vehicle for
entrenching incumbents’ political prospects.
Others claim that the prospect of acquiring increased access to rents from the federal government spurs
fragmentation (Dahlby, 2011; Magalhães, 2007; Ribeiro and Pinto, 2009). It is well understood that local
governments in developing countries rely heavily on financing from the national government. If intergov-
ernmental transfer formulas disproportionately benefit small local governments, local elites may pursue
subnational fragmentation in an effort to increase their access to government rents (Fitrani, Hofman and
Kaiser, 2005; Magalhães, 2007; Ribeiro and Pinto, 2009; Dahlby, 2011; Mattos and Ponczek, 2013; Pierskalla,
2016b,a). The structure of the intergovernmental transfer system in the Brazilian case, for example, gener-
ates such incentives, leading Mattos and Ponczek (2013) to claim: “the separation decision may be directly
linked to the attempt to increase, per capita, the provisions of public services offered to the population”
(Mattos and Ponczek, 2013).8 Politicians expect increased rents for local governments will help them to
garner the electoral support of constituents, thereby entrenching their political support. Though intuitively
plausible and supported, in some counts, by qualitative evidence, quantitative evidence downplays its rele-
vance (Fitrani, Hofman and Kaiser, 2005; Pierskalla, 2016b). Further research is needed to better understand
the relationship between anticipated fiscal spoils and subnational fragmentation.
Malesky (2009) understands subnational fragmentation as a strategy promoted by incumbent politicians
to thwart their political opponents. In the case of Vietnam, he argues that national legislators encouraged
subnational fragmentation initiatives with the goals of dividing provinces dominated by their political oppo-
nents and disturbing the existing political equilibrium (Pierskalla, 2016a; Malesky, 2009). Given the integral
resemblances between subnational fragmentation and both redistricting and gerrymandering, this purported
underlying motivation is of little surprise.
Although many attribute subnational fragmentation to political-power seeking motives, some have high-
lighted the relevance of strong local economic activity in stimulating territorial restructuring. The ratio-
nale underlying the relevance of strong local economic activity is that municipal districts with strong local
economies are not reliant on the municipalities in which they reside for subsistence and can afford to ex-
ist on their own. In the Brazilian case, interviews have lent support to this explanation. Approximately
23.6% of mayors interviewed in Bremaeker’s (1993) surveys of new Brazilian municipalities created as a
8The Portuguese translation is as follows: “a decisão de separação pode estar diretamente ligada á tentativa de aumentar,
de maneira per capita, as provisões dos serviços públicos oferecidos a esta população.”
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product of fragmentation attributed municipal emancipation to the existence of strong local economic ac-
tivity, and Noronha’s (1996) interviews of local populations in seventeen recently created municipalities in
Rio de Janeiro also suggested that strong local economic conditions played an important role in motivating
fragmentation in six out of seventeen interviewed municipalities (Noronha, 1996). Cigolini et al. (1999), too,
found that local economic conditions served as the principal motivation for the creation of twenty-two new
municipalities in the Brazilian state of Paraná in the 1990s.
Other scholars suggest that fragmentation is pursued in an attempt to indulge the different preferences
of community residents (Brink, 2004). Pierskalla (2016a) determines that ethnic and religious fragmentation
- which could contribute both to minority grievance and disparate preference explanations - play an integral
role in motivating district proliferation in the context of Indonesia.
Although not directly responsible for motivating subnational fragmentation, some scholars have recog-
nized that features of coalitional politics (Kimura, 2013; Tomio, 2002, 2005) and institutional permissiveness
(Tomio, 2002, 2005; Cigolini and Cachatori, 2011) are instrumental in determining the stock of subnational
units eligible for fragmentation. For example, Kimura (2013) argues that local civil society organizations,
local-level political elites, provincial-level political elites, national-level political elites, political parties, and
different state institutions (military and national-level ministries) all influence territorial change in Indonesia.
The extent to which these various actors collaborate and cooperate influences the likelihood of fragmenta-
tion. Tomio (2002, 2005) suggests that negotiations between political actors (e.g. between state assemblies
and governors, local leaders and assemblies, local leaders and governors) also help to determine the stock of
municipalities eligible for fragmentation in Brazil. Specifically, Tomio (2002, 2005) asserts that the nature
of the coalition in Brazilian state assemblies (e.g. whether the coalition is a majority and strong, a majority
and weak, or a minority) conditions cross-level political interactions and, consequently, the probability of
fragmentation. In essence, studies in both Indonesia and Brazil highlight the relevance of coalition types
and political alignments and assert that strong linkages influence fragmentation outcomes.
With respect to institutional permissiveness, some scholars claim that the nature and permissivity of
institutions governing fragmentation play an important role in explaining subnational fragmentation. Tomio
(2002, 2005) and Cigolini and Cachatori (2011) highlight the important role played by the permissive-
ness/restrictiveness of institutions dictating fragmentation processes. Intuitively, they posit that more per-
missive institutions facilitate fragmentation whereas more restrictive institutions hinder it. The permissivity
of institutions governing fragmentation may manifest in a variety of forms, but these are generally constituted
in requisites pertaining to the stock of subnational units that can fragment (and may include guidelines on
the number of voters, households, administrative structures, income, etc. of the newly proposed subnational
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unit).
In sum, scholars have identified a number of motivations underlying subnational fragmentation in de-
veloping countries as well as several characteristics that affect the propensity of restructuring. The most
commonly cited motivations underlying subnational fragmentation pertain to incumbent political power-
seeking. Although, as this review suggests, there are a number of mechanisms through which fragmentation
and political power may be related. The precise mechanisms as well as motivations, themselves, may vary as
a function of the country in which fragmentation is studied and of the specific institutions and actors presid-
ing over fragmentation. Thus, while it may be impractical to expect the uncovered causes of fragmentation
to be universally generalizable, there is notable room for advances in leveraging within-country differences
in fragmentation rules and institutions to come closer to isolating the true causes underlying fragmentation
and in theorizing about when and where uncovered explanations of subnational fragmentation ought to
generalize, in broad forms.
In this dissertation, I use my detailed knowledge of the process of subnational fragmentation and the
institutions governing subnational fragmentation in Brazil, as detailed in Chapter 3, to move beyond studying
the motivations of subnational fragmentation to isolate the factors that allow for fragmentation motivations
to actually translate into territorial restructuring. Although I expect that political power-seeking motivations
undoubtedly underlie subnational fragmentation in Brazil, I hypothesize that these become relevant to
fragmentation in the country mainly after municipal districts exhibit desires to fragment. Put simply, I expect
that administrative grievances experienced by peripheral municipal districts supplement political incentives
in cultivating local desires for fragmentation and that political alignments, subsequently, adjudicate the
extent to which motivated municipal districts will entrench incumbent political power. I anticipate that
municipal districts that are expected to deliver in aggrieved areas and entrench incumbent political power
in the event of fragmentation are permitted to fragment; by contrast, I imagine that municipal districts
that are not expected to deliver in aggrieved areas nor entrench incumbent political power in the event of
fragmentation are prevented from fragmenting. I detail these expectations in greater detail in the forthcoming
chapters and explicitly test them in Chapter 4.
2.3 Conclusion
Decentralization has radically reshaped local politics across the developing world since the late-twentieth
century, and as it has taken root, many scholars have studied whether the devolution of political, fiscal,
and/or administrative power to local governments has brought about theoretically-anticipated changes in
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political participation and public goods provision, among other outcomes. In general, evidence on the
effectiveness of decentralization in bringing about improvements in the aforementioned areas has been mixed.
I posit that the dual facets of decentralization - the reorganization of political, administrative, and/or fiscal
power and the reduction in size of empowered units - contribute to confusion in our understanding of the
phenomenon and argue that studies of subnational fragmentation can help to adjudicate whether the specific
facet of decentralization that reduces the size of political units generates expected improvements in political
participation and public goods provision.
In this chapter, I reviewed the scant mixed evidence accumulated on the effects of subnational fragmenta-
tion on public goods provision and introduced hypotheses that I empirically assess in forthcoming chapters.
To reiterate, I expect that subnational fragmentation will generate tailored improvements in public goods
provision insofar as it is accompanied by increased administrative attention and heightened state capac-
ity. I suspect that the failure to account for the presence/absence of these conditions partially accounts
for disparate findings in the literature. Then, I introduced evidence generated by studies of subnational
amalgamation that increasing the size of local political units diminishes sentiments of political efficacy and
satisfaction. Relatedly, I anticipate that subnational fragmentation will enhance important attitudinal inputs
to political participation in developing countries but only if voters are sufficiently mobilized.
As discussed, testing these hypotheses requires me both to understand and to control for differences across
fragmenting and non-fragmenting units. Conventional theories of subnational fragmentation attribute subna-
tional fragmentation to political power-seeking initiatives. I expect that these efforts play an important, but
not solitary, role in explaining subnational fragmentation in Brazil. As outlined, I anticipate that grievances
define the stock of fragmentation-seeking municipal districts and that political alignments, subsequently,
determine which motivated municipal districts will, ultimately, be successful in fragmenting.
In the following chapters, I establish the necessary foundation to test the outlined hypotheses on the
causes and consequences of subnational fragmentation in Brazil. In the upcoming chapter, I describe the
process of subnational fragmentation in the country as well as the various institutions governing territorial
restructuring. This foundation contextualizes my primary hypotheses regarding the causes of subnational
fragmentation (to be empirically assessed in Chapter 4). The results from that chapter, then, help me to
design compelling studies of the effects of subnational fragmentation on political participation and public
goods provision in the studies that follow.
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Chapter 3
Subnational Fragmentation in Brazil:
An Overview of the History, Process,
and Institutions
3.1 A History and Evolution of Subnational Fragmentation in
Brazil
Brazil is the fifth-largest country in the world, both in terms of population and size, and is the seventh
largest economy by gross domestic product based on purchasing power parity (GDP PPP). After decades of
regime fluctuation and a lengthy mid-twentieth century military rule, Brazil initiated a transition to democ-
racy in 1985. Since the inauguration of the country’s 1988 Constitution, Brazil has remained democratic. It
is presently comprised of twenty-six states, one federal district, and 5,570 municipalities (Lima, 2002). Each
of these are federative units. For administrative purposes, several sub-municipal units exist; these include
the city, the districts, the town, the subdistrict, the neighborhood, and sectors (Lima, 2002).1 However,
according to Brazil’s 1988 Constitution, the municipality is the smallest federal entity with political, admin-
istrative, and fiscal power. In line with trends permeating the developing world more broadly, the number
of Brazilian municipalities has dramatically increased throughout the twentieth century.
Though municipalities have existed as autonomous political units in almost all of the Brazilian Republic’s
constitutions, municipal fragmentation did not emerge with rigor until the 1930’s. Subnational fragmentation
was further set in motion with the adoption of Brazil’s 1946 Constitution, known to some as the ‘municipal
constitution’ - the constituição municipalista - due to it’s amplification of the political and financial power of
Brazilian municipalities. Many understand this added power to have incentivized the creation of additional
Brazilian municipalities in the decades that followed. Scholars attribute the subnational fragmentation of
this mid-twentieth century period to efforts undertaken to appropriate the country’s frontier states and to
secure national borders (Magalhães, 2007). States maintained almost exclusive autonomy over territorial
changes within their borders during this first prominent wave of fragmentations (Filho, N.d.). Thus, frag-
mentation experiences and patterns diverged both as a product of inter-state variation in institutions and
1In forthcoming chapters, I use available information at the administrative district level to study the causes and consequences
of subnational fragmentation. I refer to these administrative districts as municipal districts to reinforce their sub-municipal
status.
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in fragmentation prerequisites (Tomio, 2002). Overall, thousands of municipalities were created during the
mid-twentieth century.
This first, state-controlled surge of fragmentations was stymied during the subsequent dictatorship, during
which state autonomy over municipal fragmentations was reduced and concentrated in the military regime.
Although the military regime did not directly prohibit fragmentations, it encumbered them in provisions
outlined in Brazil’s 1967 Constitution and Complementary Law 1 of 1967. Consequently, many subnational
boundaries remained stationary during the 1964-1985 military dictatorship, and local democratic politics
did not reemerge on the political scene until the country’s 1985 political opening.2 In the accompanying
political opening, Brazil initiated a democratic regime transition.
Tomio (2002) describes Brazil’s transition to democracy in 1985 as a signal of its recommitment to
decentralization and municipality empowerment. The country’s decentralization restoration process and
transfer of political, administrative, and financial power to Brazilian municipalities commenced in the early
1980s and became viscerally entrenched in the 1988 Constitution (Tomio, 2005; Favero, 2004; Dahlby, 2011).
Constitutionally, Brazilian municipalities were charged with providing several public goods, services, and
works to their communities, and competitive local elections were re-introduced.
In spite of their political and legal autonomy, municipal governments remain(ed) closely tied to state and
federal governments, perhaps most visibly through their dependence on the state and federal governments
for financial support (Ribeiro and Pinto, 2009). According to the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics
Yearbook, Brazilian municipalities receive approximately $35 billion per year in transfers from the federal
government. While some of the transfers are earmarked to be spent in predetermined areas, mayors and
local legislators have sizable discretion in determining how to spend other allotted funds, and therefore,
according to Klein and Sakurai (2015), “in the eyes of local citizens, mayors hold the main responsibility for
the level and quality of local public services” (Klein and Sakurai, 2015). Put differently, while the funding
for municipality-provided public services may come from outside of the municipalities themselves, voters
hold municipal governments accountable for the use and spending of obtained funds on public services.
The onset of late-twentieth century democratization and accompanying municipality empowerment rein-
vigorated subnational fragmentation in Brazil (Magalhães, 2007). Since 1988, the number of Brazilian
municipalities has increased by more than 25%. In total, almost 1,000 Brazilian municipalities fragmented
since 1985 to produce what presently amounts to 5,570 municipalities. Each of these fragmentations re-
sulted in the creation of at least one brand new ‘child’ municipality from an extant municipal district and
one territorially reorganized ‘parent’ municipality.3 Approximately two-fifths of all present-day Brazilian
2Local elections took place in some Brazilian municipalities during the military rule.
3Subnational fragmentation transformed some municipal districts into municipalities (henceforth known as ‘child’ munici-
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municipalities were affected by fragmentation in some capacity. In total, the number of municipalities af-
fected by subnational fragmentation (comprised of municipalities that fragmented and municipalities that
were created as a product of fragmentation) since 1988 amounts to more than 2,000. The following figures
(Figure 3.1, Table ??, Figure 3.2, and Figure 3.3) break down fragmentation in Brazil’s current democratic
period both geographically and temporally.
Figure 3.1: Map of Brazilian Municipalities By Municipality Status
palities) and restructured municipalities that existed prior to fragmentation such that they no longer included the transformed
municipal districts (henceforth known as ‘parent’ municipalities).
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Table 3.1: Number of Municipalities Per State in 1988 and 2015







Distrito Federal 1 1
Esṕırito Santo 58 78
Goiás 184 246
Maranhão 136 217
Mato Grosso 82 141
Mato Grosso do Sul 65 79






Rio de Janeiro 66 92
Rio Grande do Norte 151 167
Rio Grando do Sul 244 497
Rondônia 18 52
Roraima 8 15
Santa Catarina 199 295
São Paulo 572 645
Sergipe 74 75
Tocantins - 139
Figure 3.2: Fragmentations Per Year By State
31
Figure 3.3: New Municipality Installations Per Year By State
All figures suggest that fragmentation radically altered the territorial landscape in Brazil in the late-
twentieth century and reveal important inter-region and inter-state variation in fragmentation experiences.
Figure 3.1 provides evidence that subnational fragmentation permeated local polities throughout the coun-
try’s territory. It partially corroborates Magalhaes’s (2007) claim that subnational fragmentation was spa-
tially concentrated in the South and Northeast regions of Brazil (Magalhães, 2007). However, it also suggests
that fragmentation permeated the interior of the country, especially the center-west region, to a greater de-
gree than Magalhães (2007) let on. Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 further substantiate this cartographical
observation.
Geographic patterns of fragmentation can be further disaggregated from the regional-level to the state-
level. It is worthy of note that no Brazilian state experienced a decrease in its number of municipalities in the
present democratic period.4 According to Table 3.1, most states have experienced fragmentation to varying
degrees in the present democratic period. Increases in the number of municipalities in some Brazilian states,
4Some Brazilian units that were elevated from municipal districts to municipalities were subsequently demoted back to
municipal districts due to disputes surrounding the legality of municipal creation. These disputes have since been resolved and
have resulted in the re-elevation of these municipal districts to municipality status.
32
such as Sergipe, were modest; the number of municipalities in Sergipe increased from 74 to 75, resulting
in 1.35% municipal growth. Increases in the number of municipalities in other Brazilian states, such as
Rondônia, were more striking; the number of municipalities in Rondônia increased from 18 to 52, equivalent
to 188.89% growth.
In addition to depicting the geographic patterns of late-twentieth century fragmentation, these figures
provide insight into the temporal dimension of fragmentation. Specifically, Figure 3.2 provides information
on the years in which municipalities were created as a product of fragmentation and formally recognized by
state law. It suggests that subnational fragmentation was clustered in several late-twentieth century waves.
These waves took place in municipality election years5 in the early years of the present democratic period
or in the years directly preceding local elections.6
Figure 3.3 provides information on the years in which newly created municipalities were formally installed.
In other words, this figure indicates the years in which local governments in newly created municipalities
are formally inaugurated. The clustering of municipality installation years is even more apparent than
the clustering of municipality creation years. The majority of municipalities created as a product of late-
twentieth century fragmentation were installed in the years directly following the first round of local elections
in the municipality. Thus, the majority of municipalities were installed in 1989, 1993, 1997, and 2001.
Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 suggest that the intense subnational fragmentation observed in Brazil’s present
democratic period was heavily concentrated in the years succeeding the democratic promulgation of 1988.
By the turn of the century, fragmentation decelerated significantly, and by the first and second decades of
the twenty-first century, it was largely extinct. Legal restrictions, which will be discussed in a forthcoming
section, provide compelling explanations for this observed stagnation of subnational fragmentation in later
years.
These figures provide evidence that subnational fragmentation permeated many Brazilian regions and
dramatically reorganized local polities in many of the country’s states. Additionally, they suggest that
fragmentation was concentrated in the early years of Brazil’s present democratic period and petered out
with the progression of time. However, they are uninformative on the characteristics that differentiate non-
fragmenting and fragmenting municipalities and, among fragmenting municipalities, parent and child units.
The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics’s decennial census provides information that makes it
possible to easily distinguish non-fragmenting, child, and parent municipalities on a host of characteristics
5When fragmentations occurred in election years, the negotiations and legal procedures surrounding fragmentation occurred
in the months leading up to local elections.
6The first local elections in the present democratic period occurred in 1988, and mayoral elections as well as elections for
local councilmen have subsequently taken place every four years (1992, 1996, 2000, etc.).
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in 1991, prior to the significant late-twentieth century proliferation of municipalities in Brazil,7 and in
2000, after the significant late-twentieth century proliferation of municipalities in Brazil. Summary statistics
organized by year and municipality type are presented below in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3.
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics By Municipality Type, 1991
Child No Fragmentation Parent
Population 12814.38 30852.46 39777.74
Geographic Area 737.82 1494.10 3531.81
Mun HDI 0.26 0.31 0.33
Proportion Literate 0.64 0.69 0.71
Average Years of School 2.43 3.13 3.39
Proportion Households Electricity 0.54 0.73 0.67
Proportion Households Garbage Collection 0.67 0.69 0.69
IDHM Income 0.51 0.56 0.57
Infant Mortality Per 1000 Born Alive 53.21 48.74 47.99
Proportion Extreme Poverty 0.40 0.31 0.31
Proportion Poverty 0.66 0.57 0.56
Proportion Population Urban 0.31 0.54 0.45
Proportion Life Expectancy to 60 0.67 0.69 0.69
Income Per Capita 95.84 127.74 135.52
Table 3.3: Summary Statistics By Municipality Type, 2000
Child No Fragmentation Parent
Population 8099.45 35142.82 38565.51
Geographic Area 1136.41 1467.58 2264.26
Municipality HDI 0.49 0.53 0.54
Proportion Literate 0.76 0.78 0.80
Average Years of School 3.46 4.13 4.34
Proportion Households Electricity 0.78 0.88 0.86
Proportion Households Garbage Collection 0.74 0.77 0.76
IDHM Income 0.57 0.61 0.62
Infant Mortality Per 1000 Born Alive 37.53 33.32 33.10
Proportion Extreme Poverty 0.30 0.24 0.24
Proportion Poverty 0.53 0.45 0.45
Proportion Population Urban 0.43 0.62 0.64
Proportion Life Expectancy to 60 0.74 0.77 0.76
Income Per Capita 140.67 175.43 187.04
Table 3.2 suggests that parent municipalities were larger, both geographically and in terms of population,
than non-fragmenting and child municipalities in 1991. Child municipalities were the smallest both geograph-
ically and in terms of population prior to fragmentation. In terms of a wide range of development indicators,
spanning from infant mortality rates to the proportion of households with garbage collection, parent munic-
ipalities and non-fragmenting municipalities closely resembled one another, and child municipalities lagged
behind both other municipality types. The difference between parent/non-fragmenting municipalities and
7It is important to note that information associated with child municipalities created after 1991 was retrospectively imputed.
It is unclear with what precision these imputations influenced information associated with parent municipalities.
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child municipalities is especially pronounced in the average years of school obtained. Of the municipality
types, non-fragmenting municipalities had the largest proportions of their populations living in urban areas,
followed by parent municipalities and then child municipalities, and parent municipalities were the wealthiest
in terms of income per capita, followed by non-fragmenting municipalities and then child municipalities.
In comparison with the summary statistics presented in Table 3.2, Table 3.3 indicates that both the
population and the geographic area declined in the aftermath of fragmentation, which ought to be expected
by definition. By contrast, population grew substantially in non-fragmenting municipalities over the course
of the decade. In between 1991 and 2000, all municipality types developed in terms of many of the indicators
considered. Although parent and non-fragmenting municipalities continued to outperform child municipali-
ties on development indicators, some indicators, such as infant mortality rates, suggest that this gap across
municipality types was less starkly apparent at the turn of the century.
The striking impact of subnational fragmentation on Brazil’s political landscape and availability of nu-
anced and relevant data, supplemented by unique country-specific features that permit more nuanced un-
derstandings of the phenomenon than features of fragmentation in other similarly exposed countries, makes
studying territorial restructuring in Brazil not only possible but also extremely pertinent. In the next sec-
tion, I justify the enhanced benefits of studying subnational fragmentation in Brazil, as compared with
other contexts, and describe the opportunities that a study of Brazilian subnational fragmentation affords
to introduce new evidence into the relationship between government size and both political participation
and public public goods provision.
3.2 Why Brazil?
Brazil is widely touted as one of the most decentralized countries in the world and is one of the few
countries in the developing world with nuanced subnational data not only at but also below the level of
the municipality. Despite these advantageous qualities for studying fragmentation, fragmentation in Brazil
is understudied by political scientists. This is surprising both in and of itself and because fragmentation
in Brazil differs in important ways from fragmentation elsewhere. There are two especially pronounced
differences across subnational fragmentation experiences in Brazil and in the rest of the developing world
that make extending the study of subnational fragmentation to the largely unchartered Brazilian context
valuable for isolating and understanding the true effects of fragmentation.
First, ethnic divisions - which are commonly understood to play an important role in directly or indi-
rectly motivating fragmentation in many developing countries outside of Brazil (see review in Chapter 2)
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- are largely inconsequential in motivating fragmentation in Brazil. Moving studies of subnational frag-
mentation to less ethnically-divisive contexts allows for a deeper understanding of the broader motivations
underlying subnational fragmentation (i.e. grievances, imbalances in the distribution of resources, etc.)
that can, but need not, manifest along ethnic lines. Moreover, whereas studies of subnational fragmenta-
tion in ethnically-divisive societies may confound the effects of fragmentation with the effects of partitioning
ethnically-heterogeneous local societies (insofar as ethnic divisions dictate the lines of fragmentation), studies
of subnational fragmentation in Brazil are not hampered in this way.
Second, subnational fragmentation in Brazil diverges as a function of the process through which frag-
mentation is realized. Whereas subnational fragmentation in much of the developing world outside of the
Brazilian context is often governed by the central government,8 subnational fragmentation in Brazil is ad-
ministered primarily by local and state actors. Moreover, subnational fragmentation in Brazil occurs by
way of a multi-stage process. Through an understanding of the dynamics at each stage surrounding the
fragmentation process, it is possible to differentiate between municipalities that pursued fragmentation and
municipalities that did not pursue fragmentation and between municipalities that fragmented and munici-
palities that did not fragment. This reduces the potential bias of treating the set of areas that fragmented
as if they are equal to the set of areas that requested fragmentation. Recognizing the differences between
these distinct groups and making comparisons across them allows for more reliable estimates of the effects
of fragmentation than other studies have derived to date.
In order to leverage this second unique facet of the Brazilian subnational fragmentation experience to
enhance our understandings of the causes and consequences of subnational fragmentation more broadly, it
is imperative to understand the multi-stage process by which late-twentieth century fragmentation occurred
in Brazil and the institutions and legal structures guiding it. In what follows, I, first, describe each of the
stages involved in the fragmentation process and identify the complex dynamics surrounding fragmentation
decisions. I, then, document and trace the evolution of federal guidelines for fragmentation (to which all
state-specific legislation is subject) and briefly review some state-specific laws. This background information
is critical to addressing the Why? and So what? questions that lie at the heart of this dissertation.
3.3 Stages of the Fragmentation Process in Brazil
Subnational fragmentation and municipality creation occur by way of a complicated, multi-stage process
involving multiple actors at different levels of government. The foundation of this process is largely uniform
8There are other contexts, such as the context of Indonesia, in which local actors also play a prominent role in fragmentation.
However, even in the case of Indonesia, the national parliament is the ultimate arbiter of fragmentation.
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throughout the country, but there are slight variations either in the process itself or in the logistics surround-
ing it across Brazilian states. In what follows, I introduce each of the stages involved in the subnational
fragmentation process in Brazil in chronological order, taking care to highlight procedures that may diverge
across states.
The process of subnational fragmentation is initiated from within Brazilian municipalities by political or
other leaders of municipal districts. The number of factors plausibly motivating municipal districts to pursue
subnational fragmentation is considerable, as described in Chapter 2. The most prominent motivations of
fragmentation involve political power seeking. In Chapter 4, I assess the extent to which these explanations
hold up in the context of Brazil and, in doing so, differentiate fragmenting and non-fragmenting municipal-
ities in Brazil on a series of important characteristics. For the present purpose of introducing the various
stages comprising the fragmentation process, suffice it to say that the minimal extant scholarship finds a
number of factors identified as relevant outside of the Brazilian context to be at play in explaining subna-
tional fragmentation in Brazil. The most commonly cited viewpoint is that Brazilian municipal districts
pursue subnational fragmentation in an attempt to obtain additional funding from the central government.
The structure of the intergovernmental transfer formula, which is designed to benefit municipalities with
small populations, transfers additional funds to municipality governments in the aftermath of fragmenta-
tion (Gomes, Dowell and Cristina, 2000; Magalhães, 2007; Mattos and Ponczek, 2013). Conversations with
Brazilian academics and politicians further substantiate this traditional viewpoint.9
Regardless of the precise factors motivating fragmentation, Brazilian municipal leaders interested in the
pursuit of fragmentation and the creation of their own municipalities are, first, required to form a frag-
mentation commission. Fragmentation commissions are generally comprised of a president, vice-president,
treasurer, secretary, fiscal council, and, sometimes, other members. These commissions serve as liaisons
between the state government and the citizens residing within the municipal district seeking fragmentation
and are responsible for soliciting local political support for fragmentation, compiling fragmentation proposals
that demonstrate that the fragmentation-seeking municipal district adheres to state-defined requisites for
fragmentation,10 and submitting constructed proposals to their respective state legislatures.
The effort required of municipal district leaders in this first stage of the fragmentation process is sub-
stantial. It requires canvassing, contacting and collaborating with bureaucratic officials to compile proof of
municipal districts’ capacities to function adequately as municipalities, and holding public events to discuss
fragmentation and strategy. Opportunity costs aside, however, there is little for local leaders to lose in
9Interviews conducted with Brazilian State Deputy Fred Costa, Municipal Director of Communications Josemil Rodrigues,
National Confederation of Municipalities Representative Eduardo Stranz, and others confirmed this underlying motivation.
10These requisites are discussed in general terms in the subsequent section on the institutional rules governing fragmentation.
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initiating fragmentation processes (Tomio, 2002). There are no repercussions for municipal districts if their
fragmentation proposals are subsequently vetoed (making fragmentation an impossibility). Thus, motivated
municipal districts that perceive themselves to be capable of meeting state-defined fragmentation requisites
are likely to engage in this first stage of the fragmentation process.
Second, state legislatures evaluate submitted fragmentation proposals to determine whether the infor-
mation outlined in the proposal is convincing of municipal districts’ abilities to exist independently as
municipalities. The specific requisites of municipality viability vary across states. However, these gener-
ally contain provisions relating to minimum geographic distances between the town centers of the existing
municipality and the proposed new municipality, a minimum number of voters and households under the
proposed territorial rearrangements, and sufficient revenue, tax collection, infrastructure, and consumption
in each of the municipalities’ component parts (i.e. the parts of the municipality that would make up the
‘parent’ and the ‘child’ municipalities in the event of fragmentation).
Prior to 1997, the collection of evidence demonstrating the satisfaction of each of these requisites was left
up to municipal district leaders and their interactions with independent assessment agencies or institutions.
However, in 1996, this exercise was streamlined and assigned to a permanent independent task force. Since
that time, state legislatures only accepted fragmentation-related information collected by this task force in
Municipality Viability Studies as permissible.11 Regardless of how the assessments were conducted or of who
conducted them, state legislatures were charged with evaluating collected evidence, determining municipal
districts’ propensities of ‘success’ as a municipality, and making a recommendation on whether municipal
districts’ proposals should proceed to the next stage of the fragmentation process in which fragmentation
plebiscites are held. In evaluating fragmentation proposals, state legislators take cues from political actors
who are more knowledgable about the anticipated effects of fragmentations and/or who hold strong opin-
ions on fragmentation and the potential to influence the career prospects of political power-seeking state
legislators.
If the state government determines that a municipal district is politically and economically capable of
existing as an independent municipality, it recommends that a plebiscite be held in the fragmentation-seeking
municipal district. The holding of a plebiscite is the third stage in the fragmentation process. Participation
in fragmentation plebiscites, like all forms of electoral participation in Brazil, is mandatory. In order for a
fragmentation plebiscite to pass, a majority of voters are required both to turn out and to vote in favor of
fragmentation. If both of these conditions are satisfied, the plebiscite passes, and the fragmentation proposal
proceeds to the subsequent stage in the fragmentation process. If one or both of these conditions are not
11The effects of this procedural transformation in evidence collection are unclear; however, anecdotally, some suggest that
the viability of municipal districts was, in general, presented more grimly in the aftermath of this change.
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met, the plebiscite fails and the fragmentation process, at least in the given period, is terminated.
As Tomio (2002) suggests, many Brazilian voters residing in fragmentation-pursuing municipal districts
favor fragmentation and, thus, vote in support of fragmentation in plebiscites on the subject. According to
Tomio (2002), out of the 610 plebiscites held in five Brazilian states (Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina,
São Paulo, Bahia, and Pernambuco) in the early years of the present democratic period, only nine failed
due to a lack of support among voters.12 My own research and investigation of plebiscite results in the most
municipality-dense Brazilian state, Minas Gerais, further substantiates Tomio’s (2002) findings. The vast
majority of fragmentation plebiscites in Minas Gerais passed with near unanimous support among voters.
Only a handful of fragmentation plebiscites in the state failed due to a lack of support among voters; more
commonly, plebiscites failed due to low turnout.13
Even when the electorate eligible to participate in fragmentation plebiscites was expanded in 1996 con-
stitutional amendments to also include voters in the part of the municipality that would become the ‘parent’
municipality in the event of fragmentation,14 Tomio (2002) argues that popular will for fragmentation re-
mained high among all voters participating in plebiscites. He claims that voters residing in both parts of
the municipality perceived fragmentation to be in their benefit.
If fragmentation plebiscites pass, proposals are returned to the state legislature for a vote. At this
fourth stage in the fragmentation process, the state legislature votes on whether to approve of an ordinary
law that defines the dismemberment of the municipality and the territorial limits of the new municipality.
Intuitively, the electoral costs of rejecting fragmentation proposals at this stage (after a majority of plebiscite-
participating voters express their support for fragmentation) may be extremely high, especially for certain
legislators. Therefore, it is unlikely that fragmentation proposals that were approved at each of the preceding
stages of the process will fail at this fourth stage. Instead, state legislators rubber stamp fragmentation
proposals at this stage in the fragmentation process. To my knowledge, no fragmentation proposals that
reached this fourth stage in the fragmentation process were denied.
After the state legislature writes fragmentation into ordinary law, the governor generally has an opportu-
nity to evaluate the proposed law and to make a judgement on whether to approve of the dismemberment of
the existing municipality and the creation of a brand new municipality. The governors’ decisions at this fifth
stage in the fragmentation process are likely shaped by considerations of how to maintain majorities in the
state legislature, pursue policies that reflect ideological goals, and pass other legislation on the agenda, etc.
12Tomio (2002) does not comment on plebiscite failures due to insufficient turnout.
13Without fragmentation plebiscite data from other states, it is impossible to know if the experience of Minas Gerais is
representative of the broader set of Brazilian states.
14Prior to 1996, only the fragmentation-seeking municipal district/the potential future ‘child’ municipality participated in
plebiscites regarding fragmentation.
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(Tomio, 2002). Any predispositions that governors may have toward municipality fragmentations are less
clear. On the one hand, it is plausible that fragmentation and the creation of additional municipalities may
impose financial costs on the state government. On the other, it is plausible that rejecting fragmentation
proposals and the creation of additional municipalities may effectuate electoral retaliation (especially given
that voters on whom governors rely for political support have already expressed their support for fragmen-
tation). To the extent that governors privilege electoral support from the subset of the electorate tied to
fragmentation, their hands are, to some extent, tied. This means that, like fourth stage of fragmentation, this
fifth stage is also symbolic. Again, to my knowledge, governors have never vetoed fragmentation legislation
at this fifth stage in the fragmentation process.
Finally, if fragmentation proposals pass all of the previous five stages, a new municipality is signed into
law and formally installed with the election of new mayors and members of the municipal council. This
stage is purely symbolic; no true decision regarding fragmentation is made in this stage.
In sum, there are six stages involved in the process of subnational fragmentation in Brazil. These
include fragmentation proposal initiation by municipal district leaders, proposal assessment and plebiscite
recommendation by state legislators, voter evaluation of fragmentation in plebiscites, rubber stamp approval
by state legislators, rubber stamp approval by governor, municipality-creation law enactment (accompanied
by municipality elections and formal municipal installation). Critical decision-making on and evaluation of
fragmentation proposals occurs only at the first three stages in the fragmentation process. The last three
stages serve merely as symbolic stages in which fragmentation proposals that were approved in the first three
stages are formally signed off on. Figure 3.4 summarizes these stages.
Figure 3.4: Brazil’s Fragmentation Process
Proposal Submitted
State Leg. Rejects State Leg. Accepts
Plebiscite Fails Plebiscite Passes
State Leg. Disapproves State Leg. Approves
Gov. Disapproves Gov. Approves
Elections and Mun. Installation
As alluded to both previously and in this section, the dynamics surrounding each of these stages in the
fragmentation process are governed by a series of institutional and legal rules. In what follows, I introduce
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some of the most important of these regulations at different levels of government.
3.4 Institutions and Rules Governing Fragmentation in Brazil
Institutions presiding over fragmentation exist at both the federal and the state levels of government
in Brazil. While the alteration of municipality borders - which by nature accompanies the fragmentation
of municipalities - is chiefly under the jurisdiction of state governments, state legislation on this matter is
constrained by a general framework proposed in federal law. This general framework on fragmentation is
outlined in Article 18, Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Brazil’s 1988 Constitution. Of these, Section 4 is most pertinent
to the fragmentation of Brazilian municipalities. The provisions outlined in this section require the manipu-
lation of municipality boundaries to preserve the continuity and historical-cultural unity of the municipality,
adhere to state law, and be evaluated by local populations to be affected by territorial alteration.15 These
federal requisites are broad and serve merely as overarching guidelines that are supplemented, as Article 4
suggests, by more precise regulations at the state-level.
State constitutions and complementary laws build upon the framework outlined in the federal constitution
by imposing additional regulations and requisites that need to be satisfied to allow for the (re)organization
of municipality territorial boundaries. Specifically, they identify the stock of municipal districts eligible
for fragmentation, the legislative body responsible for evaluating fragmentation proposals, the percentage
of legislators required to favorably evaluate fragmentation proposals for a plebiscite to be recommended,
and the percentage of legislators required to override executive vetos. As Tomio (2002) documents, there
is notable variation across states in terms of fragmentation requisites and, in some cases, in procedural
requirements.
First and foremost, state complementary laws identify the stock of municipal districts eligible for frag-
mentation. In general, state complementary laws define characteristics that municipal districts seeking frag-
mentation must espouse in order to fragment. These characteristics vary widely and may include minimum
numbers of residents and voters, the age of the municipal district, the percentage of taxes collected in the
municipal district as compared to collection at the state-level, the distance between existing municipalities’
headquarters and proposed new municipalities’ headquarters, and development conditions (i.e. the number
of urban buildings). Specific criteria in the aforementioned areas varies across Brazilian states. Some states
15The English translation of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Article 18 in Brazil’s 1988 Constitution is as follows: “Federal territories
are part of the Union and their creation, transformation into states, or reintegration into their State of origin shall be regulated
by complementary law” (Section 2). “States may merge into each other, subdivide, or split in order to be annexed to others, or
form new States or Federal Territories, with the approval of the population directly interested through a plebiscite, and pending
the approval of the National Congress through a complementary law” (Section 3). “The creation, incorporation, fusion, and
dismembering of municipalities should preserve continuity and historical-cultural unity of the urban environment and should
be governed by the requisites of state laws and the results of plebiscites held with directly interested populations” (Section 4).
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are more stringent with respect to fragmentation criteria and others are more permissive.
The Brazilian states of Santa Catarina and Minas Gerais, for example, are more stringent in terms of the
number of requisites they expect fragmentation-seeking municipal districts to satisfy. Both states require
fragmentation-seeking municipal districts to satisfy requirements in four of the previously identified areas.
Per Santa Catarina’s 1991 and 1995 Complementary Laws,16 municipal districts seeking fragmentation are
required to have 1) populations numbering at least 5,000, 2) existed as municipal districts for five years, 3)
distances of 5km between the municipality headquarters of the present municipality and the proposed new
municipality, and 4) 200 urban buildings. Per Minas Gerais’s 1991 complementary law,17 municipal districts
seeking fragmentation are required to have 1) populations numbering at least 3,000, 2) collected 1.5% of the
state’s total sales tax collection, 3) distances of 1.3km between the municipality headquarters, and 4) 400
urban buildings.
States, however, do not need to have requisites in multiple areas in order to be stringent with respect
to the preconditions they require of fragmentation-seeking municipal districts; states with requisites in only
one identified area can impose serious challenges for municipal districts seeking fragmentation. For example,
the Brazilian state of Pará, per Complementary Law 27 of 1995, only requires a minimum population
threshold for fragmentation-seeking municipal districts. This threshold, however, is restrictive and requires
fragmentation-seeking municipal districts to contain populations of 10,000. The complementary laws of the
Brazilian states of Ceará and Pernambuco contain similar solitary restrictive characteristics. According to
Tomio (2005), the fragmentation requisites in each of the three latter cases were more restrictive than those
adopted by the military regime in the prior period.
By contrast, Rio Grande do Norte’s 1992 complementary law,18 for example, is quite permissive and
requires municipal districts pursuing fragmentation to satisfy only one feasible condition. In Rio Grande
do Norte, the fragmentation-seeking municipal district is required to contain a population of at least 2,558
people. It follows from these disparate requisites that fragmentation was more attainable for municipal
districts in some Brazilian states than others.
With respect to the legislative body responsible for evaluating fragmentation proposals, some states dele-
gate this task to the entirety of the Legislative Assembly, and others have permanent legislative commissions
charged with the task of evaluating fragmentation proposals. The Brazilian state of Amapá, for example,
appears to have the entire Legislative Assembly vote to determine whether a fragmentation plebiscite ought
to be held in the fragmentation-seeking municipal district(s). The Brazilian states of Rio Grande do Sul
16Complementary Law 37-42 of 1991 and Complementary Law 135 of 1995
17Complementary Law 19 of 1991
18Complementary Law 102 of 1992
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and Minas Gerais, by contrast, have permanent legislative commissions charged with the tasks of evaluating
fragmentation proposals. These specific commissions are called the Commission for Municipality Matters19
and the Commission for Municipality and Regional Subjects20 in Rio Grande do Sul and Minas Gerais,
respectively.
Aside from determining characteristics that fragmentation-seeking municipal districts need to satisfy in
order to be viable candidates for fragmentation and the legislative body responsible for evaluating fragmenta-
tion proposals, state legislation dictates the percentage of state legislators required to evaluate fragmentation
proposals in order for said proposals to be recommended for plebiscites as well as the percentage of legislators
required to override executive vetoes of fragmentation proposals. These requisites are generally not unique
to lawmaking surrounding fragmentation; rather, they are identical to those governing legislation in other
substantive areas.
The precise institutions and legislation governing subnational fragmentation in Brazil have evolved over
time in response to changing political, economic, and other conditions. The most prominent change of rules
governing subnational fragmentation in the last decade of the twentieth century - during which the most
prolific waves of fragmentation in contemporary democratic Brazil took place - was an amendment to Article
18 Section 4 of Brazil’s federal constitution. This constitutional provision was modified in 1996 to read as
follows: “The creation, incorporation, merger and dismantling of municipalities shall be done by state law
within the time period determined by complementary federal law, and shall depend on prior consultation, via
plebiscite, with populations of municipalities involved, after divulging the Municipality Feasibility Studies
presented and publicized, as provided by law.” This amendment imposed additional federal oversight on
what was previously an issue space designated primarily to Brazilian states.
First, whereas fragmentation-seeking municipal districts were initially, themselves, responsible for work-
ing with bureaucratic agencies to compile official documentation indicating their satisfaction of state-defined
fragmentation requisites and for convincing state governments that they satisfied criteria for fragmentation,
supplementary legislation complementing this constitutional amendment retracted some autonomy from lo-
cal governments in this process. It streamlined the process by creating an agency partially responsible for
objectively collecting and assessing information related to the municipality viability of municipal districts.
Thus, while states remain largely autonomous in determining the stock of municipalities eligible for frag-
mentation within their borders, the federal government has, since 1996, reasserted some control over the
process of evaluating whether municipal districts satisfied fragmentation criteria.
Second, federal restrictions were imposed on the time period in which fragmentation proposals could
19In Portuguese, this committee is called the Comissão de Assuntos Municipais (CAM).
20In Portuguese, this committee is called the Comissão de Assuntos Municipais e Regionalizaćão.
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be initiated. Specifically, complementary federal laws identified limited windows during which municipal
districts could initiate fragmentation proceedings. Given the arduous labor involved in educating the public
about subnational fragmentation, soliciting public will for local restructuring, and compiling convincing frag-
mentation proposals, this time restriction proved prohibitive for fragmentation-seeking municipal districts.
Third, this constitutional revision aimed to clarify confusion from the previous version of the article over
which voters (solely voters residing in the municipal district(s) that would become part of a new municipality
in the event of fragmentation or both voters residing in the municipal district(s) that would become part of a
new municipality in the event of fragmentation and voters residing in the part of the municipality that would
become the parent municipality in the event of fragmentation) were to participate in fragmentation-related
plebiscites. In spite of attempts to introduce clarity, the reformed semantics remained somewhat vague on
this. Some including Mattos and Ponczek (2013) and Tomio (2002) suggest that the in the aftermath of this
amendment, the voters eligible to participate in fragmentation plebiscites were extended to include voters
residing in the municipality that would be territorially transformed as a result of fragmentation. My own
comparison of municipality populations with numbers of participants in fragmentation plebiscites (from data
in Minas Gerais) further confirm that only voters residing in municipal district(s) that would become a part
of a new municipality in the event of fragmentation participated in fragmentation plebiscites prior to the
introduction of this amendment and that voters in what would become the parent municipality and what
would become the child municipality voted in fragmentation plebiscites in the aftermath of this amendment.
The effort to incorporate voters in all municipalities that would be affected by fragmentation (i.e. parent
and child municipalities) was understood to be one of many to decelerate the proliferation of subnational
units in Brazil. In the words of Ferrari (2016), “As for the new scope of the plebiscite, the emancipatory
process became also impossible” (Ferrari, 2016).21
Political controversies regarding the creation of new municipalities and discussions surrounding addi-
tional amendments of fragmentation restrictions continued into the twenty-first century. Exemplary of the
contestation surrounding fragmentation are the experiences of fifty-seven municipal districts that were per-
mitted to become their own municipalities in the early twenty-first century but were, subsequently, required
to retain the municipal district status quo. In the years following their creation, the Attorney General of
the Republic, Cláudio Fontelles, alleged that the newly created municipalities did not adhere to stipulations
outlined in a complementary federal law that had not, at the time of their creation, been promulgated;
consequently, he questioned their legitimacy and deemed their creation unconstitutional (, N.d.). As a re-
sult, these municipalities were not formally installed and were, instead, relegated to municipal districts of
21The Portuguese translation is as follows: “Quanto á nova abragência do plebiscito, também teve o efeito, por si, de tornar
quase imposśıvel um novo process emancipatório” (Ferrari, 2016).
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the parent municipality to which they previously belonged. A sample of Brazilian municipalities with this
experience include Pescaria Brava, Balneario Rincão, Mojúı dos Campos, Pinto Bandeira, and Paráıso das
Águas.
An allegation of Direct Action of Unconstitutionality22 and a 2008 constitutional amendment, Constitu-
tional Amendment 57, played critical roles in revoking this reversal. Constitutional Amendment 57 nullified
the unconstitutionality ruling of the creation of this subset of municipalities in the early twenty-first century.
Thus, per this amendment, municipality status was returned to districts that became municipalities prior to
December 31, 2006 but subsequently had their municipality status revoked conditional on their satisfaction
of the pre-2006 requirements established by their respective states (Ferrari, 2016). Although municipal sta-
tus was returned to some districts with the installation of Constitutional Amendment 57, this reversal did
not usher in a new tide of fragmentations to the chagrin of many fragmentation-seeking local actors.
Despite inaction, both popular and elite demand for the creation of new local governments became more
pronounced in the first decade of the twenty-first century. This local will for subnational fragmentation
was encouraged by the manifestation of global separatist movements and, specifically, Catalonia’s persistent
fight for independence from Spain (Dantas, 2017). A 2008 O Globo survey suggests that more than 800
municipal districts submitted requests for fragmentation (‘territorial emancipation’) since the turn of the
century. Although this number dropped to approximately 410 according to a 2013 wave of the survey, the
fact that more than 7% of Brazilian municipalities actively pursued fragmentation as recently as five years
ago is striking (Dantas, 2017).
Complementing expressions of popular will for fragmentation and fragmentation proposal submissions
by local political actors, the national legislature acted to bring subnational fragmentation and the creation
of new municipalities back to the negotiating table. In contrast with what they perceived to be loose rules
governing fragmentation in the late-twentieth century, legislative proponents of fragmentation in recent years
have worked to refine legislation surrounding the creation of new municipalities such that only municipal
districts with sufficient levels of development could be transformed into municipalities (Braga, 2014). In both
2013 and 2014, the national legislature proposed fragmentation criteria that eliminated criteria unrelated
to municipal district development prospects (i.e. geographic expansiveness criteria), retained some relevant
older clauses, and added new stringent municipal financing requirements and population criteria that varied
across the country’s regions (Ferrari, 2016; Braga, 2014).23
22In Portuguese, this is called an Ação direta de inconstitucionalidade.
23Per the legislation drafted in 2013, municipal districts seeking to become their own municipalities should espouse populations
of 4,000 inhabitants in the North and Central-West regions, 7,000 inhabitants in the Northeast region, and 10,000 inhabitants
in the South and Southeast regions (Ferrari, 2016). These requirements were made more stringent in the legislative draft of
2014; this provision of the bill proposed that fragmentation-seeking municipal districts should have populations of at least 6,000
in the North and Center, 12,000 in the Northeast, and 20,000 in the South and Southeast (Ferrari, 2016).
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However, then President Dilma Rousseff vetoed both pieces of the proposed fragmentation legislation,
arguing that it was too lenient toward the creation of new municipalities. Specifically, she argued that
the financial burden that the creation of new municipalities would have on the federation would be severe
and that the then present state of the country was too delicate to initiate such dramatic changes to local
governments (Dantas, 2017; Globo, 2015).
In spite of Dilma Rousseff’s adamant disapproval of the fragmentation-related legislation, the national
legislature continued in their efforts to develop an agreeable piece of legislation that would allow for the
creation of new local governments in Brazil (Globo, 2015). In 2015, the Senate defeated the government
and approved of a supplementary bill that outlined fragmentation criteria that resembled the pieces of
legislation drafted in 2013 and 2014; prominent among these requirements were federally-imposed population
restrictions and municipality financing requirements. This legislation reignites the fervor for subnational
fragmentation in Brazil, and in spite of rumblings that new municipal districts are preparing to pursue
fragmentation, new cases of fragmentation have yet to surface.
This section documented and referenced many important legal documents and provisions that governed
subnational fragmentation and the creation of new municipalities in the present democratic period. This
foundation is important for a number of reasons; it conditions and imposes important restrictions on the
stock of municipal districts eligible to become municipalities, the nature of the actors involved in the various
stages in the fragmentation process, and time period in which fragmentation proceedings can be introduced,
for example. A thorough understanding of these important facets of the fragmentation process permits a
more accurate and informed interpretation of the forthcoming discussion on the causes and consequences of
subnational fragmentation in Brazil.
3.5 Chapter Conclusion
Brazilian municipalities have long existed but have only recently (re)acquired enhanced autonomy as a
product of the late-twentieth century decentralization reforms. In the early years of the present democratic
period, subnational fragmentation dramatically reshaped the country’s local political landscape, resulting
in the creation of over 1,000 new municipalities. In spite of its striking prominence in recent decades,
subnational fragmentation in Brazil has received little scholarly attention. This is especially surprising given
both the recent proliferation of studies on subnational fragmentation (administrative unit proliferation)
in other countries comprising the developing world and the unique advantages that exist to studying the
phenomena in Brazil over other developing countries. Specifically, the minimal ethnic heterogeneity in Brazil
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and the multi-stage local process by which fragmentation occurs allow for the computation of more reliable
estimates of both the causes and the consequences of subnational fragmentation than other studies have
uncovered to date.
In addition to providing a historical introduction to municipality creation and proliferation in Brazil and a
discussion of the benefits afforded by subnational fragmentation in Brazil to uncover reliable estimates of the
causes and the effects of subnational fragmentation, I used this chapter to establish a foundation upon which
subsequent empirical chapters build. I, first, introduced the multi-stage process by which fragmentation
occurs in Brazil and discussed the dynamic considerations of relevant local and state actors at each stage of
the fragmentation process. In the next chapter on the causes of subnational fragmentation in Brazil, I uncover
the factors that increase municipal districts’ propensities for fragmentation at each stage in the fragmentation
process. In the following chapters on the consequences of subnational fragmentation, I estimate the average
effect of fragmentation on political participation and education infrastructure quality by making comparisons
between municipalities with municipal districts that tried to fragment but were prevented from doing so at
a particular stage in the fragmentation process and municipalities with municipal districts that tried to
fragment and were successful in doing so. By making these comparisons, I can place greater confidence in
the similarities across units in the comparison groups on all factors relevant to fragmentation aside from
whether or not fragmentation is realized and, thereby, convincingly isolate the effect of fragmentation.
Moreover, I can avoid potential bias of treating the group of units that fragment as if they are equal to the
group of units that initiate fragmentation proceedings.
After introducing the various stages in the fragmentation process, I reviewed the institutional and legal
rules governing fragmentation and documented the way in which these changed over time. This review is im-
portant because it allows me to refine the comparison groups identified above - municipalities with municipal
districts that tried to fragment but were prevented from doing so at a particular stage in the fragmentation
process and municipalities with municipal districts that tried to fragment and were successful in doing so
- such that municipalities that do not satisfy identified legal requisites are appropriately considered in my
ensuing empirical analyses. For example, it is important to understand nuanced differences between munic-
ipal districts’ fragmentation proposals that are rejected on the basis of not satisfying the state-determined
required numbers of households necessary for a municipality from municipal districts’ fragmentation propos-
als that are rejected on the basis of insufficient turnout in fragmentation plebiscites. Treating fragmentation
proposals that fail for these very different reasons as the same would be negligent.
In the forthcoming chapter, I leverage the steps in the fragmentation process and the institutional rules
underlying fragmentation described in this chapter to analyze the causes of subnational fragmentation in
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Brazil. As discussed, this approach provides more nuanced insight into the causes of subnational fragmen-
tation than extant studies comparing purely fragmenting and non-fragmenting municipalities have done to
date by discerning the factors that make municipal districts viable candidates for fragmentation at each
stage in the fragmentation process. Then, controlling for the characteristics that differentiate fragmenting
and non-fragmenting municipalities (where possible), I proceed to study the consequences of subnational
fragmentation for political participation in local elections and the quality of public primary education. With
this approach, I introduce rigorous new evidence into the nascent literature on subnational fragmentation
and into unresolved debates over the effectiveness of decentralization and small government size in enhancing
democracy and increasing development.
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Chapter 4
Breaking Away? An Assessment of
the Causes of and Roadblocks to
Subnational Fragmentation in Brazil
Subnational fragmentation is dramatically reshaping local politics across the developing world. While
some scholars have begun to document the phenomenon, we still know little about the causes of subnational
fragmentation and about motivational differences across countries. This chapter expands the knowledge
generated on this topic by assessing the motivations and causes of fragmentation in the understudied Brazilian
context.
A small number of scholars have studied the causes of subnational fragmentation. Through their research,
several prominent explanations for fragmentation have emerged. As documented in Chapter 2, the most
common of these relate to incumbent political power-seeking (Green, 2008, 2010; Pierskalla, 2014; Ayee,
2012; Grossman and Lewis, 2014; Hassan, 2016; Dahlby, 2011; Magalhães, 2007; Hassan and Sheely, 2016).
Our limited knowledge on the causes of subnational fragmentation has largely been derived from assess-
ments of fragmentation in a single case or in a group of cases in which the process underlying fragmentation is
similar. Insofar as the process underlying fragmentation diverges as a function of the type of actors involved
(e.g. local versus national actors, for example), it could be remiss to attribute fragmentation in one context
to a factor discovered to motivate fragmentation in an alternative context or at least to except them to
operate similarly. As detailed in Chapter 3, the process by which fragmentation occurs in Brazil is notably
different than the process operating elsewhere. Whereas much of the fragmentation in the developing world
occurs by way of a top-down process initiated by the national government, fragmentation in Brazil occurs
through a bottom-up process initiated by local actors. Thus, there are compelling reasons to believe that the
root causes of fragmentation in Brazil may differ from those uncovered in other countries. Understanding
such differences is important in and of itself and is also critical to learning about the effects of fragmentation.
With respect to fragmentation in the Brazilian case, scholars have downplayed explicit political expla-
nations that have proven popular elsewhere. Instead, scholars of fragmentation have largely focused on the
motivations proffered by intergovernmental transfer formulas as the main factor explaining fragmentation
in Brazil (Dahlby, 2011; Magalhães, 2007).1 In brief, those championing this explanation argue that mu-
1It is worthy of note that political scientists have devoted little attention to studying subnational fragmentation in Brazil.
Therefore, much of what we know about fragmentation in Brazil stems from the work of economists. Their predilection may
49
nicipalities fragment in pursuit of additional transfers from the federal government that are allocated as a
function of municipality population size. While transfers may have played an important role in motivating
local politicians to pursue fragmentation or in convincing interested populations to vote in its favor, I argue
that this explanation is incomplete. Subnational fragmentation in Brazil is much more complicated and
multi-faceted than this conventional wisdom leads us to believe.
In this chapter, I assess subnational fragmentation in Brazil with an eye to the process by which territorial
restructuring occurs in the country and propose convincing supplementary explanations for the phenomenon.
Through original archival research in the Legislative Assembly of the most municipality dense Brazilian
state, Minas Gerais,2 I discovered that 63% of the state’s municipal districts’ fragmentation proposals were
obstructed during the fragmentation process and that many fragmentation-seeking municipal districts were
prevented from fragmenting. This suggests that studying the causes of fragmentation merely by comparing
differences in characteristics across municipalities that fragmented and municipalities that did not fragment,
as is convention, is inappropriate. Assuming uniformity across municipalities with municipal districts that
initiated fragmentation proceedings and municipalities that fragmented inhibits our understanding of the
causes of fragmentation and can lead to biased estimates of its effects. This chapter advances our knowledge
of the causes of subnational fragmentation in Brazil by assessing the factors that motivate 1) municipal
districts to submit fragmentation proposals to their respective state governments, 2) state governments to
approve submitted fragmentation proposals, and 3) voters to vote in favor of fragmentation in fragmentation
plebiscites.
I begin this chapter by studying the first stage in the fragmentation process and considering differences
across municipalities with municipal districts that submitted fragmentation proposals and municipalities with
municipal districts that did not submit fragmentation proposals. I expect that grievances originating from
geographic expansiveness, political heterogeneity, and municipality age foment political action and prompt
local leaders to initiate fragmentation proceedings in the first stage of the fragmentation process. Insofar
as fragmentation is expected to focus administrative attention on peripheral municipal districts, provide
easier pathways to political office, and allow for important changes that prove challenging in older political
units that may be less tolerant to change, I anticipate that aggrieved municipalities would undertake the
costly enterprise of pursuing fragmentation. Specifically, I expect that geographically expansive, politically
heterogeneous, and older municipalities will be more likely to fragment than municipalities that do not
exhibit these characteristics.
I, then, consider the second stage in the fragmentation process and the factors that predict the state
inappropriately color our comprehensive understanding of fragmentation in Brazil.
2There are 853 municipalities in Minas Gerais.
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legislature’s evaluations of fragmentation proposals. I hypothesize that political alignments between the
state legislature and both mayors and Fragmentation Initiation Presidents (the formal initiators of frag-
mentation processes),3 influence the state legislature’s evaluations of fragmentation proposals. Given that
local politicians serve as political brokers for state officials, as Novaes (2015) posits, it is logical to expect
that state politicians would act in accordance with the preferences of politically-affiliated Fragmentation
Initiation Presidents and mayors. Insofar as fragmentation increases the political leverage of Fragmentation
Initiation Presidents at the expense of incumbent mayors, I anticipate that political alignments between the
state legislature and the Fragmentation Initiation President will positively predict state approval of frag-
mentation proposals whereas political alignments between the state legislature and mayors will negatively
predict approval of fragmentation proposals.
Finally, I study the fragmentation plebiscites that take place in the third stage of the fragmentation
process and the factors that explain plebiscite outcomes. I hypothesize that the number of municipal
districts involved in fragmentation proposals influences plebiscite success or failure. Specifically, I expect
that plebiscites associated with fragmentation proposals initiated by a solitary municipal district (which
would become the new municipality headquarters in the event of fragmentation) will be more likely to pass
than plebiscites associated with fragmentation proposals jointly initiated by multiple municipal districts
(one of which would become the new municipality headquarters and others of which would not). I anticipate
that political support for fragmentation is high among voters residing in municipal districts that would be
transformed into municipality headquarters in the event of fragmentation and low among voters residing
in municipal districts that would retain municipal district status in the event of fragmentation. I expect
that plebiscites associated jointly initiated proposals will fail due to low support among voters in municipal
districts that would retain municipal district status in the event of fragmentation. Specifically, I imagine that
voters in these municipal districts would be unable to infer sufficient information about the counterfactual
of residing in a new municipality and would, therefore, opt to retain the status quo.
In this chapter, I draw upon months of archival and field research in the second most populous, third
most economically developed, fourth largest, and most municipality-dense state in Brazil - Minas Gerais4 -
to investigate each of these outlined expectations empirically. Specifically, I use information from fragmen-
tation proposals5 preserved in the Legislative Assembly of Minas Gerais, detailed results of fragmentation
3The direct translation of the Portuguese title of this position is the Emancipation Commission President.
4Presently, 853 out of Brazil’s 5,570 municipalities are in the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais. Minas Gerais was the solitary
state that provided me with access to archives containing fragmentation proposals and detailed plebiscite results.
5As discussed in Chapter 2, in their proposals, municipal districts in Minas Gerais were required to demonstrate the
satisfaction of approved minimum geographic distances between the town centers of the existing municipality and the proposed
new municipality; the attainment of a minimum permitted number of voters and households under the proposed territorial
rearrangements; and proof of sufficient revenue, tax collection, infrastructure, and consumption in each of the municipalities’
component parts. Additionally, municipal districts were required to provide proof of an elected emancipation commission body,
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plebiscites6 compiled with help from employees of the state’s electoral court (Tribunal Regional Eleitoral,
TRE), and secondary data sources to construct quantitative indicators associated with the outcomes and
hypotheses surrounding the first, second, and third stages in the process of subnational fragmentation in
Brazil.
Although the assessments of subnational fragmentation that follow are primarily based off of the frag-
mentation experiences of municipalities in the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais, the intense inter-municipal
heterogeneity within the state enables inferences to be drawn beyond its borders. Federal Deputy Fred Costa
(MG) suggests that the state’s inter-municipal heterogeneity and large number of municipalities has made
Minas Gerais a pioneer in testing public policies related to fragmentation.7 Thus, he claims, Minas Gerais
is a good case to study to learn about subnational fragmentation in Brazil. These features, accompanied
by rich data sources available in the state, enable me to meaningfully extend scholars’ understandings of
subnational fragmentation in Brazil. Reviewing conventional wisdom establishes the groundwork for this
study and elucidates the significant advances proffered in this chapter.
4.1 Fragmentation and Incentives Proffered by
Intergovernmental Transfer Formulas: Conventional
Explanations and Their Curiosities
Brazilian municipalities are autonomous entities and represent the lowest layer of administrative division
in the country. They are responsible for providing public goods and services in the areas of health, education,
and infrastructure either independently or jointly with other levels of government. Brazilian municipalities
fund projects in these areas with various sources of revenue. These include 1) Service fees, duties, and
taxes constitutionally under municipal jurisdiction, 2) Transfers from state and federal taxes when the
source of revenue comes from the municipality’s territory, 3) Constitutionally-mandated transfers from funds
originating in state and federal governments (e.g. ICMS and FPM, respectively)8, and 4) Voluntary transfers
to the municipality from the state and federal levels of government (Tomio, 2002).
Brollo and Nannicini (2012) and Gomes, Alfinito and Albuquerque (2013), among others, claim that
federal transfers provide the most important source of revenue for some Brazilian municipalities. There are
popular will (as signaled by a designated number of voters’ signatures), and precisely demarcated boundaries between the
proposed restructured political units.
6These results contained information about the size of the electorate, plebiscite turnout/abstention rates, and the raw
number of “yes,” “no,” “blank,” and “null” votes cast in each of the involved municipal districts.
7Interview conducted on February 5, 2018.
8Transfers from the state come from resources generated by the consumption tax (ICMS), which in Brazil is set and collected
by the states. Transfers from the federal level come from the FPM, which is constitutionally defined.
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two types of federal transfers to municipal governments. One is constitutionally-mandated and guaranteed
to all Brazilian municipalities, and the other is a discretionary transfer. Brollo and Nannicini (2012) claim
that the two types of federal transfers combined amount to 65% of Brazilian municipalities’ budgets, and
Gomes, Alfinito and Albuquerque (2013) suggest that FPM transfers, specifically, comprise the overwhelming
majority of resources at the disposal of Brazilian municipalities. The precise formula determining the
allocation of FPM transfers from federal to municipal governments is outlined in Decree 1881 of August
27, 1981. This decree stipulates that transfer amounts are determined by the population of municipalities
and are awarded in a discontinuous fashion. Following each census, municipalities are grouped according
to population, and each population bracket is assigned a coefficient (Litschig and Morrison, 2010). These
coefficients are, then, entered into a formula to determine the precise amount of transfers to be awarded to
municipalities from the FPM. Table 4.1 presents the various population categories as well as their associated
coefficients.
Table 4.1: FPM Coefficients by Population Threshold
Population Coefficient
Up to 10,188 0.6
From 10,189 to 13,584 0.8
From 13,585 to 16,980 1.0
From 16,981 to 23,772 1.2
From 23,773 to 30,564 1.4
From 30,565 to 37,356 1.6
From 37,357 to 44,148 1.8
From 44,149 to 50,940 2.0
From 50,941 to 61,128 2.2
From 61,129 to 71,316 2.4
From 71,317 to 81,504 2.6
From 81,505 to 91,692 2.8
s From 91,693 to 101,880 3.0
From 101,881 to 115,464 3.2
From 115,465 to 129,048 3.4
From 129,049 to 142,632 3.6
From 142,633 to 156,216 3.8
Above 156,216 4.0
The formula into which these coefficients are entered is structured such that smaller municipalities are
allocated more financial resources per capita than larger municipalities. In other words, smaller municipalities
disproportionately benefit. Gomes, Alfinito and Albuquerque (2013) highlight the striking disparity in
the amount of FPM transfers allocated to small and large Brazilian municipalities in 1996 and further
qualify the relationship between municipality size and transfers. The authors argue that micro-municipalities
(municipalities with populations under 5,000) are grossly benefitted by the formula determining FPM transfer
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allocations. They claim that the benefits experienced by micro-municipalities come at the cost of larger,
more developed municipalities (especially those in the Southwest region of the country)(Gomes, Alfinito and
Albuquerque, 2013).
The concurrent adoption of this FPM transfer formula and the proliferation of Brazilian municipalities
have, naturally, led many to attribute the intense municipal fragmentation in Brazil to incentives stemming
from intergovernmental transfer formulas (Dahlby, 2011; Magalhães, 2007; Mattos and Ponczek, 2013). For
example, Mattos and Ponczek (2013) claim, “the decision to separate can be directly linked to an effort
to increase, per capita, the provision of public services offered to local populations” (Mattos and Ponczek,
2013).9 The gross benefits that small and, especially, micro-municipalities acquire as a function of this
formula’s construction provides a logically compelling and intuitive explanation of the incentives underlying
fragmentation.
However, the empirical evidence supporting this explanation of fragmentation is limited.10 It is unclear
how one would investigate the relationship between transfers and fragmentation without producing a tau-
tological argument. Moreover, the fact that fragmenting municipalities received more funding per capita
from the federal government post-fragmentation than pre-fragmentation does not necessarily imply that this
effect of fragmentation caused it. Nor does it dismiss alternative or supplementary explanations.
In the next section, I introduce a process-sensitive theory on the causes of fragmentation in Brazil that
introduces supplementary factors plausibly responsible for differentiating municipalities that fragmented
from municipalities that did not fragment at each of the first three stages in the fragmentation process.11
I review each stage in the fragmentation process and generate stage-specific hypotheses to explain why
some municipal districts submitted fragmentation proposals while others did not and why some municipal
district-initiated fragmentation proposals failed either due to rejection by the state legislature or to a failed
plebiscite.
9“Ou seja, a decisão de separação pode estar diretamente ligada à tentativa de aumentar, de maneira per capita, as provisões
dos serviços públicos oferecidos a esta população.”
10Studies discrediting conventional wisdom, such as the work of Gomes, Dowell and Cristina (2000), seek to dismantle the
conventional wisdom that intergovernmental transfer incentives motivated fragmentation by demonstrating that the smallest
municipalities were not necessarily those in the most underdeveloped, are similarly inadequate.
11To refresh, these stages include fragmentation proposal initiation by district leaders, proposal assessment and plebiscite
recommendation by state legislatures, and voter evaluation of fragmentation in plebiscites.
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4.2 Fragmentation in Brazil: Theories and Hypotheses
4.2.1 Stage 1: Municipal Districts Initiate Fragmentation Proposals
As discussed in Chapter 3, the first step of the fragmentation process requires local leaders to arouse
interest in fragmentation in their municipal districts and to submit proposals documenting proof of satisfied
federal- and state-determined requisites to their respective state legislatures.12 Extant scholarship suggests
that the desire to incur additional transfers per capita from the central government prompted local officials
to undertake the costly enterprise of initiating fragmentation proceedings. Though I do not dispute this
claim, I expect that grievances, more broadly construed, motivated fragmentation proposal initiations.
Many scholars theorize that grievances play an important role in explaining participation in conventional
and, especially, in unconventional political activity (Opp, 1988; Snow, 2013; Lowrance, 2006; Gurr, 2015).
While recognizing that grievances, alone, may be insufficient in stimulating participation in unconventional
forms of political activity, some posit and empirically demonstrate that grievances are important predictors
of participation in political protests and social movements (Quaranta, 2017; Almeida, 2007; Ibrahim, 2011;
Silva, 2009; Della Porta, 2014). As fragmentation initiatives, like social movements and political protest,
involve undertaking costly enterprises to change the status quo, there are compelling reasons to expect that
grievances would similarly instigate actors to initiate fragmentation proceedings. In fact, according to Dalton,
Burklin and Drummond (2001), “unease with the way representative democracy currently functions...may
be stimulating support for direct democracy as an alternative.” Along these lines, I expect that grievances
may give rise to the direct democracy required of fragmentation in the Brazilian context.
Specifically, I hypothesize that grievances may arise from geographic expansiveness, political hetero-
geneity, and municipality age. I expect that municipal districts within geographically expansive, politically
competitive, and older municipalities are more likely to initiate fragmentation proceedings than municipal
districts within municipalities not exhibiting these characteristics. In what follows, I discuss the way in which
each of these characteristics foster the grievances that may motivate subnational fragmentation proceedings.
There are compelling reasons to expect that geographic expansiveness generates grievances for subsets of
Brazilian municipalities. Insofar as administrative attention and resources are unequally distributed across
municipal districts and concentrated in municipalities’ headquarters (a condition frequently cited in the
12In their proposals, districts in Minas Gerais were required to demonstrate the satisfaction of approved minimum geographic
distances between the town centers of the existing municipality and the proposed new municipality; the attainment of the
minimum permitted number of voters and households under the proposed territorial rearrangements; and proof of sufficient
revenue, tax collection, infrastructure, and consumption in each of the municipalities’ component parts. Additionally, districts
seeking fragmentation were required to provide proof of an elected emancipation commission body, popular will (as signaled by
a designated number of voters’ signatures), and precisely demarcated boundaries between the proposed restructured political
units.
55
municipality histories of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE)), disaffection may arise
among neglected peripheral municipal districts. I expect that powerful sentiments of disaffection cultivate
political action and inspire subnational fragmentation. The experience of the present-day municipality of
Hortolândia (SP), previously a municipal district of Sumaré (SP), grounds this possibility in reality.
In a conversation with the Director of Communications in the present-day Brazilian municipality of Hor-
tolândia, I learned that geographic expansiveness, the lacking of a common local identity, and, especially,
administrative neglect led the municipal district of Hortolândia to pursue fragmentation from the munici-
pality of Sumaré in 1991. In the face of urbanization in the 1960’s, the municipal district of Hortolândia
experienced a rapid deterioration in public service provision and a spike in criminality and violence. Addi-
tionally, in spite of its weighty contribution to the revenue of Sumaré, Hortolândia did not witness returns
on its investment. Instead, the municipality’s revenue was concentrated in the municipal headquarters of
Sumaré. Disaffection in each of these areas led Hortolândia to initiate fragmentation from Sumaré. In an
interview conducted in April 2017, the present (as well as former) mayor of Hortolândia, Angelo Perugini,
said that Hortolândia would not have needed to fragment if Sumaré had been a better administrator.13
IBGE municipality histories suggest that the geographic and administrative grievances that motivated
Hortolândia to fragment from Sumaré also influenced many other municipal districts to initiate fragmenta-
tion proceedings. For example, the IBGE municipality history of the present-day municipality of Água Azul
do Norte (PA) states that “the vast distance [between the municipal district and municipality headquar-
ters] led to cries for emancipation.”14 Deputy Pedro Satélite also attributed the creation of the present-day
municipality of Coloniza (MT) to widespread grievances stemming from geographic expansiveness and admin-
istrative neglect during its tenure as a municipal district in the municipality of Aripuanã (IBGE). Building
off of the experiences of the aforementioned municipal districts, I anticipate that geographically expansive
municipalities foster grievances that lead municipal districts within their borders to initiate fragmentation
proceedings (Hypothesis 1.1).
Grievances may also manifest from political gridlock associated with local governments comprised of many
political parties. Large numbers of effective parties complicate political negotiation and the compromise
required of co-governing. Consequently, politicians from municipalities with large numbers of effective parties
may pursue fragmentation in an effort to concentrate political rule in their own political parties and pursue
their legislative goals with fewer challenges from political adversaries. Additionally, local politicians may
pursue fragmentation in an effort to entrench political support from the electorate. In a period of volatile
13Interview conducted in April 2017.
14In Portuguese, “A distância da sede de Paranuapebas, ficava a 308 quilômetros da vila, levou a população de Água Azul a
lutar pela emancipação poĺıtica.”
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political competition and un-institutionalized party systems, this prospect is especially probable. For these
reasons, I expect that municipal districts in municipalities with large numbers of effective political parties
will be more likely to pursue fragmentation than municipal districts in municipalities with small numbers of
effective parties (Hypothesis 1.2).
Relatedly, insofar as fragmentation provides politicians with an opportunity to respond to administrative-
and resource-driven grievances of peripheral districts in geographically expansive municipalities, it follows
that the political ambitions of politicians in municipalities with large numbers of effective political parties
would be more attainable. Thus, I also predict that municipal districts in municipalities that are geo-
graphically expansive and have large numbers of effective political parties will be more likely to pursue
fragmentation than municipal districts in municipalities that are less geographically expansive and have
fewer effective political parties (Hypothesis 1.3).
Finally, I expect that grievances can materialize as a function of the age of the municipality. The older
the municipality is, the more pessimistic aggrieved outlying municipal districts may be that their living
conditions will improve under the status quo. Therefore, I hypothesize that municipal districts in older
municipalities will be more likely to pursue fragmentation than municipal districts in younger municipalities
(Hypothesis 1.4).
In sum, I theorize that grievances arising from geographic expansiveness, political heterogeneity, and older
aged municipalities incentivize local leaders from municipal districts within these municipalities to undertake
the costly enterprise of initiating fragmentation proceedings. I hypothesize that municipal districts from more
geographically expansive, more politically heterogenous, and older municipalities are more likely to initiate
fragmentation proceedings than municipal districts from more geographically concentrated, more politically
homogenous, and younger municipalities.
4.2.2 Stage 2: State Legislatures’ Decisions Surrounding Fragmentation
Proposals
In the second stage of the fragmentation process, state legislatures review municipal districts’ submitted
fragmentation proposals with rigor. They, subsequently, decide whether to accept the fragmentation pro-
posals and recommend that a plebiscite be held in the fragmentation-seeking municipal district or to reject
them and end the prospect of fragmentation. In the case of Minas Gerais, 168 out of 356 fragmentation
proposals submitted to the State Legislature of Minas Gerais were rejected on grounds other than not sat-
isfying prescribed criteria.15 In this section, I introduce plausible explanations underlying states’ decisions
15The rejection of proposals was either documented explicitly in archival documentation or is assumed on the basis that no
plebiscite was subsequently held. Plebiscites were only permitted with the recommendation of the Legislative Assembly.
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to accept or reject fragmentation proposals.
As previously explained, Brazil’s recommitment to democracy in the mid-1980’s ushered in a period of po-
litical reopening, and new and old political parties (re)emerged haphazardly on the country’s political scene.
This tumultuous transition environment, exacerbated by an Open List Proportional Representation (OLPR)
electoral system, fostered intense party system fragmentation (Mainwaring, 1991; Carey and Shugart, 1995;
Clark, Gilligan and Golder, 2006; Power and Zucco Jr, 2009). Political fragmentation led federal and state
representatives to rely heavily on local politicians to broker voters for them (Novaes, 2015). Insofar as state
representatives depended on local politicians to rally local support for their candidacies in this environment,
it is reasonable to expect that state legislative fragmentation decisions would reflect the desires of local
brokers. Thus, I expect that if state representatives’ local brokers submitted fragmentation proposals to the
state, state legislatures would have approved fragmentation proposals (Hypothesis 2.1). If fragmentation
afforded (or was expected to afford) Fragmentation Initiation Presidents additional political leverage,16 it
follows that state representatives would, similarly, expect to accrue post-fragmentation political benefits.
Thus, state representatives would support the fragmentation efforts of Fragmentation Initiation Presidents.
Deriving expectations about state decision-making on the basis of alignments between state representatives
and municipal government officials is more complicated and warrants an intervening discussion.
As documented in the previous section, administrative inattention and grievances were foremost among
the explicit motivations given for outlying municipal districts to fragment from the municipalities in which
they resided. A concentration of administrative attention and resources in municipality headquarters trig-
gered sentiments of neglect experienced by outlying municipal districts. It follows that fragmentation ben-
efitted outlying municipal districts at the expense of municipality headquarters. Insofar as local politicians
with electoral bases in municipality headquarters anticipated that they would be held accountable for a loss
of resources in the municipality headquarters following fragmentation, politicians intending to remain in
their municipality post-fragmentation would plausibly oppose fragmentation. If politicians from the munici-
pality headquarters served as brokers for state representatives, it follows that the electoral prospects of state
representatives would, like the electoral prospects of politicians from the municipal headquarters, weaken
in the event of fragmentation. By this logic, if state legislators’ local brokers served in government in the
municipality containing the municipal district initiating fragmentation (i.e. what would become the parent
municipality in the aftermath of fragmentation), I expect that state governments would deny fragmentation
proposals (Hypothesis 2.2).
16The experience of Minas Gerais confirms that fragmentation did, in fact, yield benefits for proponents of territorial re-
structuring. Approximately 27% of new municipalities created in Minas Gerais in 1996 witnessed the Fragmentation Initiation
President go on to become the first mayor of the new municipality. This percentage increases when commission members other
than the President are considered.
58
4.2.3 Stage 3: Voters Weigh in Through Plebiscites
If state legislatures approve fragmentation proposals and recommend that plebiscites be held in fragmentation-
seeking municipal districts, plebiscites are held in the third stage of the fragmentation process. The precise
questions posed to voters in fragmentation plebiscites generally take on some form of the following: “Do you
agree with the creation of the municipality of [insert name of municipality], to be constituted of the municipal
districts [insert name of municipal districts]?”17 In response to this question, voters are prompted to respond
affirmatively or negatively. If a majority of the eligible electorate in fragmentation-seeking municipal dis-
tricts vote in favor of fragmentation, plebiscites pass/are successful. If a majority of the eligible electorate in
fragmentation-seeking municipal districts either does not turn out or votes against fragmentation, plebiscites
fail/are unsuccessful.
As described in Chapter 3, fragmentation proposals initiated by a solitary municipal district require a
majority of the eligible electorate both to turn out and to vote in favor of fragmentation in order for the
plebiscite to pass. The requisites for plebiscite success or failure are more complicated and stringent in
situations in which two (or more) municipal districts jointly initiate a fragmentation proposal to fragment
from the municipality in which they presently reside. I call fragmentation proposals submitted by more
than one municipal district joint fragmentation proposals. If the state government accepts a joint fragmen-
tation proposal, the opinions on fragmentation are separately solicited from voters in each of the municipal
districts that would comprise the new municipality. There are two types of municipal districts involved in
joint fragmentation proposals. I call these major municipal districts and minor municipal districts. Major
municipal districts are municipal districts that would be transformed into the headquarters of the new mu-
nicipality if fragmentation is realized. Minor municipal districts are municipal districts that would comprise
the proposed municipality in the event of fragmentation but would retain municipal district status under
the proposed territorial rearrangement. In other words, minor municipal districts would not, themselves, be
transformed into the headquarters of the new municipality.18 A plebiscite will only pass if a majority of the
eligible electorate in major and minor municipal districts both turn out and vote in favor of fragmentation.
It follows that a plebiscite will fail (and fragmentation will be rejected) if a majority of the eligible electorate
in any of the municipal districts involved in the fragmentation proposal fails to turn out or votes against
17In Portuguese the question is: “Concorda com a criação do munićıpio de [insert name of municipality], a ser constituido
pelo distrito de [insert name of the municipal district]?” This precise wording was used in fragmentation plebiscites held in the
Brazilian state of Esṕırito Santo.
18For example, one major district, Ibiracatu, and two minor districts, Bonança and Campo Alegre de Minas, initiated
proceedings to fragment the municipality to which they belonged, Varzelândia. They jointly submitted their fragmentation
proposal to the State Legislature of Minas Gerais in 1995. Both the state legislature and the voters subsequently approved of
the proposal, and the major district of Ibiracatu was transformed into a municipality. In the aftermath of fragmentation, the
minor districts of Bonança and Campo Alegre de Minas remained districts albeit under the jurisdiction of the municipality of
Ibriacatu instead of under the jurisdiction of Varzelândia.
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fragmentation.
As practices of direct democracy - fragmentation plebiscites being one example - have become increasingly
common, scholars have studied the logics underlying vote choices in referenda. Among other results, their
studies find that risk-aversion and political information influence voters’ decisions on proposed legislation.
In studying the 1995 referendum on sovereignty in Quebec, Nadeau, Martin and Blais (1999) find that
risk-averse voters are likely to base their choices purely on cost-benefit calculations and that risk-reluctant
voters are significantly influenced by perceived “worst outcomes.” In reference to the Australian Republic
Referendum of 1999, Davidson, Fry and Jarvis (2006) reach a similar conclusion. They argue that voters’
decisions on whether or not to amend the Australian Constitution were guided by loss-minimization efforts as
opposed to value-maximization efforts. Gerber and Lupia (1993) posit that exposure to political information,
as opposed to persuasions involving risk, influences the extent to which policy preferences are translated into
vote choices in referenda and other initiatives in California. They find that uninformed voters are biased
toward voting in favor of the status quo or abstaining as they, naturally, have more information about the
status quo than about a given ballot proposition. Bowler and Donovan (2000) provide empirical support for
these claims pertaining to referenda in California. Taken together, these contributions suggest that, policy
content aside, political information and risk aversion are important components underlying voting decisions
in direct democracy.
Scholars have devoted minimal attention to understanding how these principles of direct democracy
translate to explaining voting decisions in fragmentation plebiscites in Brazil. To my knowledge, Arvate,
Mattos and Ponczek (2010) provide the primary explanation for how Brazilian citizens make complicated
decisions about fragmentation. Arvate, Mattos and Ponczek (2010) claim that, in the absence of a complete
understanding of the transfer system,19 citizens look to cues from their within-state neighboring munic-
ipalities when asked to make a decision about whether to support or reject fragmentation of their own
municipality. Specifically, Arvate, Mattos and Ponczek (2010) argue that voters living in municipalities with
many fragmenting neighbors have higher propensities of supporting fragmentation in their own municipali-
ties. However, they provide no evidence that voters use their neighboring municipalities’ experiences with
fragmentation to inform their own decisions in fragmentation plebiscites nor do they dispel any alternative
explanations. Curiously, the results of fragmentation plebiscites do not appear in their paper in any form.
Their logic presumes, but does not provide evidence, that voters participating in fragmentation plebiscites
observe positive effects of fragmentation in new neighboring municipalities and, consequently, decide to
vote in favor of fragmentation in their own municipalities. I hypothesize that this reasoning, accompanied
19Like much work on the subject, the work of Arvate, Mattos and Ponczek (2010) adopts the assumption that intergovern-
mental transfer incentives are the primary motivating drivers of fragmentation.
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by an important caveat relating to municipal district type, may explain the outcome of fragmentation
plebiscites. My specific expectations also factor in the broader knowledge accumulated on participation in
direct democracy. Insofar as observing the experiences of fragmenting neighboring municipalities increases
information about the transformation from a municipal district to a municipality and reduces the risk
involved in voting against the status quo, I expect that voters residing in major municipal districts (i.e.
municipal districts that would be transformed into municipality headquarters in the event of fragmentation)
will turn out and vote in favor of fragmentation. Put differently, I believe that fragmentation plebiscites will
pass in major municipal districts.
By contrast, I expect that neighboring municipalities’ fragmentation experiences will provide blurrier
signals to minor municipal districts (i.e. municipal districts that will retain their municipal district status
in the event of fragmentation) about the counterfactual situation of their status as municipal districts of a
new municipality.20 Thus, I expect that voters in minor municipal districts would either abstain or vote in
favor of the status quo and against fragmentation in an effort to minimize risk and loss. In other words, I
anticipate that plebiscites will fail in minor municipal districts.
It follows from this logic that proposals jointly initiated by multiple municipal districts, comprised of
both major and minor municipal districts, may be more susceptible to plebiscite failure than fragmentation
proposals submitted by a solitary major municipal district (Hypothesis 3). With actual fragmentation
plebiscite results from the state’s electoral court, I can extend the set of cases in which direct democracy is
studied and build upon the knowledge that Arvate, Mattos and Ponczek (2010) have accumulated.
4.2.4 Summary
In summary, fragmentation in Brazil occurs through a six-stage process. These stages are detailed in
Chapter 3 and include fragmentation proposal initiation by municipal district leaders, proposal assessment
and plebiscite recommendation by state legislators, voter evaluation of fragmentation in plebiscites, rubber
stamp approval by legislators, rubber stamp approval by governor, and municipality-creation law enactment
(accompanied by municipality elections and formal municipal installation). Studying each of the former three
stages, at which true decisions regarding fragmentation are made, significantly advances our understanding
of the causes of subnational fragmentation in Brazil. In the above subsections, I outlined a theory of
fragmentation accompanied by various hypotheses that may explain the propensity of fragmentation proposal
“success” at each of these stages in the fragmentation. These are summarized below.
• Stage 1: I expect that grievances stimulate political activism and the initiation of fragmentation pro-
20There are no municipal district-level performance measurement metrics.
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ceedings. Grievances can manifest from geographic expansiveness, large numbers of effective parties
competing in local elections, both geographic expansiveness and large numbers of effective parties com-
peting in local elections, and municipality age. I hypothesize that municipal districts in municipalities
that are geographically expansive (Hypothesis 1.1), have large numbers of effective parties competing in
local elections (Hypothesis 1.2), are both geographically expansive and have large numbers of effective
parties competing in local elections (Hypothesis 1.3), and are older (Hypothesis 1.4) are more likely to
initiate fragmentation proceedings than municipal districts in municipalities that do not exhibit these
characteristics.
• Stage 2: I hypothesize that political alignments between state representatives and Fragmentation
Initiation Presidents will increase the likelihood that state governments accept submitted fragmentation
proposals (Hypothesis 2.1), and I anticipate that political alignments between state representatives and
mayors will reduce the likelihood that state governments accept submitted fragmentation proposals
(Hypothesis 2.2).
• Stage 3: I anticipate that fragmentation proposals initiated by one municipal district will be more
likely to pass plebiscites than fragmentation proposals jointly-initiated by multiple municipal districts
(Hypothesis 3).
In the following sections, I describe the data and methods that I use to test my theoretical expectations
at each stage in the fragmentation process.
4.3 Municipal Districts Initiate Fragmentation Proposals:
Research Data, Methods, and Analyses
Fragmentation proceedings commence with local actors submitting proposals to their respective state
legislatures. I hypothesize that grievances with status quo political arrangements motivate these actors to
undertake the costly enterprise of initiating proposals. Specifically, I expect that these grievances arise from
geographic expansiveness, large numbers of effective parties competing in local elections, both geographic
expansiveness and large numbers of effective parties competing in local elections, and municipality age. I
anticipate that municipal districts in municipalities that espouse these characteristics are more likely to
initiate fragmentation proceedings that municipalities that do not espouse these characteristics.
I study the relationships between fragmentation proposal initiation in the two major waves of late-
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twentieth century fragmentations in Brazil21 and the grievance factors identified above with a logistic regres-
sion analysis. My dependent variable is a dichotomous variable capturing fragmentation proposal initiation.
This variable takes on a value of 1 when at least one of a municipality’s municipal districts initiates fragmen-
tation proceedings and a value of 0 when none of a municipality’s municipal districts initiate fragmentation
proceedings. The data associated with this dependent variable comes from original coding of fragmentation
proposals from the State Legislative Assembly in Minas Gerais, and summary statistics associated with mu-
nicipalities that submitted fragmentation proposals and municipalities that did not submit fragmentation
proposals are included below in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics By Fragmentation Proposal Initiation, Minas Gerais 1991
No Fragmentation Proposal Fragmentation Proposal
Population 16960.65 48874.51
Geographic Area 608.35 1967.62
Proportion Literate 0.76 0.72
Average Years of School 3.36 3.32
Proportion Households Electricity 0.77 0.69
Proportion Households Garbage Collection 0.72 0.71
IDHM Income 0.57 0.56
Infant Mortality Per 1000 Born Alive 37.79 39.97
Proportion Extreme Poverty 0.28 0.31
Proportion Poverty 0.56 0.59
Proportion Population Urban 0.56 0.49
Proportion Life Expectancy to 60 0.72 0.71
Income Per Capita 125.01 121.54
My primary independent variables correspond with the hypotheses that grievances stemming from ge-
ographic expansiveness, large numbers of effective parties competing in local elections, both geographic
expansiveness and large numbers of effective parties competing in local elections, and municipality age mo-
tivate municipal districts to initiate fragmentation proceedings. I operationalize geographic expansiveness
with a logged measure of municipality area size (in square kilometers) from the Institute of Applied Eco-
nomic Research (IPEA). To measure the effective number of parties competing in local elections, I retrieved
the 1988 and 1992 local election results in Minas Gerais from the state’s regional electoral court22 and, with
these results, computed the effective number of parties in each municipality-electoral period using Lassko
and Taagepera’s (1979) measure. I operationalize municipality age with a logged variable capturing the
number of years since municipality creation. The data associated with the municipality age variable comes
from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).
21These two major waves of late-twentieth century fragmentations culminated in the installation of new municipalities in
1993 and 1997. The overwhelming majority of new municipalities created in the present democratic period were installed in
one of these two years.
22The 1988 and 1992 election results for many Brazilian states are unavailable electronically and/or to the public.
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I also incorporate several control variables in my regression model. These include logged municipality
population, logged municipality revenue, and the logged amount of financial resources per capita transferred
to municipalities from the central government. The data associated with each of these control variables
comes from the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA). Finally, I include year-fixed effects and
clustered standard errors.
The results of my logistic regression analysis are displayed below in Table 4.3.













Akaike Inf. Crit. 915.133
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The results of my analysis suggest that municipal districts in municipalities that are geographically larger
and more populous and that have more political parties competing in local elections are more likely to initiate
fragmentation proposals than municipal districts in municipalities that are smaller and less populous and
that have fewer political parties competing in local elections. In other words, the log odds of initiating
fragmentation proceedings increase for municipal districts in municipalities that foster administrative and
political grievances.
Predicted probabilities make these effects more easily interpretable. The probability of a municipal
district initiating a fragmentation proposal increases from 8.5% to 12.4% when the geographic area increases
from 209 square kilometers to 831 square kilometers (corresponding with the geographic areas at the 25th
and 75th percentiles, respectively), from 10.8% to 13.05% when the effective number of parties in the
municipality increases from 1.98 to 3.32 (corresponding with the number of parties at the 25th and 75th
percentiles, respectively), and from 10.6% to 11.8% when the population increases from 4680 to 18255
(corresponding with the populations at the 25th and 75th percentiles, respectively). Each of these predicted
probabilities were calculated holding all other variables from the model at their means.
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Additionally, my results suggest that the relationship between geographic area and the number of po-
litical parties competing in local elections is conditional, meaning that the geographic area and number of
political party coefficients are dependent. Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 plot the conditional coefficients and the
distribution of the conditioning variables.
Figure 4.1: Estimated Coefficient of Geographic Area on Fragmentation Proposal Initiation By Number of
Effective Parties
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Figure 4.2: Estimated Coefficient of Number of Effective Parties on Fragmentation Proposal Initiation By
Geographic Area
Figure 4.1 indicates that as the effective number of parties increases, the magnitude of the coefficient of
geographic area on fragmentation proposal initiation decreases. Figure 4.2 indicates that as the geographic
area increases, the magnitude of the coefficient of the number of effective parties on fragmentation proposal
initiation decreases. In both figures, the variables’ conditional effects reach statistical significance only for
limited ranges.
In sum, my results signal the importance of administrative and political grievances in motivating mu-
nicipal districts to initiate fragmentation proceedings and substantiate Hypotheses 1.1-1.3. Insofar as the
population variable encompasses the intergovernmental transfer incentives hypothesis, my results may pro-
vide some evidence supporting conventional wisdom about the motivations of subnational fragmentation in
Brazil. However, the magnitude of the effect of population is noticeably smaller than the magnitude of the
effect of the other statistically significant variables (geographic area and the effective number of parties).
Moreover, the intergovernmental transfer incentive hypothesis implies that poorer municipalities with larger
populations would be those with the most to gain from fragmentation. Surprisingly, my analysis does not
that find municipal districts from poorer municipalities are more likely to initiating fragmentation proceed-
ings. Regardless, the important takeaway from this analysis is that administrative and political grievances
play important roles in motivating municipal districts to initiate fragmentation proceedings.
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4.4 State Legislatures’ Decisions Surrounding Fragmentation
Proposals: Research Data, Methods, and Analyses
The previous analyses confirm that municipal districts with administrative and political grievances ini-
tiate fragmentation proceedings and submit fragmentation proposals to their respective state legislatures.
In the second stage of the fragmentation process, state representatives evaluate the merit of these propos-
als and decide whether or not to accept the proposal and to recommend that a plebiscite be held in the
fragmentation-seeking municipal district. Though the state legislature declined a number of proposals sub-
mitted in the late-twentieth century on the basis of their failure to satisfy objective criteria,23 it rejected
many others without explicit justification. In the case of Minas Gerais, approximately 44% of fragmentation
proposals submitted to the state legislature in between the promulgation of democracy and the turn of the
century appear to have satisfied state-defined fragmentation criteria24 but were nonetheless rejected by vote
in the legislature. I hypothesize political alignments between state legislators and local political brokers help
to explain the rejection of 44% of the fragmentation proposals submitted to the State Legislature in Minas
Gerais.
I use logistic regression analyses to assess whether political alignments predict state legislatures’ decisions
on whether or not to approve of submitted fragmentation proposals. The sample used in these analyses
consists of all municipalities in Minas Gerais with municipal districts that submitted fragmentation proposals
to the State Legislative Assembly between 1988 and 1996.25 The dependent variable in these analyses is a
dichotomous dependent variable indicating whether or not the state legislature approved of municipalities’
fragmentation proposals. The dichotomous variable takes on a value of 1 when a fragmentation proposal
was approved by the state and a value of 0 when a fragmentation proposal was rejected by the state.
The primary independent variables are dichotomous variables capturing political alignment between
state representatives and political actors who could plausibly serve as political brokers at the local level. The
political alignment independent variables take on different forms that correspond with my unique hypotheses.
The variables differ on the basis of the actors involved and the way in which alignment is operationalized.
23A mere 10 out of 356 fragmentation proposals submitted to the State Legislature of Minas Gerais were explicitly rejected
on the grounds of failure to meet prescribed criteria. For example, the fragmentation proposal regarding the creation of the
municipality of Cana Brava in 1995 was denied on the grounds that the proposed headquarters of Cana Brava would be too close
in geographic proximity to the headquarters of the ‘parent’ municipality of João Pinheiro. The proposal regarding the creation
of Nova Matrona in 1995 was rejected due to the fact that the municipal district did not exhibit the required number of voters
(2,000) in the area to be ‘emancipated,’ and the creation of Vai-Volta in 1995 was denied on the grounds that the municipal
district did not exhibit an urban area with the required minimum number of homes (400). The other seven fragmentation
proposals denied on objective grounds were discarded for similar reasons. This suggests that municipal districts self-regulated
and only undertook the costly enterprise of initiating fragmentation proceedings through preparing a fragmentation proposal
if they were confident that it satisfied objective criteria.
24At least, archived fragmentation proposal files contained no information to the contrary.
25It is worthwhile to note that the majority of these proposals were submitted to the state in 1991 and 1995.
67
Each model in this section contains at least one independent variable of political alignment. Models 1-3
contain independent variables capturing either political alignment between the state legislature and mayors
or between the state legislature and Fragmentation Initiation Presidents. Models 4-5 contain one variable
capturing political alignment between the state legislature and mayors and one variable capturing political
alignment between the state legislature and Fragmentation Initiation Presidents. Each political alignment
independent variable takes on a value of 1 when there is political alignment and a value of 0 when there is
not political alignment. A brief interlude on the way in which political alignment may be operationalized for
alignments between state representatives and mayors and between state representatives and Fragmentation
Initiation Presidents follows.
The discreet, and sometimes fleeting, nature of brokerage relationships between politicians in state and
local governments makes studying them complicated. In countries with enduring and institutionalized party
systems, political alignments are generally conceived of as partisan alignments. However, even in Brazil’s
late-twentieth century political environment in which politicians’ party affiliations were often ephemeral, it
is plausible that state legislators and their local brokers were linked through co-partisanship or that they
jointly decided their partisanship allegiances in this early democratic period. Under the assumption that
brokerage relationships operated through partisanship ties in late-twentieth century Brazil, I hypothesize
that state legislatures approve fragmentation proposals initiated by partisan-aligned Fragmentation Initiation
Presidents and reject fragmentation proposals initiated by non-partisan-aligned Fragmentation Initiation
Presidents (Hypothesis 2.1). The primary independent variable associated with this hypothesis takes on a
value of 1 when the Fragmentation Initiation President’s political party reflects the majority party in the state
legislature and a value of 0 otherwise.26 The data used to construct this variable comes from fragmentation
proposals preserved in the State Legislature of Minas Gerais and from election results obtained at the state
electoral court (Tribunal Regional Eleitoral, TRE) in Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais.
Also under the assumption that brokerage relationships operated through partisanship ties, I hypothesize
that state legislators approve fragmentation proposals submitted by municipal districts with non-partisan-
aligned mayors and reject fragmentation proposals submitted by municipal districts with partisan-aligned
mayors (Hypothesis 2.2). The independent variable associated with this hypothesis takes on a value of 1
when the mayor’s political party is the same as the majority party in the state legislature and a value of 0
otherwise. The data used to construct this variable also comes from the TRE in Minas Gerais.
Political alignment between state legislators and local actors, however, need not operate through partisan
ties. Niedzwiecki (2016) suggests that other links may serve to connect politicians in younger democracies.
26It is important to note that there is significant missingness in this variable due to non-reporting of Fragmentation Initiation
President’s political parties and my inability to recover this data.
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For example, state and local actors could be connected by shared status as ‘political insiders,’ where politi-
cal insiders are conceived of as politicians with experience serving in government. By definition, incumbent
politicians at all levels of government are political insiders. Thus, it would be senseless to investigate whether
political alignment, as operationalized by a linkage between political insiders, between state representatives
and mayors predicts state representatives’ evaluations of fragmentation proposals. Conceiving of political
alignments through a lens of political insiders is, however, valuable for assessing my hypothesis that political
alignments between state legislators and Fragmentation Initiation Presidents influence whether or not state
legislators approve submitted fragmentation proposals (Hypothesis 2.1). This conceptualization is appro-
priate in this instance because only a subset of Fragmentation Initiation Presidents were political insiders;
many did not have any prior political experience in the democratic period. Thus, a secondary independent
variable that captures alignment through a political insider linkage is used to test Hypothesis 2.1. This
political insider alignment variable takes on a value of 1 when the Fragmentation Initiation President is a
political insider and a value of 0 otherwise. Fragmentation Initiation Presidents are considered to be political
insiders if they were previously elected to office or elected to serve as a substitute in the event that an elected
member could not carry out his or her term.27 Data from original archival research combined with election
results from the TRE are used to populate this independent variable.
In addition to my primary independent variables, my models control for other variables that could factor
into the state legislatures’ decisions regarding the future life of fragmentation proposals. These control
variables include municipality revenue, area, and population. I also include year-fixed effects. The results of
these models are displayed below in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Logistic Regression Analyses of State Legislatures’ Fragmentation Proposal Evaluations
Dependent variable:
Approved Fragmentation Proposal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PA: Mayor-State −0.357 (0.292) −1.021 (1.013) −1.125∗ (0.651)
PA: FIP-State −1.302 (1.057) −1.022 (1.091)
IA: FIP-State 0.510 (0.617) 0.501 (0.630)
Municipality Revenue 0.00000∗∗ (0.00000) −0.00000 (0.00000) −0.00000 (0.00000) −0.00000 (0.00000) −0.00000 (0.00000)
Area 0.0002∗∗ (0.0001) −0.0004 (0.001) 0.00004 (0.0003) −0.0003 (0.001) 0.0001 (0.0003)
Population −0.00000 (0.00000) 0.0002∗∗ (0.0001) 0.00004 (0.00003) 0.0002∗ (0.0001) 0.00005 (0.00003)
Constant 0.115 (0.270) −0.148 (1.267) 0.669 (0.640) 0.402 (1.436) 1.181 (0.751)
Observations 217 38 85 37 84
Log Likelihood −135.522 −14.466 −35.951 −13.423 −33.970
Akaike Inf. Crit. 281.044 38.931 81.901 38.845 79.940
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The results of my models provide minimal evidence in support of my hypotheses. Five out of the seven
27Because election and political data from the time period is so limited, it is difficult to know whether substitutes actually
served during the electoral period.
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coefficients associated with the alignment independent variables - the Party Alignment: Mayor and State
coefficients and the Insider Alignment: Fragmentation Initiation President and State coefficients - are in
the expected directions. While these coefficients lend support to my expectations directionally, the lack of
statistical significance in all but one alignment coefficient discredits my hypotheses. However, the statistical
insignificance may be a product of the limited number of cases considered and of missing data among
the small sample size. In fact, Models 2, 3, and 4 suffer from a severe lack of statistical power.28 Data
inaccessibility and/or insufficient preservation have made these shortcomings hard to address, but future
archival research and coding may rectify this.
It is also worth noting that many coefficients associated with the control variables are also statistically
insignificant. This makes the statistical significance of the Party Alignment: Mayor and State coefficient
in Model 2 especially impressive. Nonetheless, I am left to conclude that my empirical work supports my
political alignment expectations directionally but, generally, not in terms of statistical significance. There
is, however, some evidence in support of Hypotheses 2.2. Future research should continue to investigate this
stage of the fragmentation process.
4.5 Voters Weigh in Through Plebiscites: Research Data,
Methods, and Analyses
If the state government approves fragmentation proposals and recommends that a plebiscite be held in the
fragmentation-seeking municipal district, voters are asked to evaluate the proposed territorial restructuring
in plebiscites. These plebiscites serve as the final stage of the fragmentation process in which a true decision
regarding the future of proposed new municipalities is made.29
Plebiscite results obtained from the Tribunal Regional Eleitoral (TRE) in Minas Gerais confirm that
fragmentation plebiscites are more than just procedural formalities. According to these results, fragmentation
plebiscites in Minas Gerais were more likely to pass than to fail. That said, approximately 40% of these
plebiscites failed between 1988 and 1992, and approximately 25% of plebiscites failed in the subsequent
municipal electoral period between 1992 and 1996. These percentages indicate the real opportunity provided
to the public to veto fragmentation proposals.
Additionally, the plebiscite results from Minas Gerais indicate that attributing plebiscites’ successes
or failures to disparate community preferences in the aggregate, as Arvate, Mattos and Ponczek (2010)
28The statistical power associated with Model 4, for example, is a mere 26%. In order to increase statistical power to 80%,
the percentage accepted as emblematic of a sufficiently powered model, the sample size would need to increase from 37 to 118.
29Technically, the state legislature and governor need to sign fragmentation legislation into law, municipality elections need
to be held, and municipality governments need to be installed after fragmentation plebiscites.
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suggest, is oversimplifying a more complicated relationship. Fragmentation plebiscites conducted in Minas
Gerais suggest that support for fragmentation was extremely high overall among voters whose opinions
on fragmentation were solicited in fragmentation plebiscites. The average percentage of voters in favor of
fragmentation across municipal districts in which plebiscites passed was 89.4%. Curiously, the percentage
of voters supporting fragmentation was also high in many municipal districts in which plebiscites failed;
in fact, more than 90% of voters, in the aggregate, cast their ballots in favor of fragmentation in 20 out
of 54 municipal districts in which plebiscites failed. Of the plebiscites that failed, only in the plebiscite
held in the Ermidinha municipal district of Nova Esperança did the overall percentage of votes cast against
fragmentation outnumber the percentage in favor of fragmentation. In each of the other fifty-three failed
plebiscites in Minas Gerais, the overall percentage of voters voting in favor of fragmentation surpassed the
percentage of voters opposing fragmentation. This section attempts to explain the surprising observation that
many plebiscites failed in municipal districts in which the majority of voters voted in favor of fragmentation.
It does so by considering restrictions imposed both by turnout and by peculiar plebiscite rules.
As stated earlier in this chapter, I anticipate that the number of municipal districts involved in frag-
mentation proposal initiation influences the outcome of the plebiscite (Hypothesis 3). Specifically, I expect
that fragmentation plebiscites are more likely to pass when they are initiated by a solitary municipal district
than when they are jointly initiated. I expect that support for fragmentation will be high among voters
in majority municipal districts (that, in the event of fragmentation, will be transformed into municipali-
ties) and that support for fragmentation will be low among voters in minority municipal districts (that,
in the event of fragmentation, will retain their municipal district status). It follows that I anticipate that
the fragmentation voting patterns in minority municipal districts will violate the requirements surrounding
fragmentation plebiscites30 and, thus, prevent fragmentation.
Figure 4.3 expresses the percentage of voters in support of fragmentation in the municipal district in which
fragmentation was least popular and turnout was lowest31 by the number of municipal districts involved in the
fragmentation proposal and turnout for each fragmentation proposal plebiscite. Observations are coded by
color and by shape on the basis of the number of municipal districts involved in the proposal. The clustering
of fragmentation proposals initiated by a solitary municipal district in the top right quadrant of Figure 4.3
and the scattered distribution of fragmentation proposals jointly initiated by multiple municipal districts
(especially, two municipal districts) suggests that disparate community preferences may have influenced
30The rules surrounding fragmentation plebiscites require a majority of voters to turn out and cast votes in favor of fragmen-
tation in both majority and minority municipal districts.
31The percentage of voters favoring fragmentation as displayed in the plot is conservatively calculated. Only municipal
districts with the highest abstention rates and lowest percentage of voters in favor of fragmentation are plotted for fragmentation
proposals that were jointly initiated.
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Figure 4.3: Percentage of Voters in Favor of Fragmentation By Number of Municipal Districts Involved in
Fragmentation Proposal and Turnout
plebiscite outcomes when the number of municipal districts involved in plebiscites is considered.
In order to provide further evidence of a relationship between the number of municipal districts involved
in fragmentation proposal initiations and plebiscite outcomes, I estimate a logistic regression analysis. The
dependent variable in this analysis is a dichotomous variable indicating plebiscite success or failure. This
variable variable takes on a value of 1 when a plebiscite is successful and a value of 0 when a plebiscite fails.
The plebiscite data used in this analysis was obtained from the Tribunal Regional Eleitoral (TRE) of Minas
Gerais.32 The primary independent variable in these models is the number of municipal districts involved
in a fragmentation proposal. The number of municipal districts involved in fragmentation proposals ranges
between 1 and 3. The mean number of municipal districts involved in a fragmentation proposal is 1.3, and
the median number of municipal districts is 1. The data used to construct this variable, again, comes from
the Tribunal Regional Eleitoral (TRE) of Minas Gerais. I do not have any additional control variables at
the municipal district(s) unit of analysis. Therefore, I cannot incorporate control variables in my model.33
I do, however, estimate these models with year-fixed effects. The results of this analysis are displayed in
Table 4.5 below.
32The Tribunal Regional Eleitoral (TRE) of Minas Gerais has preserved detailed results of fragmentation plebiscites. These
go beyond purely denoting whether plebiscites passed or failed. The results contain information about the size of the electorate,
plebiscite turnout/abstention rates, and the raw number of ”yes”, ”no”, ”blank”, and ”null” votes cast in each of the municipal
districts involved in fragmentation proposals.
33It is worthy of note that no municipal-level predictors explain whether fragmentation proposals are initiated singularly or
jointly.
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Table 4.5: Logistic Regression Analysis of Plebiscite Outcomes
Dependent variable:
Plebiscite Pass




Akaike Inf. Crit. 162.705
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The statistically significant results in Table 4.5 confirm my hypothesis that the number of municipal
districts involved in a fragmentation proposal is negatively correlated with plebiscite success (Hypothesis 3).
Put differently, the greater the number of municipal districts involved in a fragmentation proposal, the lower
the probability is that the fragmentation plebiscite will successfully pass. The predicted probability that a
fragmentation proposal initiated by one municipal district would pass in a plebiscite is 84%. As the number
of municipal districts initiating a solitary proposal increases to two and three, the predicted probabilities that
the proposal would pass in a plebiscite decrease to 67% and 44%, respectively. This, complemented by the
fact that every jointly-initiated fragmentation proposal that was unsuccessful at the plebiscite stage failed
due to lack of turnout or support in an outlying, minor municipal district, provides strong evidence that
the number of municipal districts involved in fragmentation proposals influences the likelihood of plebiscite
success and that failed proposals are likely the fault of minor districts.
While it is likely that risk aversion or a lack of political information about the post-fragmentation
counterfactual caused some voters in minor districts either to abstain or to vote against fragmentation, there
is also some evidence that political manipulation may have contributed to failed plebiscites. An interview
I conducted with an anonymous professor and journalist from the municipality of Barbacena (MG) sheds
light on the dynamics underlying the high abstention rate in the fragmentation plebiscite in the district of
Correia de Almeida in 1995.
Correia de Almeida (MG), a district in the municipality of Baracena (MG), initiated fragmentation
proceedings in 1995. Its fragmentation proposal was granted approval by the state government of Minas
Gerais, and a plebiscite was organized to be held in the district in 1995. According to the interviewee,
intense political maneuvering occurred in the days leading up to the plebiscite in an effort to prevent the
elevation of Correia de Almeida to the status of a municipality.34 Specifically, he stated that local politicians
34The interviewee claimed, “Naquela oportunidade alguns poĺıticos que sobrevivem com os votos desta comunidade fizeram
manobras para evitar que o distrito de Correia de Almeida se tornasse um munićıpio.”
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organized a free excursion to Aparecida do Norte, a religious tourist destination in the Brazilian state of
São Paulo, on the same day that the plebiscite was to be held. Consequently, many voters went on the
excursion at the cost of abstaining from participation in the fragmentation plebiscite.35 Approximately
52.3% of eligible votes in Correia de Almeida abstained from participating in the plebiscite. Of the 1,876
voters that participated, 1,715 (approximately 91%) voted in favor of fragmentation and 86 voted against
fragmentation. The district was just a mere 93 votes away from attaining an absolute majority in favor of
fragmentation. The thought that the high abstention rate explains the inability to obtain the support of an
absolute majority of district voters is supported by the Tribunal Eleitoral Regional documentation (which
justifies the fragmentation failure with a statement that the quorum was not satisfied).
Although Correia de Almeida singularly initiated fragmentation proceedings (that is to say, no other
districts jointly initiated the proposal with Correia de Almeida), it is plausible that similar practices of
political meddling extended beyond the district’s borders to minor districts involved in jointly-initiated
proposals. The small size of minor districts may make them prone to elite capture. While the generalizability
of this experience remains uncertain, Correia de Almeida’s experience sheds light on a possible alternative
dynamic underlying low turnout and high abstention in the plebiscite stage of the fragmentation process. In
the forthcoming conclusion, I summarize this chapter’s contribution and touch upon the foundation that it
provides to study the effects of fragmentation.
4.6 Conclusion
Subnational fragmentation affords scholars a unique opportunity to weigh into contentious debates sur-
rounding political unit size and the effects of decentralization. However, its utility depends on scholars’
abilities to understand the lack of random assignment in determining which subnational units fragment and
which do not. In this chapter, I advanced traditional explanations of fragmentation in the Brazilian context
and suggested that causes underlying subnational fragmentation in the context of Brazil are much more
complex than traditional wisdom on intergovernmental transfers has led us to believe. In doing so, I have
also contributed to our understanding of three broader political behaviors - participation in unconventional
political activities, legislative behavior, and participation in direct democracy.
First, I considered existing explanations and proposed new explanations underlying fragmentation and,
more specifically, municipal districts’ decisions on whether or not to submit fragmentation proposals. This
chapter highlights the important reality that not all municipal districts that submitted fragmentation propos-
35The interviewee stated, No fim da semana que houve a votação, na sexta-feira foram realizadas várias excursões para a
cidade religiosa da Aparecida/SP, todas gratuitas. Assim, muitos deixaram de votar.
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als actually experienced fragmentation. Empirical assessments of the predictors of fragmentation proposal
initiation confirm my theoretical expectations that grievances stemming from geographic expansiveness and
large numbers of effective parties in local elections influence municipal districts’ decisions to undertake the
costly enterprises of pursuing fragmentation. Additionally, I find that municipal districts in more populous
municipalities are more likely to pursue fragmentation than municipal districts in less populous municipali-
ties. I suggest that this may provide some evidence in support of the intergovernmental transfer explanation
but note that the magnitude of the uncovered effect is smaller than the effect size associated with the
grievance explanations.
Second, I studied the factors that predict state legislature approval of submitted fragmentation proposals.
I find very weak evidence in support of my expectation that political alignments between the state legislature
and both mayors and Fragmentation Initiation Presidents help to differentiate fragmentation proposals that
the state government approves and fragmentation proposals that the state government rejects. However, I
also find that few of my control variables discriminate between these two types of proposals. Future work
would be well served to continue investigating fragmentation decisions made in the state legislature to rule
out the possibility that legislative decisions surrounding fragmentation are truly random.
Third, I assessed fragmentation plebiscite results and determined that the number of municipal districts
involved in fragmentation proposal initiation affects plebiscites’ propensities of success. More specifically, I
find that jointly-initiated fragmentation proposals are less likely to pass in plebiscites than fragmentation
proposals initiated by a solitary municipal district.
By deeply understanding the conditions allowing for fragmentation at each of the stages in the fragmen-
tation process, I not only learn something new about subnational fragmentation in Brazil but can better
account for the causes of fragmentation in assessments of its consequences. Combining these two types of
assessments, however, remains a work in progress. In Chapter 5, I begin to incorporate the findings from
this chapter, to the best of my ability, in an effort to understand whether fragmentation influences political






Political participation lies at the heart of proper democratic functioning. It is the primary channel
through which voters interact with the political system, express opinions about politics, and select elected
officials. Political participation and, more specifically, voting is often the principal way in which voters hold
their representatives accountable for following through on their mandates and their political performance in
office more broadly.
Accordingly, many scholars have investigated the factors that influence political participation. Their
studies have produced a wide array of individual- and contextual-level explanations of variation in partic-
ipation and, chiefly, in turnout. In this chapter, I investigate whether there exists a relationship between
subnational fragmentation and political participation with the motivating goal of adding to this impressive
body of scholarship.
There are compelling, theoretically-grounded reasons to expect that small political units, such as those
generated by subnational fragmentation, may stimulate political participation. These are grounded in the
classic resource, mobilization, and rational choice models of electoral participation. First, small political
units may reasonably reduce the cognitive, informational, and transportation expenses that make political
participation a costly enterprise and, relatedly, increase access to resources that facilitate engagement. Some
of the most pronounced individual-level explanations of political participation involve educational attain-
ment (Verba, Nie and Kim, 1987; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Dalton, 2002; Blais, 2000; Carreras and
Castañeda-Angarita, 2014; Converse, 1972; Campbell, 2013), cognitive abilities (Norris, 1999; Dalton, 2002;
Denny and Doyle, 2008), and levels of political knowledge/information (Converse, 1972; Gordon and Segura,
1997; Berggren, 2001; Grönlund and Milner, 2006). The political behavior literature concedes that voters
with greater educational attainment, cognitive abilities, and levels of political participation and/or political
knowledge are more prone to participate politically. Insofar as smaller units facilitate the transmission of po-
litical information and make politics more accessible to voters (Dahl and Tufte, 1973), it is rational to expect
the cognitive and informational costs of civic engagement to be less and the rates of political participation
to be higher in smaller, as compared with larger, political units.
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At a systemic-level, scholars of political behavior understand that the transportation costs, for example,
involved in political participation may be prohibitive (Nicolau, 2002; Limongi, 2015; Moisés and Meneguello,
2013). Speaking specifically on the Brazilian context covered in this work, Limongi (2015) posits that the
transportation costs for voters living in rural areas in Brazil pose significant obstacles to political partici-
pation. She claims that, oftentimes, voters from peripheral areas would only cast ballots if transportation
was provided to them from their homes to polling stations in city centers. Considering that smaller political
units, by nature, concentrate political activity in more geographically confined areas than their larger coun-
terparts, it is conceivable that subnational fragmentation would make the transportation to polling stations
less costly and could, consequently, raise participation rates.
Second, small political units may increase civic engagement in politics if they increase voters’ suscep-
tibilities to political mobilization. The mobilization model of political behavior, developed by Rosenstone
and Hansen (1993), posits that voters are more likely to participate in politics if they are invited, asked,
or pressured to do so (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Blais, 2007). An extensive literature provides empir-
ical support for this model in assessments of the effectiveness of participation persuasion attempts made
by phone, mail, and personal contact as a part of Get-Out-The-Vote (GOTV) campaigns. Perhaps most
prominent among these contributions is Gerber and Green’s (2000) landmark study aimed at assessing the
effects of different forms of campaigning on turnout. Using a randomized experiment conducted in New
Haven in the lead up to the 1998 midterm election, Gerber and Green (2000) found that voter turnout
increased in places where individuals were exposed to personal campaigning. By contrast, voter turnout was
not affected by telephone calls and increased slightly as a product of direct mail canvassing. The substantive
and methodological rigor of this policy-informing project inspired others to assess the effects of GOTV efforts
in other contexts or under other conditions (Michelson, 2003; Smith, Gerber and Orlich, 2003; Arceneaux,
2005; McNulty, 2005; Wong, 2005; Nickerson, Friedrichs and King, 2006; Nickerson, 2006). The compilation
of these studies suggests that the positive effects of mobilization on political participation are widespread.
As detailed in Chapters 3 and 4, the process of subnational fragmentation in Brazil requires intense
mobilization of voters by political elites at both the first and the third stages in the subnational fragmenta-
tion process. Local political elites pursuing subnational fragmentation need to demonstrate public will for
fragmentation with voters’ signatures in the fragmentation proposals that they submit to state legislatures
in the first stage of the fragmentation process and to convince voters to vote in favor of fragmentation in
plebiscites in the third stage in the fragmentation process. Both require intense mobilization on the part
of local political leaders. Insofar as the recruitment involved in the fragmentation process itself carries over
to local elections succeeding fragmentation, it is plausible that subnational fragmentation would enhance
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political participation through mobilization.
Third, small political units may positively influence important attitudinal inputs that predisposition
voters to participate politically. Among these are sentiments of citizen effectiveness, political efficacy, and
political trust. Several scholars subscribe to this perspective. Dahl and Tufte (1973) posit that the imme-
diacy, accessibility, and comprehensibility of local politics instill sentiments of citizen effectiveness in voters
and that these sentiments of citizen effectiveness translate into higher levels of political participation. Al-
mond (1963) argues that the aforementioned factors accompanied by the manageable nature of local politics
generate enhanced sentiments of political efficacy in local, as compared with national, governments. Finally,
Meguid (2007) claims that institutional structures that reduce the geographic distance between politicians
and voters are likely to effectuate enhanced sentiments of trust in the government and, specifically, in the
proximate subnational government. Insofar as citizen effectiveness, political efficacy, and political trust in-
fluence individuals’ calculations on whether or not to engage in politics, as scholars of political behavior
concede that they do,1 it is reasonable to expect small political units that generate these sentiments to also
positively influence political participation.
Through each of the channels identified above, there are compelling reasons to believe that subnational
fragmentation, and the accompanying reduction in political unit size, would enhance political participation.
In this chapter, I investigate the relationship between subnational fragmentation and political participation
and test whether these theoretical expectations are borne out. In doing so, I not only provide new insight into
a plausible, yet unstudied, effect of subnational fragmentation, but I also add to our understanding of the
factors influencing political participation. Moreover, I test the central tenets of contemporary conversations
surrounding the consequences of decentralization and the timeless debates over the effects of political unit
size. In keeping with the context considered in the remainder of the dissertation, I study the relationship
between subnational fragmentation and political participation in Brazil. In what follows, I identify the
coincidence of the intense proliferation of municipalities in Brazil and the reintroduction of competitive local
elections as an opportunity to study the effect of subnational fragmentation on political participation. I,
then, describe my approach to researching this relationship.
1See Rosenstone and Hansen (1993); Teixeira (1992); Campbell, Gurin and Miller (1954); Abramson (1983); Verba, Schloz-
man and Brady (1995); Anderson (2010); Almond (1963); Klesner (2002) and Mishler and Rose (2005)
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5.1 Brazil’s Late-Twentieth Century Democratic Transition:
Subnational Fragmentation, Reintroduction of Local
Elections, and Political Participatory Goals
Following nearly two decades of dictatorship, Brazil expressed a recommitment to democratic ideals in
early 1980’s and initiated a regime transition that culminated with the adoption of the Constitution of the
Federative Republic of Brazil in 1988. The country’s first free and fair elections following the adoption of the
new democratic constitution took place in 1988. The 1988 elections were municipal elections and resulted
in the election of mayors and municipal councilmen.2 Elections for local offices have taken place every four
years beginning in 1988 and continuing in 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, etc.3
The reinstatement of competitive elections in Brazil was accompanied by ambitious goals of expanding
political participation in the country (Tomio, 2002; Falleti, 2005). The subsequent adoption of participatory
budgeting and electronic voting - both of which were motivated by and successful in achieving participatory
goals (DE OLIVEIRA, N.d.; Bhatnagar et al., 2003; Dias et al., 2014; Hidalgo, 2010; Fujiwara, 2015; Nicolau,
2002; Zucco and Nicolau, 2016) - speaks to the seriousness of the country’s commitment to increasing political
inclusion in the late-twentieth century.
However, these initiatives were not singular in their capacities to enhance participation. The creation
of more than 1,000 new municipalities in the years following the democratic transition and the accompa-
nying reduction in political unit size in double that number of municipalities provides another avenue by
which late-twentieth century political participation in Brazil may have been enhanced. In light of the rigor
surrounding the implementation and study of programs aimed at increasing political participation in the
present democratic period, such as participatory budgeting and electronic voting, theoretical underpinnings
suggest that it is sensible to also study the relationship between subnational fragmentation and political
participation.
In this chapter, I attempt to fill this gap by studying the relationship between subnational fragmentation
and political participation. In line with expectations pertaining to the related relationships between both
political unit size and decentralization and political participation, I expect that subnational fragmentation
will increase voters’ propensities to engage with local government and enhance political participation in
local elections. Specifically, I hypothesize that it will boost turnout rates in local elections. In the Brazilian
2The first direct presidential, gubernatorial, and national as well as state legislative elections in the present democratic
period occurred in 1989. Since these founding elections, local and state/national elections have been offset by two years.
3Elections for state and national offices have taken place every four years beginning in 1989 and continuing in 1994, 1998,
2002, 2006, etc.
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context in which voting is mandatory, I also expect there to be a negative relationship between subnational
fragmentation and spoiled votes (i.e. null and blank ballots). Insofar as null and blank votes serve as less
costly alternatives to abstention, I anticipate that some pre-fragmentation voters who wished to abstain
but not to pay the political costs of doing so cast null and blank votes. If fragmentation increases voters’
propensities of engaging with local government, I expect that individuals will be less likely to cast protest
votes in the form of null or blank votes in the aftermath of fragmentation. In other words, I expect that
fragmentation reduces the proportion of null and blank ballots cast in local elections and increases the
concentration of valid votes. In the following section, I describe the methods and data that I use to test
these expectations.
5.2 Fragmentation and Political Participation in Fragmenting
and Non-Fragmenting Municipalities: Research Design and
Data
In this chapter, I consider whether reducing the size of local political units by way of subnational frag-
mentation enhances political participation in municipal elections. In order to assess the relationship be-
tween fragmentation and political participation, I compare pre- and post-fragmentation levels of political
participation across Brazilian municipalities that fragmented and Brazilian municipalities that did not frag-
ment. However, insofar as fragmenting municipalities are systematically different than their non-fragmenting
counterparts (as Chapter 4 suggests), a raw comparison of pre- and post-fragmentation levels of political
participation across fragmenting and non-fragmenting Brazilian municipalities is insufficient. In order to
obtain reliable estimates of the effect of fragmentation on political participation, I am required to account
for systematic differences across municipality types without introducing post-treatment bias. Matching af-
fords me an opportunity to account for these differences and to identify non-fragmenting units that most
closely resemble fragmenting units. Using solely a subset of fragmenting and non-fragmenting municipalities
that matching analyses identify as similar, I compare patterns of political participation across fragmenting
and non-fragmenting municipalities with increased certainty that, aside from fragmentation, municipalities
of these two types are similar. I estimate the statistical significance of observed differences across these
two groups with difference-in-difference analyses. Following the introduction of my data, I describe these
procedures in greater detail with reference to the specific data utilized.
To study the relationship between fragmentation and political participation empirically, I have con-
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structed an original dataset of municipal creation with information from the Brazilian School Census Data,
the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), the Institute of Applied Economic Research
(IPEA), the Brazilian National Household Sample Survey (PNAD), Atlas Brasil, the National Institute of
Education Research and Studies (INEP), the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), the Regional Electoral Courts
(TREs), etc. This dataset includes detailed measures of the administrative, political, fiscal, and demographic
histories of all Brazilian municipalities (currently numbering 5,570) over the 1988-2015 period. It includes
original indicator variables denoting whether municipalities were created and/or installed4 for each year in
the period studied and merges this information with existing measures of political participation as well as
relevant control variables.
This dataset of municipal creation informs a supplementary dataset consisting of municipalities and
reaggregated municipalities. Reaggregated municipalities replace the component parts of fragmenting mu-
nicipalities in the aftermath of fragmentation such that information about each municipality as it existed
in 1988 (at the moment in which the present constitution was instated) is preserved.5 While the municipal
creation dataset proves valuable in capturing the precise experiences of Brazilian municipalities, it does not
permit me to appropriately make desired pre- and post-fragmentation comparisons in political participation.6
Therefore, this chapter relies integrally on the supplementary dataset comprised both of municipalities and
reaggregated units. This dataset permits me to make one-to-one comparisons of the political participation
patterns of the same unit (albeit reconstructed in the post-fragmentation period) over time. Given this
chapter’s focus on the relationship between fragmentation and political participation, a discussion on elec-
tion data sources in Brazil, as they pertain to political participation, and their preservation and availability
is warranted.
The Superior Electoral Court (TSE)7 is the highest Brazilian Electoral Justice body and is comprised
of Regional Electoral Courts (TREs)8 corresponding with each of the Brazilian states as well as the Federal
District. One of the primary areas over which the TSE and various TREs have jurisdiction is elections. These
branches are responsible for managing the logistics surrounding actors involved in elections (specifically,
political parties, candidates, and voters), the actual execution of elections, and the preservation of election
4Brazilian municipalities are considered to be created in the year that all legal requisites are satisfied. However, municipalities
are not formally installed until the first municipal government assumes office.
5In terms of the Rio Pardo de Minas example, Rio Pardo de Minas existed with a particular structure until 1995. In 1995, Rio
Pardo de Minas fragmented. This fragmentation resulted in the creation of a new child municipality, Santo Antônio de Retiro,
and a territorially reorganized Rio Pardo de Minas. Although Rio Pardo de Minas enters my dataset every year from 1988 to
2015, its post-1995 composition actually aggregates information from the territorially reorganized Rio Pardo de Minas and the
part of Rio Pardo de Minas that fragmented to form the new municipality of Santo Antônio de Retiro. Other reaggregated
units are constructed in this same fashion.
6Comparing political participation in municipalities reorganized or created as a product of fragmentation with political
participation in pre-fragmentation municipalities involves comparisons of two (or more) post-fragmentation municipalities with
one pre-fragmentation municipality. This violates the required statistical property of independence of observations.
7In Portuguese, this organ is called the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.
8In Portuguese, these organs are called the Tribunal Regional Eleitoral.
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results. In the early years of Brazil’s present democratic period - including the period characterized by the
intense late-twentieth century subnational fragmentation in Brazil - election results collected by the TSE
and the various TREs provide some of the primary sources from which political participation in the period
can be studied.
In addition to documenting the performance of individual parties and candidates, election results contain
information on the raw number of valid, null, and blank ballots cast and on the size of the electorate. This
information can be used to calculate various credible indicators of political participation including turnout
and abstention rates as well as the proportion of valid, null, and blank ballots cast. Although the proportion
of valid, null, and blank ballots do not capture political participation directly, in the context of Brazil
in which voting is mandatory, they can provide important insight into participation.9. Insofar as voters
encounter a cost from abstaining, those who do not wish to participate nor to pay the cost of abstaining
may disqualify their vote by casting a null or blank ballot. This would prevent them from having to pay
the cost of abstaining while simultaneously providing them with an opportunity to send signals of political
dissatisfaction or disinterest (signals similar to those accompanying abstention). Thus, although null and
blank ballots are not equivalent to abstaining, they can serve as proxies for a lack of meaningful participation.
While the TSE and the various TRE organs have preserved many election results comprising information
on political participation from the present democratic period, the results from the 1988 and 1992 elections
- the elections surrounding the intense 1992 and 1996 waves of subnational fragmentation in Brazil - are
particularly sparse and/or have not been digitized. Some attribute the dearth of information surrounding
the 1988 and 1992 municipality election results to efforts undertaken to hide corrupt political maneuverings.
Regardless, the fact is that, in many cases, the 1988 and 1992 municipality election results are hard to come
by and are not systematically available as are the results from contests in later election years.
The periodic overlap of this dearth of information on political participation and the prolific 1992 and
1996 waves of subnational fragmentation is problematic for a study of the relationship between fragmentation
and political participation. In fact, the missing election data from both 1988 and 1992 precludes a study
comparing levels of political participation in non-fragmenting municipalities and reaggregated fragmenting
municipalities in the periods prior to and in the aftermath of the 1992 wave of fragmentation. The preser-
vation and accessibility of some election results from 199210 makes a limited assessment of the effects of the
9It is important to note that despite mandatory voting, turnout is not universal, and there is notable variation in turnout
across Brazilian municipalities. In the 1996 municipality elections, for example, turnout ranged from 98.16% in São José do
Sabugi to 10.2% in Cantá.
10I was able to access 1992 election results from the following Brazilian states: Amapá, Maranhão, Pernambuco, Piaúı, Rio
de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Norte, Paráıba, Rio Grande do Sul, and Matto Grosso do Sul. Of this subset, the election results
of two states (Pernambuco and Piaúı) do not contain the size of the electorate. In order to salvage these states, I impute the
1992 electorate size of Brazilian municipalities using available information on electorate size from the 1994 elections.
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prolific 1996 wave of fragmentation on political participation possible. Specifically, I assess the effects of
the 1996 wave of subnational fragmentation on political participation in nine Brazilian states that span the
range of development exhibited by the broader population of Brazilian states.11 Insofar as development is
the primary indicator or proxy for important factors (e.g. state capacity) differentiating states included and
excluded from the subset of states in the analysis, there is little reason to be concerned that the uncovered
results would not generalize to the broader subset of Brazilian states.
Fortunately, the availability of election results surrounding the 2000 wave of fragmentation permits an
additional assessment of the relationship between fragmentation and political participation. However, this
too is limited both in the number of fragmentations in this wave and in geographic scope. Only 63 mu-
nicipalities fragmented in 2000. This pales in comparison with the 449 municipalities that fragmented in
1996. As discussed in Chapter 3, the increased federal regulation of subnational fragmentation beginning
in 1996 slowed the intense municipality proliferation of the early post-transition years. Moreover, these 63
instances of subnational fragmentation occurred in a small subset of Brazilian states; specifically, 29 munic-
ipalities fragmented in Rio Grande do Sul, 18 municipalities fragmented in Mato Grosso, four municipalities
fragmented in Goiás, and one municipality fragmented in each Piaúı, Rio Grande do Norte, Alagoas, Bahia,
and Esṕırito Santo. This means that the participatory effects of fragmentation uncovered from studying the
2000 wave of fragmentations are driven, largely, by the experiences of municipalities in Rio Grande do Sul
and Mato Grosso.
While studies of the effects of subnational fragmentation on political participation involving both the
1996 and 2000 waves of fragmentation are imperfect, their shortcomings are dissimilar. This means that if
analyses conducted separately for each of the waves of fragmentation produce the same results, I can place
greater confidence in said results than I would be able to with either analysis independently. In what follows,
I discuss the precise way in which I use the administrative, demographic, election, and other data that I
have collected to study the relationship between the 1996 and 2000 waves of subnational fragmentation in
Brazil and political participation.
First, I match municipalities that fragmented in 1996 and in 2000 with similar municipalities that never
fragmented over the 1988-2015 period12 in an attempt to reduce imbalances across fragmenting and non-
fragmenting municipalities without introducing post-treatment bias (Rubin, 2006; Ho et al., 2007; Lyall,
2009). Specifically, I match fragmenting and non-fragmenting municipalities on a series of characteristics that
differentiate municipalities in these two groups with one-to-one, nearest neighbor propensity score matching
11On the basis of total income in 1991, this subset comprises the least developed state (Amapá), the second most developed
state (Rio de Janeiro), and seven other states with middling levels of development (IPEA).
12Municipalities that fragmented in other years were excluded from the sample of municipalities eligible to be selected into
the non-fragmenting group.
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without replacement.13 The characteristics on which these municipalities are matched are informed by both
my own work from Chapter 4 and other research on the topic and include population, area, the number of
political parties voted for in local elections, literacy rates, years of existence, municipality revenue, transfers
from the federal government, and state for the 1996 fragmentation analysis and population, area, the number
of political parties voted for in local elections, literacy rates, years of existence, and dichotomous variables
for the two states with significant proliferation in the 2000 for the 2000 fragmentation analysis. This strategy
results in 413 reaggregated fragmenting and 413 non-fragmenting municipalities associated with the 1996
wave of fragmentation14 and 66 reaggregated fragmenting and 66 non-fragmenting municipalities associated
with the 2000 wave of fragmentation. Using these matched pairs, I subset my data such that only fragmenting
municipalities and their non-fragmenting counterparts are included.15 With this reduced sample, I implement
a series of difference-in-difference analyses in an attempt to uncover the effect of fragmentation on indicators
of political participation in Brazilian local elections.
The proportion of valid, null, and blank ballots cast and the turnout/abstention rates in Brazilian local
elections serve as indicators of political participation, as previously discussed, and as the primary dependent
variables in my difference-in-difference analyses. The primary independent variables are binary indicators
capturing whether a municipality fragmented (1 for fragmentation, 0 otherwise), post-fragmentation time
period observation (1 for post-fragmentation, 0 otherwise), and an interaction between municipality fragmen-
tation and post-fragmentation time period observations (1 for both fragmentation and post-fragmentation,
0 otherwise).16 My analyses are estimated separately for the two waves of fragmentation studied. For
analyses corresponding with the 1996 wave of fragmentation, my primary independent variables capture
fragmentation observation, post-1995 observation, and an interaction between fragmentation and post-1995.
For analyses corresponding with the 2000 wave of fragmentation, my primary independent variables capture
fragmentation observation, post-1999 observation, and an interaction between fragmentation and post-1999.
The following difference-in-difference modeling specification allows me to make comparisons of levels of
political participation between reaggregated fragmenting and non-fragmenting Brazilian municipalities prior
to and in the aftermath of fragmentation:
13I also confirm that the results yielded with matching pairs identified in this fashion are robust to alternative matching
specifications including optimal, full, and genetic matching as well as one-to-one, nearest neighbor propensity score matching
with replacement.
14It is important to note that the entire sample identified with this matching exercise is not ultimately used in the ensuing
difference-in-difference models to missing election data. This missing data further reduces the size of the samples for this
analysis.
15I use the strategy of Lyall (2009) as a guide for implementing this approach.
16For observations in which reaggregated municipalities replace municipalities, the appropriate unit of analysis would be the
reaggregated municipality-year.
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Υmt = α+ β1PostFragmentationt + β2MunicipalityFragmentedm
+β3PostFragmentationt ∗MunicipalityFragmentedm + δs + εmt (5.1)
Per this model, Υmt is an indicator of political participation in municipality m at time t, α is a con-
stant, PostFragmentationt is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 when t>1996 for studies of the 1996
wave of fragmentation and t>2000 for studies of the 2000 wave of fragmentation and 0 otherwise, and
MunicipalityFragmentedm is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 when municipality m fragmented and 0 oth-
erwise. The β3 coefficient associated with the interaction of PostFragmentationt andMunicipalityFragmentedm
is the estimated difference-in-difference estimator, and the primary coefficient of interest. Additionally, δs
represents state fixed effects. These state fixed effects control for any unobservable state-specific charac-
teristics that do not vary across time. Finally, εmt is the error term. I incorporate municipality clustered
standard errors. Due to a concern of post-treatment bias (i.e. that fragmentation would influence covariates
in the model after the treatment), I pre-process my data with matching such that only municipalities that
are similar on relevant pre-fragmentation covariates are included and exclude control variables.
Given the limited timespan of the pre-fragmentation series,17 I decided not to include all of the election
years in the post-fragmentation sample. Were I to include this entire subset, the difference-in-difference effect
ascertained would obscure nuance in times series variance. Therefore, I adopt an approach in which I exploit
cross-sectional, as opposed to time series, variance and compute “cleaner” estimates. Specifically, I restrict
the number of years in the post-fragmentation period. I compare levels of political participation in the
election prior to each of the studied waves of fragmentation separately with levels of political participation
in each of the elections succeeding fragmentation across reaggregated fragmenting and non-fragmenting
municipalities. This means that for the 1996 wave of fragmentation, I compare levels of political participation
in 1992 with levels of political participation in each of the 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 elections in reaggregated
fragmenting and non-fragmenting municipalities and that for the 2000 wave of fragmentation, I compare
levels of political participation in 1996 with levels of political participation in each of the 2000, 2004, and
2008 elections in reaggregated fragmenting and non-fragmenting municipalities. Thus, each difference-in-
difference estimation contains only one pre-fragmentation measure of political participation and one post-
fragmentation measure of political participation. Again, computing difference-in-difference models with
these restricted time periods simplifies the interpretation of the estimates and allows me to appropriately
consider differences in estimates across time.
17There is only one pre-fragmentation measure of political participation for the 1996 wave of fragmentation.
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In what follows, I implement and present the results of the empirical analyses outlined above. To preview,
I find some evidence that fragmentation enhances turnout and the valid vote share and reduces the proportion
of null votes cast in local elections but only in the first elections succeeding fragmentation. I interpret this
as a signal that positive participatory effects of fragmentation, where they exist, are short-lived.
5.3 Fragmentation and Political Participation in Fragmenting
and Non-Fragmenting Municipalities: Results
In an effort to study the effect of subnational fragmentation on political participation, I, first, match
reaggregated fragmenting and non-fragmenting municipalities in Brazil. My aim in matching is to reduce
pre-fragmentation imbalances across reaggregated fragmenting and non-fragmenting municipalities. The
percent balance improvements resulting from matching indicates that matching satisfies this goal. For ex-
ample, in terms of overall distance, matching improves imbalances across reaggregated fragmenting and
non-fragmenting municipalities associated with the 1996 wave of fragmentation by 76.49%. In terms of geo-
graphic area (one of the primary characteristics identified in explaining fragmenting in Chapter 4), matching
improves imbalances across groups associated with the 1996 wave of fragmentation by 63.65%. Prior to
matching, the mean difference in geographic area across reaggregated fragmenting municipalities and non-
fragmenting municipalities associated with the 1996 wave of fragmentation was 977.77 square kilometers.18
Matching reduces this mean difference across municipality types to 355.40. Visual evidence of balance
improvements across reaggregated fragmenting and non-fragmenting municipalities is provided in the his-
tograms depicted in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2. These compare the weighted pre- and post-fragmentation
propensity scores across groups. They, like the percent balance improvements, suggest that fragmenting and
non-fragmenting municipalities’ propensities of fragmenting were notably different and that matching helps
to reduce disparities across fragmenting and non-fragmenting municipalities.19
18The mean geographic area in reaggregated fragmenting municipalities was 2366.53 square kilometers, and the mean geo-
graphic area in non-fragmenting municipalities was 1388.76 square kilometers.
19It is worthy of note that, based on the factors identified as predicting fragmentation, many non-fragmenting municipalities
in both waves of fragmentations had low propensities to fragment. Many fragmenting municipalities, especially, in the 2000
wave of fragmentations also had low propensities to fragment. However, this fragmenting group of municipalities covers a
greater range of propensity scores than the non-fragmenting group.
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Figure 5.1: Propensity Score Matching Balance, 1996
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Figure 5.2: Propensity Score Matching Balance, 2000
With the matching-generated sample of reaggregated and non-fragmenting municipalities, I inspect vi-
sual differences in political participation measures across reaggregated fragmenting and non-fragmenting
municipalities and, then, statistically estimate observed differences in political participation across groups.
As a primary cut into investigating the relationship between fragmentation and political participation,
I consider plots capturing the proportion of voters that participated in municipality elections as well as
the proportion of total votes cast in electoral contests that were valid, null, and blank across the subset of
reaggregated fragmenting and non-fragmenting municipalities identified with matching. Non-fragmenting
municipality trajectories capture political participation in municipalities that never fragmented in the late-
twentieth century period studied, and reaggregated fragmenting municipality trajectories capture the com-
bined political participation in parent and child municipalities involved in one of two waves of fragmentation.
As previously described, electoral data and the need for both pre- and post-fragmentation measures of polit-
ical participation restrict my assessments to the waves of fragmentations that resulted in new municipality
installations in 1997 and 2001. In what follows, I, first, present plots capturing the proportion of voters that
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participated in municipality elections as well as the proportion of total votes cast in electoral contests that
were valid, null, and blank in non-fragmenting municipalities and reaggregated fragmenting municipalities
that fragmented in between 1993 and 1996, held their first municipality elections in 1996, and were formally
installed in 1997. I, then, present plots capturing the proportion of voters that participated in municipality
elections as well as the proportion of total votes cast in electoral contests that were valid, null, and blank in
non-fragmenting municipalities and reaggregated municipalities that fragmented in between 1997 and 2000,
held their first municipality elections in 2000, and were formally installed in 2001.
Figure 5.3: Turnout and Proportion of Valid Votes in Municipality Elections By Municipality Type, 1996
Wave of Fragmentation
Figure 5.4: Proportion of Null and Blank Votes in Municipality Elections By Municipality Type, 1996 Wave
of Fragmentation
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Figure 5.5: Turnout and Proportion of Valid Votes in Municipality Elections By Municipality Type, 2000
Wave of Fragmentation
Figure 5.6: Proportion of Null and Blank Votes in Municipality Elections By Municipality Type, 2000 Wave
of Fragmentation
Observationally, the most striking difference across comparable reaggregated fragmenting and non-
fragmenting municipalities associated with the 1996 wave of fragmentation is in turnout rates and in the
proportion of valid votes cast in the 1996 municipality elections, the first elections after the 1996 wave of
fragmentation. In comparison with non-fragmenting municipalities which, in every other year, outperform
reaggregated fragmenting municipalities in the considered participatory measures, reaggregated fragmenting
municipalities experience a significant spike both in turnout and in the proportion of valid votes cast in the
1996 municipality elections; in these elections, alone, both reaggregated fragmenting municipalities’ turnout
rates and the proportion of valid votes cast noticeably outnumber those of non-fragmenting municipalities.
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The increase in the valid vote share experienced in reaggregated fragmenting municipalities seems to be
largely a product of increased turnout. However, a slight decline in the proportion of null votes cast in
reaggregated fragmenting municipalities in the 1996 elections may also help to explain the spike in the valid
vote share. Interpreted holistically, these plots suggest that fragmentation enhanced political participation
but only in the elections immediately succeeding territorial restructuring.
Though reaggregated fragmenting municipalities from the 2000 wave of fragmentation do not similarly
experience increases in turnout rates and in the proportion of valid votes cast in the 2000 municipality
elections and underperform in political participation in virtually every year and participatory category con-
sidered (with the exception of 2008), this does not necessarily negate the conclusion drawn from observations
derived from the 1996 wave of fragmentations. Given that the 1996 wave of fragmentations was much larger,
geographically expansive, and less restricted (in terms of the institutional rules and regulations surrounding
it), it may be appropriate to place more weight on the patterns and results from that wave of fragmentations.
While these descriptive figures provide initial points of comparison of political participation trends across
reaggregated fragmenting and non-fragmenting municipalities, they are incapable of weighing in on the sta-
tistical significance of differences, where observed. In what follows, I investigate the statistical significance
of differences in indicators of political participation across reaggregated fragmenting and non-fragmenting
municipalities with difference-in-difference analyses. To reiterate, difference-in-difference analyses are con-
structed separately for each of the two waves of fragmentation analyzed and for various time period com-
parisons. For the 1996 wave of fragmentations, these time period comparisons include 1992 and 1996, 1992
and 2000, 1992 and 2004, and 1992 and 2008. For the 2000 wave of fragmentations, these time period
comparisons include 1996 and 2000, 1996 and 2004, and 1996 and 2008. Below, I summarize the results from
these difference-in-difference analyses with coefficient plots organized by each of the participatory dependent
variables. The physical regression tables are available in the Appendix.
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Figure 5.7: Coefficient Plot from Difference-in-Difference Analyses of Turnout in Municipality Elections
Figure 5.8: Coefficient Plot from Difference-in-Difference Analyses of Valid Votes in Municipality Elections
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Figure 5.9: Coefficient Plot from Difference-in-Difference Analyses of Blank Votes in Municipality Elections
Figure 5.10: Coefficient Plot from Difference-in-Difference Analyses of Null Votes in Municipality Elections
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The most pronounced observation from these coefficient plots is that subnational fragmentation generates
minimal positive participatory effects. Contrary to theoretical expectations, subnational fragmentation does
not appear to universally increase turnout rates or the valid vote share or to decrease the proportion of null
or blank ballots cast. More often than not, it produces null effects. Nonetheless, there are some important
exceptions to these overarching patterns.
First, per comparisons made between 1996 and both 2004 and 2008, fragmentation increased turnout
rates by 3.9% and 5.2%, respectively. Second, per comparisons made between 1992 and 1996 and 1996 and
2008, fragmentation increased the valid vote share by 10.9% and 5.4%, respectively. Third, per compar-
isons made between 1992 and 2008, fragmentation decreased the blank vote share by 1.4%. Finally, per
comparisons made between 1992 and 1996, fragmentation decreased the null vote share by 1.3%. I interpret
these statistically significant effects of fragmentation as signals that fragmentation, sometimes, increased
the proportion of votes responsible for contributing to electoral outcomes and decreased the proportion of
votes that may have been cast as protest by votes by voters wishing to abstain without paying the costs
of doing so. These results may salvage the relationship between subnational fragmentation and political
participation, in light of otherwise null results. At minimum, they dispel some notions in recent work (i.e.
Remmer (2010)) that community size negatively impacts political participation in the developing world.
Of these statistically significant results, those uncovered from analyses of the 1996 wave of fragmentations
are especially persuasive given that they are derived from the less restrictive and more geographically repre-
sentative of the two fragmentation waves considered.20 In attributing additional weight to the findings from
the 1996 wave of fragmentations - chiefly, that fragmentation increased the valid vote share by a whopping
10.9% - a new and important caveat surfaces with respect to the relationship between subnational fragmen-
tation and political participation: There may be positive participatory effects following from subnational
fragmentation, as evidenced by an increase in the proportion of valid votes and a decrease in the proportion
of null votes, but these may be short-lived. As the novelty of fragmentation wears off in elections after the
first post-fragmentation elections, these positive participatory effects may also subside.
This interpretation of the relationship between subnational fragmentation and political participation
sheds light on the possible channel through which these two phenomena may be related. As previously
discussed, subnational fragmentation may enhance civic engagement by making participation less costly,
20Moreover, the results from models comparing participatory levels across 1992 and 1996 are robust to the exclusion of the
only Brazilian state, Santa Catarina, that used electronic voting in 1996. This robustness check helps to dispel suspicions that
the introduction of electronic voting, which is understood to have increased the valid votes to turnout ratio and decreased
the proportion of residual votes (Fujiwara, 2015; Hidalgo, 2010; Nicolau, 2002; Zucco and Nicolau, 2016), may confound the
relationship between fragmentation and participation in some fashion.
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mobilizing the electorate, and/or positively influencing important attitudinal predictors of participation. Of
these, only the logic associated with the mobilization mechanism would allow for the observed short-lasting
effects of subnational fragmentation on political participation. This would imply that the recruitment efforts
required of subnational fragmentation would incentivize participation in the post-fragmentation municipality
elections but would subside with the passage of time. Any effects of subnational fragmentation on political
participation mediated by the other mechanisms would be stationary as opposed to ephemeral.
In sum, subnational fragmentation generated some, albeit minimal, positive participatory effects. The
most reliable of these analyses recommend an important caveat to the relationship between subnational
fragmentation. They indicate that subnational fragmentation may generate enhanced participation but that
these effects are ephemeral. The nature of this relationship suggests that a story of political mobilization
likely underlies the short-lived connection between subnational fragmentation and political participation.
5.4 Conclusion
Political participation is an integral cornerstone of democratic governance. Thus, developing countries
with fledgling democracies prioritized enhancing political participation in the late-twentieth century. In
an effort to increase participation and engage previously disenfranchised segments of the electorate, Brazil,
for instance, decentralized political power, implemented participatory budgeting programs, and adopted
electronic voting. While scholars have devoted notable attention to assessing whether these reforms generated
expected improvements in political participation, this chapter is the first to my knowledge to study whether
reducing the size of local governments through subnational fragmentation increased political participation
in Brazil as theories of political unit size would believe us to lead that it should.
In keeping with the broader theme of the dissertation, this chapter assessed the theoretical expectations
of a negative relationship between the size of political units and political participation through studying
the relationship between subnational fragmentation and turnout rates and the proportion of valid, null, and
blank ballots in local elections. Empirical analyses provide provide some, albeit limited, supporting evidence
for the theoretical expectation that smaller political units - created as a product of fragmentation - enhance
political participation. Specifically, they confirm that subnational fragmentation in Brazil enhanced the
valid vote share and contributed to a decrease in null ballots in the country’s first post-fragmentation local
elections but that it did not have longer-term participatory effects. I interpret this as evidence that the
political mobilization of local populations that occurred in the fragmentation process likely carried over to
and influenced political participation in the first post-fragmentation elections. As the political mobilization
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of the fragmentation process grew more temporally distant, participatory enthusiasm subsided.
Otherwise, the results of this chapter provide underwhelming evidence in support of a robust and enduring
relationship between political unit size and political participation. However, they also fail to substantiate
Remmer’s (2010) finding that electoral turnout in the less industrialized world declines with community size.
Though a reduction in the size of political units may, in and of itself, be insufficient in augmenting sustained
political participation, the findings from this chapter suggest that fragmentation accompanied by political
mobilization may stimulate desired increases in political engagement.
Future scholarship would be well-served to more concretely tease out the role of political mobilization in
the elections surrounding subnational fragmentation. One way to do this would be to look for opportunities
to dissect the participatory patterns in parent and child municipalities. If political mobilization explains
the temporary participatory uptick in reaggregated fragmenting municipalities, turnout rates and the valid
vote share ought to be higher in child municipalities that were politically mobilized in the fragmentation
process than in parent municipalities that were bystanders in the process. Although investigating these
heterogeneous participatory effects may be a challenging enterprise for subnational fragmentations of the late-
twentieth century, if contemporary (relatively) permissive legislation and popular will lend way to additional
incidences of subnational fragmentation, this profitable project would become possible.
Additionally, forthcoming scholarship in this line of research should rule out alternative explanations
for the results uncovered in this chapter. For example, it could be the case that political participation
increases in municipalities involved in fragmentation in the elections immediately succeeding fragmenting
but subsequently lowers until local politicians have developed a track record for evaluation. Insofar as the
time period studied in this chapter is too short for local politicians to develop this track record, it might be
remiss to expect to uncover a relationship between subnational fragmentation and political participation,
even if it exists. Forthcoming research should extend the time period considered forward to investigate this
alternative possibility.
Finally, there would be benefits to extending the time period considered backward in time to assess
whether differences in turnout rates and in the proportion of valid, null, and blank votes existed in reaggre-
gated fragmenting and non-fragmenting municipalities prior to the period in which fragmentation occurred.
The limited availability of electoral data in the pre-fragmentation period requires me to assume that the
participatory trends in reaggregated fragmenting and non-fragmenting municipalities were parallel prior to
fragmentation. However, this assumption may be preemptive and remains to be tested. Future research may
benefit from archival research and data collection that would permit an investigation of this assumption as
well as a pre-fragmentation placebo test, both of which could allow me to place greater confidence in my
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observed results.
Although there remains much to be done to better understand the relationship between subnational
fragmentation and political participation (and, plausibly, political mobilization), this chapter provided con-





and Education Infrastructure Quality
The fundamental need for public goods and services underlies the very existence of governments. At
their core, governments are charged with solving collective action problems and with providing services
more efficiently and effectively than any one constituent could provide for him or herself. However, not
all governments provide their constituents with the same levels or qualities of services, and scholars have
proposed numerous explanations for the unequal distribution of public goods and services. Among these,
government size and the geographic proximity between the governmental entity supplying public goods and
the constituents receiving public goods is important.
Some posit that smaller political units are positioned to provide higher quality public goods and services
than larger political units (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972; Weingast, 2009; Gibson, 2004; Agrawal and Ribot,
1999; Alesina and Spolaore, 2005; Balaguer-Coll, Prior and Tortosa-Ausina, 2010). They argue that smaller
entities encourage the provision of public services that are tailored to meet the needs of local communities
and permit citizens to strategically locate themselves in communities offering optimal tax-service packages.
Studies assessing these expectations have given rise to a contentious and unresolved debate (Treisman, 2007;
Prud’Homme, 1995; Tanzi, 1996; Tiebout, 1956; Weingast, 1995; Oates, 1972; Feidler and Staal, 2012; Huther
and Shah, 1998).
In this chapter, I study the relationship between subnational fragmentation and public goods provision
in Brazil. The intense proliferation of Brazilian municipalities since the country’s most recent democratic
transition, complemented by the autonomy granted to local governments to provide public services to their
communities, provides me with unique opportunities to learn about the understudied effects of territorial
restructuring in the developing world and to contribute to the ongoing discussion regarding the expected
relationship between government size and public goods provision.
In what follows, I discuss Brazilian municipalities’ responsibilities relating to public goods provision with
an eye to public primary education. I, then, describe the matching and difference-in-difference methodolog-
ical approach I use to assess the relationship between fragmentation and metrics of education quality and
introduce data sources on education in Brazil that make such a study possible. Next, I present and discuss
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my results. To preview, I find that fragmenting municipalities initially underperform in education quality in
comparison to their non-fragmenting counterparts. However, after fragmentation, fragmenting municipalities
catch up to their non-fragmenting counterparts. I interpret this as a signal that fragmentation contributed
to enhancing public primary education.
Although this first research study reveals an effect of fragmentation on education quality, it is incapable
of assessing whether the effects of fragmentation are disparate across types of municipalities involved in
fragmentation. There are compelling reasons to believe that the effects of fragmentation may be different
for municipalities that experience solely a reduction in the distance between their local governments and
constituents as a product of fragmentation (i.e. parent municipalities) than for municipalities that experience
both a reduction in the distance between their local governments and constituents and an introduction of
brand new local governments (i.e. child municipalities). In a second empirical section in this chapter, I
explore whether the effects of fragmentation on education quality differ across parent and child municipalities.
My research design is similar to that used in the first empirical section but with a new school-level dataset.
I find that education quality in schools in child municipalities was initially lower than education quality in
schools in parent municipalities, and while education quality in all schools improved over time, it improved in
schools in child municipalities at a more rapid rate. These findings suggest that fragmentation was especially
instrumental in improving service provision in the parts of the municipalities that did not previously have
their own governments and were underperforming prior to fragmentation (i.e. the part of the municipality
that transformed to become a child municipality post-fragmentation).
Then, I provide some preliminary evidence that fragmentation itself, as opposed to an unintended side
effect of fragmentation, is responsible for the observed effects. I demonstrate that municipalities involved in
fragmentation are more likely to contain municipality education councils, institutions committed to improv-
ing education quality, than their non-fragmenting counterparts. I suggest that a commitment to improving
service provision, through the creation and operation of municipality education councils, explains the ob-
served relationships between fragmentation and the quality of public services. Finally, I summarize and
conclude.
6.1 Public Goods Provision in Brazilian Municipalities:
Fragmentation and Public Primary Education
Though Brazilian municipalities have long existed as political units, their political strength, autonomy,
and capacities have vacillated significantly over time with the most recent tide favoring municipal autonomy.
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Following years of authoritarian rule and centralized political authority, democracy and decentralization were
gradually restored in the 1980s. At that time, significant political, administrative, and financial powers were
(re-)transferred to Brazilian municipalities (Tomio, 2005; Favero, 2004; Dahlby, 2011). A recommitment
to municipal autonomy and empowerment became viscerally entrenched in the country’s 1988 Constitution
(Tomio, 2005; Favero, 2004; Dahlby, 2011). Per this legislation, Brazilian municipalities were singularly
charged with providing several public goods, services, and works to their communities. These include
the construction and maintenance of roads, the creation and upkeep of public parks and museums, the
provision of primary healthcare, and the program of public primary education (Souza, 2002; Arretche,
2009). Toral (2016) claims, “while municipal governments have a wide range of responsibilities, education
is very prominent among them,” and municipalities are expected to spend at least a quarter of their income
in this policy area (Toral, 2016; Brazil Constitution, N.d.).
The 1988 Brazilian Federal Constitution states that the provision of education is the duty of the State
and the family and that public education is both mandatory and free (Brazil Constitution, N.d.). It is
to be publicly organized and provided for by the union, states, federal district, and municipalities (Brazil
Constitution, N.d.). Administratively, Brazil’s basic public education system is divided into three tiers;
these tiers include primary school, middle school, and high school. Municipalities, states, and the federal
government manage schools in each of these tiers. Municipal governments are chiefly responsible for the
provision of public primary education and were responsible for more than 80% of enrollments in public
primary education as of 2012. While private education options exist, less than 15% of Brazilian students
were enrolled in private primary and middle schools in 2012 (Toral, 2016). This confirms that the vast
majority of students enrolled in primary education in Brazil attend public schools (Toral, 2016; Education
for All 2015 National Review Report: Brazil, 2015).
The quality of public education in Brazil is remarkably low in comparison with the quality of education
provided both in private schools in Brazil and in public schools in other OECD and middle-income countries
(Bruns, Evans and Luque, 2011). According to a 2008 Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) Report,
Brazil severely underperformed in education standards in comparison with other country participants in the
OECD Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) (Menezes-Filho et al., 2008). For example,
almost 40% of Brazilian students were delayed according to the 2003 PISA Assessment (Menezes-Filho et al.,
2008). This proportion was much higher than corresponding percentages in other similar countries. Almost
90% of Brazilian 15-year-olds were classified as extremely low-skilled in mathematics on the basis of their
performance in the 2003 PISA Assessment, and a majority (67.1%) remained in the low-skilled category for
mathematics in the 2012 PISA Assessment (Menezes-Filho et al., 2008; Education Policy Outlook Brazil,
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2015).1 Although indicators from the 2012 round of the PISA Assessment suggest that Brazilian education
has improved in recent years,2 much room for further development remains. Realizing these advances and
improving the quality and accessibility of education is a policy priority in Brazil (Toral, 2016).
While significant attention has been devoted to developing, implementing, and assessing policies and
programs aimed at improving the quality of education in Brazil,3 we know little about the effect of subna-
tional fragmentation and the size of local governments on educational outcomes of interest. This oversight is
surprising given strong theoretical expectations that reducing the size of political units, as accomplished by
subnational fragmentation, will enhance the provision of public goods and services (Tiebout, 1956; Oates,
1972; Weingast, 2009; Gibson, 2004; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Balaguer-Coll, Prior and Tortosa-Ausina,
2010).
The few extant studies on the effects of subnational fragmentation in the Brazilian case provide mixed
evidence in support of these theoretical expectations. Using regression models that estimate the relationship
between fragmentation and various measures of education and life quality4 with data from 1991 and 2000 in
Minas Gerais, Wanderley (2008) finds that subnational fragmentation notably improved income levels and
life qualities in child municipalities at the expense of parent municipalities. Favero (2004) also suggests that
the municipality-level Human Development Indices and São Paulo Social Responsibility Indices increased5
in fragmented municipalities from pre- to post-fragmentation periods through descriptive assessments. How-
ever, Ribeiro and Pinto (2009) suggest that the dismemberment of child municipalities from their parents
“quite often leads to the establishment of administrative units with poor political, institutional, and financial
capacities” (Ribeiro and Pinto, 2009). Mattos and Ponczek’s difference-in-difference study on the relation-
ship between fragmentation and both public goods and social indicators substantiates this claim (Mattos and
Ponczek, 2013). They find that fragmentation encumbers adequate public goods provision. In this chapter,
I scale up some of these contributions and introduce more concrete and nuanced evidence into the debate.
Given the strong theoretical assumption that devolving political power and reducing the size of local
governments will improve public goods provision, it is remiss to disregard local political arrangements in
conversations on how to improve the quality of education in Brazil. The passage of almost two decades
since the most intense periods of fragmentation in the current democratic period has allowed ample time
1According to the results of the 2012 PISA Assessment, the average percentage of underperformers in mathematics across
OECD countries was 23%.
2For example, in comparison with other OECD countries, Brazil made the greatest improvement in mathematics performance
between the 2003 and 2012 PISA Assessments. Whereas Brazil witnessed an increase of 35 score points in mathematics, other
OECD countries, on average, experienced a decrease of 3 score points (Education Policy Outlook Brazil, 2015).
3For example, one of the fundamental motivations for Bolsa Famı́lia, an important conditional cash transfer program, was
to increase school attendance.
4These include the average number of years of education, illiteracy rates, the proportion of children aged 5-6 in school, the
proportion of teenagers with children, and the poverty rate.
5Index increases signal improvement.
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for the effects of fragmentation to emerge, thus, making studies on the effects of fragmentation particularly
timely. Moreover, the ample Brazilian education data and the fact that some educational outputs fall under
the sole jurisdiction of municipalities makes a study of the effects of fragmentation on education quality
possible. In the following section, I describe the methods and data that I use to assess the relationship
between fragmentation and the provision of quality education.
6.2 Fragmentation and Education Infrastructure Quality in
Non-Fragmenting and Fragmenting Municipalities: Research
Design and Data
In this chapter, I consider whether reducing the size of political units yields an improvement in the provi-
sion of public goods and services by evaluating the relationship between fragmentation and various metrics
of education quality. In order to assess the relationship between subnational fragmentation and education
quality, I compute the effect of fragmentation on education quality with difference-in-difference analyses con-
ducted with a subset of similar fragmenting and non-fragmenting municipalities identified through matching.
This approach is valuable insofar as it controls for systematic differences across municipality types without
inducing post-treatment bias. Following the introduction of my data, I describe these research procedures
in greater detail with reference to the specific data utilized.
To study the relationship between fragmentation and education quality empirically, I use data from a
dataset supplementary to my original dataset on municipal creation6 that consists of similar non-fragmenting
and reaggregated fragmenting municipalities identified by matching in Chapter 5.7 Though much of the data
from the supplementary dataset was introduced and used in previous chapters, the education-specific data is
new. Given this chapter’s focus on education and on the relationship between fragmentation and education
quality, a specific discussion on education data sources in Brazil and on the sources selected for my analyses
is warranted.
As policy initiatives and other efforts have prioritized improving education in Brazil, a series of indicators
6To refresh, this dataset draws upon varied sources including the Brazilian School Census Data, the Brazilian Institute
of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA), the Brazilian National Household
Sample Survey (PNAD), Atlas Brasil, the National Institute of Education Research and Studies (INEP), the Superior Electoral
Court (TSE), the Regional Electoral Courts (TREs), etc. and includes detailed measures of the administrative, political, fiscal,
and demographic histories of all Brazilian municipalities (currently numbering 5,570) over the 1988-2015 period.
7In Chapter 5, non-fragmenting and reaggregated fragmenting municipalities associated with the 1996 wave of fragmentations
were matched with one-to-one, nearest neighbor propensity score matching without replacement on the basis of population, area,
the number of political parties voted for in local elections, literacy rates, years of existence, municipality revenue, transfers from
the federal government, and state. This yielded 413 reaggregated fragmenting municipalities and 413 similar non-fragmenting
municipalities.
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have been developed to measure changes in the quality of education provision in Brazil. The most prominent
among these include Prova Brasil, the Basic Education Assessment System (SAEB), the National Assessment
of Basic Education (ANEB), and the annual Brazilian School Census. Each of these studies captures unique
facets of education quality including, but not limited to, material retention, school furnishings, teacher
training, etc. For the purposes of my dissertation, I consider solely the Brazilian School Census data.
The data from the Brazilian School Census are appropriate for an analysis of the relationship between
subnational fragmentation and education quality for the following reasons: 1) Its annual enumeration began
in 1995, two years prior to the second major wave of fragmentations in Brazil; 2) It is mandatory for all
Brazilian private and public school administrations to complete, and it can be easily completed online via the
Educacenso system; and 3) The scope of the content is vast and includes important information on education
infrastructure quality (in addition to information on student performance, attendance, and matriculation
rates). In studying the relationship between subnational fragmentation and the quality of provided education,
it is preferable to consider the effects of subnational fragmentation on education infrastructure quality as
opposed to the effects of subnational fragmentation on student performance, attendance, and matriculation
rates because education infrastructure quality is more directly controlled by the municipality government.
Student performance, attendance, and matriculation rates, by contrast, are more susceptible to influences
external to the municipality government and administration.
The Brazilian School Censuses contain multiple metrics of education infrastructure quality at the school-
level of analysis beginning in 1995. These include: Whether sewage, sanitation, electricity, a science lab, a
cafeteria, a library, internet, and a television exist; whether the school-building is permanent; the number
of computers and printers; whether the school has internet connection; and the student-classroom, student-
teacher, and student-functionary ratio. For the sake of conciseness, I privilege several metrics in this larger
subset that are especially fundamental to quality education infrastructure. These include the existence of san-
itation and electricity. Sanitation and electricity are critical preconditions to student learning achievement.
I average individual school inputs to construct measures of sanitation and electricity at the municipality-
or reaggregated municipality-year level of analysis, and these measures of education infrastructure quality
serve as my primary dependent variables.
To complement these individual metric dependent variables, I create a simple additive index that com-
bines additional metrics of education infrastructure quality at the municipality- or reaggregated municipality-
year level of analysis.8 I consider this school index as an additional, complementary dependent variable.
8This index consists of metrics capturing whether sewage exists, the school building is permanent, electricity exists, sanitation
exists within the school, a library exists, a science lab exists, and a cafeteria exists. Each of these specific indicators are
enumerated in the time period corresponding with fragmentation and contribute to education infrastructure quality. Moreover,
the Chronbach’s alpha between these metrics is 0.77. This signals that the intercorrelation between metrics is sufficiently high
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I argue that the school index may be more reliable in capturing education infrastructure quality than any
one metric independently. To reiterate, the sanitation and electricity metrics and the school index are the
primary dependent variables in my analysis.
The primary explanatory variables are binary indicators corresponding with fragmentation, the post-
fragmentation period, and the interaction between fragmentation and the post-fragmentation period. The
1995 start date of the Brazilian School Census data restricts my analysis of the relationship between frag-
mentation and the quality of education infrastructure to fragmentation that took place post-1995. Thus, I
assess the intense fragmentation of 1996 and the installation of new municipalities created as a product of
fragmentation in 1997. This means that only municipalities that fragmented in between 1993 and 1996 and
that were installed in 1997 are considered to be fragmenting municipalities in this analysis9 and, relatedly,
that the post-fragmentation period consists of all years after 1996. Put differently, the fragmentation variable
takes on a value of 1 when fragmentation occurred in 1997 and a value of 0 otherwise; the post-treatment
variable takes on a value of 1 for all years after 1996 and a value of 0 otherwise; and the interaction term
takes on a value of 1 when the observation year is post-1996 and fragmentation occurred and resulted in
new municipality installation in 1997.
Formally, the difference-in-difference modeling specification can be written as follows:
Υmt = α+ β1Post1996t + β2MunicipalityFragmentedm
+β3Post1996t ∗MunicipalityFragmentedm + δs + εmt (6.1)
Per this model, Υmt is a proxy for education infrastructure quality in municipality m at time t, α is a con-
stant, Post1996t is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 when t>1996 and 0 otherwise, andMunicipalityFragmentedm
is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 when municipality m fragmented in the period studied and 0 other-
wise. The β3 coefficient associated with the interaction of Post1996t and MunicipalityFragmentedm is the
estimated difference-in-difference estimator, and the primary coefficient of interest. The δs represents state
fixed effects,10 and εmt is the error term. I cluster standard errors at the level of the municipality.
Also similarly to Chapter 5, I restrict my difference-in-difference analyses to include only one pre-
fragmentation and one post-fragmentation observation. This approach exploits solely cross-sectional, as
opposed to times series, variance and computes more interpretable effects than a multi-period model. Specif-
ically, I compare metrics of education infrastructure quality in 1996 with metrics of education infrastructure
and, thus, that a basic additive index is appropriate.
9All other municipalities that fragmented in other years in the present democratic period are dropped from the analysis.
10These state fixed effects control for any unobservable state-specific characteristics that do not vary across time
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in each 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010 in reaggregated fragmenting and non-fragmenting
municipalities identified as similar on the basis of the matching implemented in the previous chapter.
In what follows, I present descriptive plots of education infrastructure quality in non-fragmenting and
reaggregated fragmenting municipalities identified as similar in the matching exercise in Chapter 5. These
plots confirm observational differences in education infrastructure quality as a function of municipality type.
I, then, proceed to assess the statistical significance of observed differences. To preview, I find strong
evidence that fragmentation enhanced the quality of education infrastructure. I interpret this as a signal
that municipalities involved in fragmentation had sub-standard service provision prior to fragmentation but
took advantage of the increased administrative attention brought about by fragmentation to improve service
delivery and, more specifically, education infrastructure quality. I, then, demonstrate the robustness of
these results to an especially hard test of the relationship between subnational fragmentation and education
infrastructure quality with original data collected in Minas Gerais.
6.3 Fragmentation and Education Infrastructure Quality in
Non-Fragmenting and Fragmenting Municipalities: Results
Observationally, notable differences exist in the quality of education infrastructure provided by the
matched reaggregated fragmenting and non-fragmenting municipalities across the period analyzed. The dis-
parate qualities of education infrastructure across municipality types are most pronounced in the mid-1990’s
and diminish over the course of the observed period. Figure 6.1, Figure 6.2, and Figure 6.3 demonstrate these
temporal disparities using sanitation, electricity, and the school index, respectively, as metrics of education
infrastructure quality.
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Figure 6.1: Proportion of Schools With Sanitation Per Municipality Type
Figure 6.2: Proportion of Schools With Electricity Per Municipality Type
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Figure 6.3: School Index Per Municipality Type
Figure 6.1, Figure 6.2, and Figure 6.3 provide descriptive evidence that education infrastructure quality
was lower in reaggregated fragmenting municipalities than in their non-fragmenting counterparts prior to
fragmentation. However, with the passage of time, the proportion of schools in reaggregated fragmenting
municipalities with sanitation and electricity caught up to the proportion of schools in non-fragmenting
municipalities with sanitation and electricity. In fact, the proportion of schools in reaggregated fragmenting
municipalities with electricity eventually surpassed the proportion of schools in non-fragmenting municipal-
ities with electricity. Similarly, school index scores in reaggregated fragmenting municipalities caught up to
school index scores in non-fragmenting municipalities with the passage of time. These plots suggest that
fragmentation enhanced the quality of education infrastructure provided by municipality governments.
I assess the statistical significance of these observed differences with difference-in-difference analyses. As
discussed previously, difference-in-difference modeling specifications differ in terms of the metric of education
infrastructure quality used but also in terms of the post-fragmentation period considered. In what follows,
I present the results of these analyses grouped by dependent variable in a series of coefficient plots.11
11The regression tables associated with these coefficient plots can be found in the Appendix.
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Figure 6.4: Coefficient Plot from Difference-in-Difference Analyses of Sanitation in Municipality-
Administered Public Schools
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Figure 6.5: Coefficient Plot from Difference-in-Difference Analyses of Electricity in Municipality-
Administered Public Schools
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Figure 6.6: Coefficient Plot from Difference-in-Difference Analyses of School Indices in Municipality-
Administered Public Schools
In large part, the difference-in-difference results confirm the observed descriptive patterns; they further
substantiate the positive impact of fragmentation on education infrastructure quality. The interaction be-
tween fragmentation and the post-fragmentation period is always positive and almost always statistically
significant. Moreover, the size of the effect is quite large regardless of the dependent variable or time period
considered. The magnitude of the effect of fragmentation on the percentage of schools with sanitation ranges
from 4.7% to 13.1%, and the effect size of fragmentation on the percentage of schools with electricity ranges
from 4.1% to 14%. Additionally, fragmentation increases scores on the school index (ranging from 0 to 1)
anywhere from 0.024 to 0.070 points. These serve as strong signals that fragmentation played an important
role in increasing the quality of education infrastructure provided by municipality governments. The results
of these estimations are robust to alternative matching modeling specifications.12
These strong and robust results are informative of the effects of fragmentation insofar as the data used
is reliable and statistical requisites are satisfied. Experts in Brazilian education validate the reliability of
the Brazilian School Census data, and the continued and long-term investment in this data source further
speaks to its credibility. In constructing and implementing my matching and difference-in-difference models,
12Alternative matching specifications considered include optimal, full, and genetic matching as well as one-to-one, nearest
neighbor propensity score matching with replacement.
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I attempted to satisfy required statistical properties to the best of my ability. However, the possibility of
lurking confounding, unobservable variables remains. Insofar as unobservable variables impact the quality
of municipality-provided, public, primary education infrastructure, calculated estimates could be biased.
Using original data collected from Minas Gerais, I can make tighter comparisons and, thus, better estimate
the effect of fragmentation on education infrastructure quality with reconstructed difference-in-difference
designs.13
6.4 Fragmentation and Education Infrastructure Quality in
Non-Fragmenting and Fragmenting Municipalities: Results
from Subset of Data from Minas Gerais
Whereas the data associated with the entire sample of Brazilian municipalities categorizes municipalities
purely as fragmenting or non-fragmenting, original data collected from Minas Gerais allows me to classify
municipalities into more nuanced groups. In addition to the fragmenting and non-fragmenting categories,
the data from Minas Gerais allows me to identify municipalities that initiated fragmentation proceedings
but whose proposals were subsequently vetoed in plebiscites held in the third stage of the fragmentation
process. This permits comparisons of reaggregated fragmenting municipalities in Minas Gerais with non-
fragmenting municipalities in the state that initiated fragmentation proceedings that were approved by
the state but were rejected in the final meaningful stage of the fragmentation process, the plebiscite. By
restricting the sample of the universe of Brazilian municipalities (as considered in the previous section) to
a smaller group of municipalities with similar intentions to fragment and with state approval to do so, I
can hold fixed unobservable characteristics that may differentiate municipalities with municipal districts that
initiate fragmentation proceedings and receive state approval to fragment from municipalities with municipal
districts that do not initiate fragmentation proceedings and do not have state approval to fragment. If the
results of difference-in-difference analyses constructed similarly,14 albeit with this subset of municipalities in
Minas Gerais, confirm the results from the nation-wide sample, I can place greater confidence in my results.
The dependent variables considered in the difference-in-difference estimations with this subset of data from
Minas Gerais, again, include important stand-alone metrics of education infrastructure quality (sanitation
13Minas Gerais is the solitary Brazilian state for which I have information on fragmentation proposals at various stages in
the fragmentation process.
14No matching precedes difference-in-difference analyses implemented with data on the subset of municipalities from Minas
Gerais. In the models constructed with the universe of Brazilian municipalities, it is necessary to control for characteristics
that differentiate municipalities that fragment from municipalities that fragment. However, by restricting my sample to include
solely municipalities with similar experiences in terms of fragmentation proposal initiation and state approval, I am already
loosely controlling for characteristics that predict which municipalities arrive at these stages.
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and electricity) as well as the comprehensive education quality index, and the time periods considered vary
but always include one pre-fragmentation and one post-fragmentation period. I present the results of these
analyses in the form of coefficient plots below.15
Figure 6.7: Coefficient Plot from Difference-in-Difference Analysis of School Sanitation in Municipality-
Administered Public Schools in Minas Gerais
15The regression tables associated with these coefficient plots can be found in the Appendix.
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Figure 6.8: Coefficient Plot from Difference-in-Difference Analysis of School Electricity in Municipality-
Administered Public Schools in Minas Gerais
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Figure 6.9: Coefficient Plot from Difference-in-Difference Analysis of School Indices in Municipality-
Administered Public Schools in Minas Gerais
Notwithstanding several exceptions, the results of difference-in-difference analyses implemented with data
on a subset of similar non-fragmenting and reaggregated fragmenting municipalities from Minas Gerais16
confirm the results obtained from the nation-wide sample: The effect of subnational fragmentation on
various metrics of education infrastructure quality is positive and statistically significant. This substantiates
theoretical expectations that smaller, more localized government structures will enhance the quality of public
service provision.
Though these analyses provide important new evidence confirming the expected negative relationship
between political unit size and the quality of public goods provision, they do not assess plausible divergent
effects of fragmentation experienced by fragmenting municipalities’ component parts. They cannot confirm
which unit, if any, is the primary driver of the observed relationship nor describe whether the trends of
education infrastructure quality in parent and child municipalities are parallel. In the section that follows,
I describe the construction of a school-level dataset that affords me the opportunity to assess whether
parent and child municipalities experience the effects of fragmentation on education infrastructure quality
differently.
16Again, this subset includes reaggregated fragmenting municipalities and non-fragmenting municipalities with municipal
districts that satisfied all requirements for fragmentation with the exception of obtaining support from the majority of the
population ‘directly interested’ in a plebiscite.
114
6.5 Fragmentation and Education Infrastructure Quality in
Parent and Child Municipalities: Research Design and Data
To assess the effect of fragmentation on education infrastructure quality in parent and child municipalities,
I have compiled a school-level panel dataset encompassing all active, municipality-funded schools providing
public primary education in all twenty-one states exposed to fragmentation between 1996 and 1997.17 This
data includes various school-level measures of education infrastructure quality as provided by the Brazilian
School Census (discussed above) for the following years: 1996, 1997, 2000, 2005, and 2010. These data afford
me the opportunity to move beyond studying the effects of fragmentation on reaggregated municipalities (i.e.
the combination of the parent and the child components of a fragmented municipality) and to begin assessing
whether fragmentation impacts parent and child municipalities differently. In other words, I can investigate
whether the effects of fragmentation are different for municipalities that experience solely a reduction in
the distance between their local governments and constituents as a product of fragmentation (i.e. parent
municipalities) than for municipalities that experience both a reduction in the distance between their local
governments and constituents and an introduction of brand new local governments (i.e. child municipalities).
My school-level dataset encompasses 158,857 unique schools. Some exist for all five years included in the
panel and others exist for a shorter interim of this longer period. Of these 158,857 schools, 7,494 (approx-
imately 5%) resided in more than one municipality in the 1996-2010 period. The majority of schools that
resided in more than one municipality in the 1996-2010 period (6,639 out of 7,494) switched the municipalities
in which they resided in between 1996 and 1997 due to fragmentation.18
In order to assess whether the effects of fragmentation are disparate for parent and child municipalities,
I compare metrics of education infrastructure quality across schools that switched the municipalities in
which they resided between 1996 and 1997 and are associated with child municipalities and schools that did
not switch the municipalities in which they resided between 1996 and 1997 and are associated with parent
municipalities.19 I assess differences differences in metrics of education infrastructure quality across ‘schools
that switched’ in child municipalities and ‘schools that stayed’ in parent municipalities both descriptively
and with difference-in-difference analyses.
Though the essence of the difference-in-difference analyses implemented in this section carries over from
17The states included in this panel are as follows: Alagoas, Amapá, Bahia, Esṕırito Santo, Goiás, Maranhão, Mato Grosso,
Matto Grosso do Sul, Minas Gerais, Pará, Paráıba, Paraná, Pernamuco, Piaúı, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Norte, Rio
Grande do Sul, Rondônia, Roraima, São Paulo, and Tocantins.
18Investigating the remaining 12.5% of schools that switched municipalities at other periods of time is a topic worthy of
explanation but is beyond the scope of this initial exploration of the effects of subnational fragmentation. I exclude schools
that switched municipalities for reasons other than fragmentation from my analysis.
19This latter group of schools that did not switch the municipalities in which they resided is comprised of two subgroups
- schools in parent municipalities and schools in non-fragmenting municipalities. For the purpose of this analysis, I consider
solely the subgroup of schools associated with parent municipalities.
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the previous section, there are several important differences. These are reflected in the following modeling
specification:
Υst = α+ β1Post1996t + β2ChildMunicipalitys
+β3Post1996t ∗ ChildMunicipalitys + δstate + εst (6.2)
Per this model, Υst is the school index score in school s at time t.
20 The α coefficient is a constant,
Post1996t is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 when t>1996 and 0 otherwise, and ChildMunicipalitys
is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 when school s resides in a child municipality. Schools within child
municipalities switched the municipalities in which they resided between 1996 and 1997 as a product of
fragmentation. ChildMunicipalitys takes on a value of 0 when school s resides in a parent municipality.
Schools within parent municipalities did not switch the municipalities in which they resided between 1996
and 1997 as a product of fragmentation. Schools in both child and parent municipalities were exposed to
fragmentation and were governed by smaller local governments in the aftermath of fragmentation, but only
schools in child municipalities that switched the municipalities in which they resided between 1996 and 1997
witnessed the installation of brand new governments with fragmentation. Again, the β3 coefficient associated
with the interaction of Post1996t and ChildMunicipalitys is the estimated difference-in-difference estimator,
and the primary coefficient of interest. Additionally, δstate represents state fixed effects.
21 Finally, εst is
the error term. I cluster standard errors at the school-level. Unlike the previous model assessing differences
in education infrastructure quality across non-fragmenting and reaggregated fragmenting municipalities, no
matching precedes the difference-in-difference models in this section.22
In the subsequent subsection, I, first, provide descriptive plots tracing education infrastructure quality in
schools in parent and child municipalities across time. To preview, these demonstrate that in comparison to
schools in parent municipalities, the quality of education infrastructure in child municipalities is significantly
lower prior to fragmentation but that fragmentation disproportionately increases the rate at which the quality
of education infrastructure improves in child municipalities. Thus, the effect of fragmentation on child
municipalities appears larger than the effect of fragmentation on parent municipalities. I, then, move on to
20The variables associated with sanitation and electricity are dichotomous at the school-level and assessing their relationship
with fragmentation requires complex non-linear difference-in-difference modeling specifications. Future research may consider
supplementing difference-in-difference models predicting the effect of fragmentation on school index scores with more complex
models that can accommodate dichotomous metrics of education infrastructure quality. However, because the school index
dependent variable arguably best captures education infrastructure quality, the omission of singular metrics of education
infrastructure quality is not worrisome.
21These state fixed effects control for any unobservable state-specific characteristics that do not vary across time.
22Insufficient data at the school-level of analysis precludes the use of matching in this section’s models.
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assessing the statistical significance of observed differences in school index scores with difference-in-difference
estimations.
6.6 Fragmentation and Education Infrastructure Quality in
Parent and Child Municipalities: Results
Figure 6.10, Figure 6.11, and Figure 6.12 depict the education infrastructure quality trajectories in schools
that switched in child municipalities and schools that stayed in parent municipalities.
Figure 6.10: Proportion of Schools With Sanitation Per Municipality/School Type
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Figure 6.11: Proportion of Schools With Electricity Per Municipality/School Type
Figure 6.12: Average Education Infrastructure Quality Indices Per Municipality/School Type
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These figures indicate that the quality of education infrastructure provided for by schools that switched
in child municipalities was significantly lower than the quality of education infrastructure provided for by
schools that stayed in parent municipalities in the pre-fragmentation period across all metrics of education
infrastructure considered. However, differences in the quality of education infrastructure across these two
groups became almost indistinguishable by 2010. In fact, since the mid-2000’s, the proportion of schools
with electricity in schools that switched in child municipalities has surpassed than the proportion of schools
with electricity in schools that stayed in parent municipalities. Thus, the education infrastructure quality
provided for by all schools improved over time, but schools in child municipalities improved their qualities
of education infrastructure at a faster rate than schools in parent municipalities. In what follows, I assess
whether observed differences in school index scores are statistically significant with difference-in-difference
analyses. As in the previous section, I present the results of these models in a coefficient plot. This plot
facilitates interpretation and focuses attention on the interaction effect of primary interest.
Figure 6.13: Coefficient Plot from Difference-in-Difference Analysis of School Indices in Municipality-
Administered Public Schools in Parent and Child Municipalities
These results confirm that the seemingly marginal differences in education infrastructure quality between
schools in parent and in child municipalities in observational plots are, in fact, statistically significant when
the dependent variable considered is the school index. The interaction between School Switch-Child Mun
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and Post-1996 is always positive and statistically significant regardless of the time period considered. Frag-
mentation increases child municipalities’ schools’ scores on the school index (ranging from 0 to 1) anywhere
from 0.018 to 0.039 points. In sum, these results strongly signal that fragmentation played an especially
important role in increasing the quality of education infrastructure in schools in child municipalities. Put
differently, the effects of fragmentation on education infrastructure quality are especially pronounced in mu-
nicipalities that experience both a reduction in distance between their local governments and constituents
and an introduction of brand new local governments.
This school-level assessment refines our understanding of the effects of fragmentation on affected munici-
palities. It suggests that the contribution of parent and child municipalities to the experiences of reaggregated
municipalities is unequal and, more specifically, that effects of fragmentation on child municipalities stimulate
the observed “catch up” effect experienced by reaggregated municipalities.
6.7 Discussion and Alternative Explanations
All of the results presented above indicate that fragmentation enhanced the quality of education infras-
tructure quality. In spite of the strong and robust results following from my analyses, it is important to
be wary of limitations. While an exploration of the relationship between fragmentation and public goods
provision lends itself to the use of the difference-in-difference research designs, there are several limitations
of this approach. First, due to the start date of the school census data, I am unable to confirm that the
parallel trends assumption of difference-in-difference analyses is satisfied. Second, while I attempted to con-
firm that pre-fragmentation differences are not drivers of observed relationships by pre-processing my data
with matching, I am restricted to matching fragmenting and non-fragmenting municipalities on observable
variables. By reestimating my analyses with a subset of municipalities involved in fragmentation processes
in Minas Gerais, I attempted to tighten my comparisons and lessen concerns regarding unobservable vari-
ables. However, insofar as the influence of unobservable variables continues unabated and biases my results,
the inferences I draw may be misleading. Third, the adopted strategy for the analysis of municipalities
and reaggregated units uses unweighted aggregation strategies. School-level data is aggregated up to the
municipality-level of analysis, and the inputs of multiple municipalities are aggregated to create reaggre-
gated units without any weighting technique. This approach assumes that the contribution of each school
to the municipality average is equal. However, this need not be the case. To the extent that ambiguities are
obscured in this strategy, my results may be deceptive.
Aside from these potentially problematic statistical issues and methodological decisions, my empirical
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results do little in the way of confirming that observed improvements in public goods provision ought to be
attributed to the fragmentation itself and not to an alternative factor that changes along with fragmenta-
tion. A plausible and potentially popular alternative explanation is that the observed relationship between
non-fragmenting municipalities and reaggregated units may not be a product of fragmentation itself but a
product of the fact that fragmenting municipalities that crossed defined population thresholds procure more
intergovernmental transfers per capita23 and invest these additional funds in education.24
My analyses assessing heterogeneous effects of fragmentation across parent and child municipalities cast
preliminary doubt on this explanation. If increased fiscal resources per capita were responsible for observed
differences between non-fragmenting municipalities and reaggregated units, I should not observe disparate
experiences in education infrastructure between child and parent municipalities. As both child and parent
municipalities would have secured additional financial resources in the aftermath of fragmentation,25 I would
have expected to see similar experiences in terms of education infrastructure quality among these groups
of municipalities. However, the results of my school-level analysis indicate stark differences in education
infrastructure quality between schools in parent and child municipalities. This observation indicates that
something other than transformations in transfer allocations per capita underlies observed differences. I
expect that fragmentation is part of this catalyst, and if my expectation is correct, I ought to observe
increased administrative attention as the distance between local governments and constituents is reduced
following fragmentation.
In an effort to test this expectation and provide further evidence in contrast with the proposed alternative
explanation, I assess whether fragmentation results in an increase in the number of municipality education
councils. In the context of Brazil, municipality education councils serve as social control and accountability
enhancing bodies and, thus, signal local administrative attention to community needs. If fragmentation is
related to increased administrative attention, I can place greater confidence in my attribution of the results
in earlier sections to fragmentation itself. Using my supplementary dataset accompanied by data from
IBGE’s Research Profile of Brazilian Municipalities,26 I estimate the effect of fragmentation on municipality
education councils with difference-in-difference analyses. Again, I use the pre-processed data derived from
the matching exercise in Chapter 5. The results of this analysis is included in Table 6.1.
These results indicate that the previous findings on the relationship between fragmentation and education
23As described in Chapter 4, the allocation of funding in the form of an especially important federal transfer - FPM - is
determined, in large part, by the size of municipality populations.
24According to Ferraz and Finan (2011), “local governments receive, on average, $35 billion per year from the federal govern-
ment to provide a significant share of public services in the areas of education, health, transportation, and local infrastructure.”
There is a predetermined amount of revenue that municipalities are required to invest in education.
25This assumes that both of these municipality types procured additional resources per capita as the populations comprising
them were reduced.
26IBGE’s Research Profile of Brazilian Municipalities includes data on whether or not Brazilian municipalities have munici-
pality education councils.
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Table 6.1: Difference-in-Difference Analysis of Municipality Education Councils, 1996 vs. 2010
Dependent variable:
Municipality Education Council
School Switch - Child Mun −0.072∗∗ (0.032)
Post-Treatment −0.365∗∗∗ (0.023)




Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,132.056
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
infrastructure quality are robust to the dependent variable substitution of metrics of education infrastruc-
ture quality with municipality education commissions. This provides preliminary evidence that observed
relationships between fragmentation and education infrastructure quality are likely attributable to changes
associated with fragmentation itself and are not spurious. I conclude by suggesting that fragmentation
played an important role in enhancing the provision of primary, public education in Brazilian municipalities,
and changes following from fragmentation can likely to be attributed to increased administrative attention,
especially, in child municipalities.
6.8 Conclusion
Theories of decentralization and political unit size provide compelling reasons to expect that empowering
small units will enhance public goods provision. In this chapter, I investigated these expectations through
studying the relationship between subnational fragmentation and education infrastructure quality, a metric
appropriately capturing the quality of service provided by municipality governments. My empirical analyses
suggest that subnational fragmentation enhanced education infrastructure quality in the context of Brazil.
It helped to reduce the experiential gap in education infrastructure quality across fragmenting and non-
fragmenting municipalities with the progression of time.
Additionally, I assessed whether the effect of fragmentation on education infrastructure quality was
different across parent and child municipalities and learned that the effect was statistically significantly
greater in child municipalities. This suggests that parent and child municipalities unequally contribute
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to the experiences of reaggregated fragmenting municipalities. Child municipalities, especially, drive the
observed “catch up” experience of reaggregated fragmenting municipalities.
This contribution profitably extends the minimal scholarship on the effects of fragmentation and provides
newfound insight into the consequences of political unit size for public goods provision. However, it studies
solely one public service provided to constituents by Brazilian municipalities. The robustness of these results
to alternative services provided for by Brazilian municipalities remains to be tested. Moreover, it remains
to be studied whether observed improvements in education infrastructure quality come at a financial cost.
Additionally, while this study pioneers the effort to assess the divergent effects of fragmentation ex-
perienced by municipalities’ component parts, it assesses only one of many plausible disparate effects. It
is probable that differences stemming from municipality type (i.e. parent versus child municipalities) are
not the only plausible heterogenous effects. It is also conceivable that municipalities similarly affected by
fragmentation but with dramatically different population sizes, for example, may experience different con-
sequences of fragmentation. Perhaps there is an optimal municipality size that allows for an ideal balance
of the advantages and disadvantages of smaller and larger political units. Future work would be well served
to understand whether fragmentation yields additional heterogeneous effects among municipalities involved
in fragmentation and, if so, what factors generate these disparate effects.
Also, further confirmation that the observed effects of fragmentation can truly be attributed to frag-
mentation itself, as opposed to an accompanying side effect, is warranted. This study attempted to confirm
that the observed relationship between fragmentation and education infrastructure quality was not spurious.
However, investigating and, potentially, dispelling other mechanisms through which fragmentation could
impact the quality of provided public goods is an important step to be undertaken in future scholarship.
While there remains much work to be done to tease out the effects of fragmentation, this contribution
provides optimism that reducing the size of government responsible for providing important public goods
through fragmentation can be an effective strategy to improve the quality of public goods and services. It
confirms that decentralization and the devolution of political and administrative power can contribute to
the realization of developmental goals. The forthcoming and final chapter of this dissertation summarizes
the results from this chapter as well as from the preceding chapters. In addition, it provides a discussion of
what and how this study of fragmentation has contributed to our understanding of the effects of political




In the early years of Brazil’s present democratic period, Santo Antônio de Retiro, an underdeveloped
municipal district, fragmented the municipality in which it resided and became it’s own municipality. In the
years that followed, Santo Antônio de Retiro developed rapidly. In terms of the United Nations Development
Programme municipality human development index scores, Santo Antônio de Retiro improved its score from
0.419 in 1991 to 0.601 in 2000, resulting in an increase of 0.182 points. Was subnational fragmentation and
the reduction in the size of the political unit to credit for this observed developmental advance?
Classic theories of decentralization suggest that the devolution of political, fiscal, and/or administrative
responsibilities to local government units ought to generate improvements in the areas of political partici-
pation and public goods provision, for example. With respect to public goods provision, decentralization is
expected to improve public goods provision such that the unique needs of local communities are reflected in
the goods offered. With respect to political participation, decentralization is expected to enhance the attitu-
dinal sentiments that incentivize political participation. However, theories outlining these expectations are
unclear on which facet of decentralization - the reorganization of political, fiscal, and/or administrative power
facet of decentralization or the reduction in political unit size - is expected to influence the aforementioned
areas.
In my dissertation, I assessed whether one facet of decentralization - the reduction in political unit size
- improved public goods provision and enhanced political participation by studying the causes and the con-
sequences of subnational fragmentation. In doing so, I not only assessed whether subnational fragmentation
was to credit for the developmental advances in Santo Antônio de Retiro but also whether it enhanced polit-
ical participation and improved tailored public goods in Brazilian municipalities implicated in fragmentation
more broadly. My comprehensive investigation into the dynamics surrounding subnational fragmentation in
Brazil contributes to a nascent literature on an important phenomenon reshaping local politics across the
developing world and brings new evidence to bear on classic debates over the effects of government size and,
ultimately, decentralization.
The first original contribution of my dissertation investigated the causes of subnational fragmentation
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in Brazil at each decision-making stage in the country’s subnational fragmentation process. First, I learned
that administrative grievances and political incentives played important roles in distinguishing the stock of
local districts susceptible to fragment. Specifically, in the case of Brazil, older municipalities with expansive
geographic areas and large effective numbers of political parties competing in local elections were more likely
to witness local political leaders from their peripheral municipal districts submit fragmentation proposals
than municipalities without these characteristics.
In comparison with the literature accumulated on the causes of subnational fragmentation outside of
Brazil, the overarching motivations of fragmentation uncovered in my dissertation appear similar. However,
important differences exist in the nature of administrative grievances and political incentives in Brazil and
in other countries similarly exposed to fragmentation. Whereas ethnic divisions are understood to generate
sentiments of administrative discontent in Kenya (Hassan, 2016), for example, expansive geographic areas
appear to contribute to administrative grievances in the context of Brazil, as in the case of Senegal (Gottlieb
et al., 2016). Moreover, the political incentives for fragmentation exist at different levels of government in
the Brazilian case and in other countries exposed to fragmentation; the political incentives for fragmentation
in Brazil are local, whereas the political incentives for fragmentation outside of Brazil can be more national
in scope (Hassan and Sheely, 2016; Green, 2008, 2010; Grossman and Lewis, 2014).
In addition to identifying the catalysts of subnational fragmentation, this dissertation moved beyond
existing work on the causes of subnational fragmentation in the developing world to try to understand the
various factors that prevent the realization of subnational fragmentation in the stock of local districts eligible
for or expressing interest in subnational fragmentation. Through archival research in the Legislative Assem-
bly of the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais and assessing fragmentation plebiscite results obtained through the
state’s Regional Electoral Court (TRE), I discovered that not all Brazilian municipal districts that pursued
fragmentation actually realized their end goals of fragmenting and creating their own municipalities. After
local Brazilian leaders initiate fragmentation proceedings by submitting fragmentation proposals to their
respective state legislatures, the state legislature and local voters have veto power over fragmentation in the
second and third stages in the fragmentation process. Through studying the dynamics surrounding state
legislators’ evaluations of fragmentation in the second stage of the fragmentation process and voting behavior
in fragmentation plebiscites in the third stage of the process, I learned that both political alignments and
the number of municipal districts involved in fragmentation proposal submission help to predict whether
fragmentation is realized.
Specifically, I determined that state governments were more likely to approve of fragmentation proposals
submitted by local leaders with whom they had previously served in government and that state governments
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were more likely to reject fragmentation proposals submitted by politically aligned mayors (due to the
presumption that fragmentation could harm the political prospects of aligned mayors). This insight suggests
that while decisions to pursue fragmentation are motivated by political incentives at the local level, the
realization of fragmentation depends, in part, on political incentives at the state-level of government and on
whether political goals at different levels of government are mutually reinforcing.
Additionally, I learned that fragmentation plebiscites are more likely to pass when only one municipal
district is involved in fragmentation proposal initiation than when multiple municipal districts jointly file
for fragmentation. I suggested that voters evaluating fragmentation proposals involving only one municipal
district that would be transformed into the new municipality headquarters in the event of fragmentation were
more likely to make positive and certain inferences about their future experiences than voters evaluating
fragmentation proposals involving more than one municipal district and residing in a municipal district that
would retain its municipal district status in the event of fragmentation. It follows that voters in municipal
districts that would be elevated to municipality status in the event of fragmentation would vote in favor of
fragmentation in plebiscites whereas voters in municipal districts that would retain their municipal district
status in the event of fragmentation would vote against fragmentation in plebiscites.
This procedural knowledge of both fragmentation and the dynamics surrounding decision-making at each
stage in the fragmentation process profitably moves our understanding of the phenomenon beyond underly-
ing motivations; it permits the study of topics pertaining to legislative behavior and participation in direct
democracy in the second and third stages of the fragmentation process, respectively, and the diagnosis of
factors that restrict the realization of fragmentation. Beyond relevance for deeply understanding the causes
of subnational fragmentation, differentiating non-fragmenting municipalities that sought fragmentation from
non-fragmenting municipalities that never sought fragmentation permitted me to make compelling compar-
isons of similar subnational units in studies of the consequences of subnational fragmentation and to reduce
the potential bias of treating the set of areas that fragmented as if they are equal to the set of areas that
requested fragmentation in these studies. I leveraged optimal comparison units, where possible, to perform
robustness checks on studies of the effects of fragmentation conducted with the broader subset of Brazilian
municipalities. These studies not only extended the literature on subnational fragmentation but provided
convincing tests of the central tenets of the political unit size and decentralization literatures.
I, first, investigated the effects of fragmentation on political participation, expecting to find that the
reduction in political unit size generated by fragmentation increased voters’ propensities to participate
politically insofar as political mobilization accompanied territorial restructuring. I found that subnational
fragmentation initially enhanced turnout, increased the valid vote share, and decreased both the blank
126
and null vote shares in local Brazilian elections but that these positive effects did not persist beyond the
first local elections in the post-fragmentation period. After the political mobilization required of subnational
fragmentation died down, voters’ heightened levels of political participation in local elections subsided, either
returning to trend with or to dip below political participation levels in non-fragmenting municipalities. These
results conform to my expectations and suggest that merely reducing the size of political units, in and of
itself, may be insufficient to permanently extend the base of political participants.
Moreover, these findings suggest that any observed improvements in the way of public goods provision
are unlikely to arise from enhanced accountability originating from unanimous sustained participation. If
contemporary demands for fragmentation are realized and new municipalities materialize, it will be important
to reexamine these results and to extend them to leverage the more disaggregated electoral data that exists in
the contemporary period. This latter endeavor would prove important in disentangling potentially disparate
effects of subnational fragmentation on political participation on the basis of municipality type (i.e. parent
or child municipality).
I, then, assessed the effects of fragmentation on the provision of public goods and services. With respect
to this relationship, I expected to find that the reduction in political unit size generated by fragmentation
enhanced the quality of public services. In line with my expectations and with anecdotal experiences, I
found that fragmenting municipalities initially underperformed in education infrastructure quality in com-
parison to their non-fragmenting counterparts but that the gap in education infrastructure quality between
fragmenting and non-fragmenting municipalities diminished over time. Using unique school-level data, I
found that child municipalities created as a product of fragmentation, such as Santo Antônio de Retiro, were
disproportionately benefited by fragmentation. Specifically, education infrastructure quality in child munic-
ipalities lagged behind education infrastructure quality in parent municipalities prior to fragmentation, but
after fragmentation, education infrastructure quality in child municipalities rose to or surpassed the level
existing in parent municipalities. This result confirms that the observed development trajectory pattern of
Santo Antônio de Retiro was not unique; rather, it was representative of fragmentation experiences in Brazil
more broadly.
As the previous chapter on political participation finds, enhanced accountability originating from unan-
imous sustained participation is unlikely to explain these results. In this section, I provided preliminary
evidence that observed effects of the relationship between subnational fragmentation and public goods pro-
vision can be attributed to increased administrative attention and a concentration of resources in new
municipalities in the aftermath of fragmentation. However, these findings need to be put to further empir-
ical scrutiny. Future research ought to undertake this task and to consider plausible intervening effects of
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fragmentation on state capacity.
Overall, the results of my empirical work on the effects of subnational fragmentation suggest that, in
the long run, fragmentation may achieve some anticipated improvements in service delivery but may not
permanently enhance political participation. More broadly, the findings of this dissertation suggest that the
facet of decentralization that reduces the distance between governments and constituents can yield some,
but not all, of its promises. While this dissertation advances our understanding of decentralization and
of both the causes and consequences of subnational fragmentation in the developing world, the picture
it generates surrounding the effects of subnational fragmentation remains incomplete. In order to make
appropriate policy recommendations both in the specific case studied and in the developing world broadly, it
is imperative to continue to advance this line of research both empirically and theoretically. In what follows,
I outline a number of outlets for forthcoming work in this area of research to consider.
First, future scholarship would benefit from investigating additional unexplored or under-explored conse-
quences of subnational fragmentation. These include, but are not limited to, whether and how fragmentation
impacts nation-building projects and the formation of national identities, the nature of linkages between
voters and government officials, political attitudes, local conflict and security, the stability and longevity of
democratic and autocratic leaders’ tenures, subnational authoritarianism, and inter-party bargaining and
coalitions (Pierskalla, 2016a). While central tenets of the political unit size and decentralization literatures
inform expectations surrounding relationships between subnational fragmentation and some of the afore-
mentioned themes, more specific literatures on these topics provide compelling reasons to expect them to be
related to subnational fragmentation.
Second, forthcoming work ought to continue to exploit variation in institutional rules in an effort to
isolate the causal effects of subnational fragmentation in the previously identified areas. In my dissertation,
for example, I attempted to make an important stride forward by making comparisons across municipalities
that were motivated to fragment but did not satisfy the requisites for a successful fragmentation plebiscite
(and were, therefore, prevented from fragmenting) and municipalities that were motivated to fragment
and did satisfy the requisites for a successful fragmentation plebiscite (and were, therefore, permitted to
fragment). Future work would be well served to leverage similar institutional rules that permit analogous,
tightened comparisons.
Third, beyond extending the scope of dependent variables considered and the way in which these rela-
tionships are studied, Pierskalla (2016a) also suggests that future work would benefit from exploring whether
certain factors, such as the structure of national party systems, mediate the effects of fragmentation on this
extensive set of dependent variables. Relatedly, it would be worthwhile to investigate whether the causes
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and effects of subnational fragmentation are heterogeneous across democratic and authoritarian regimes,
federal and unitary systems of government, types/levels of decentralized governance, and processes by which
fragmentation occurs (i.e. top-down or bottom-up). These projects pose significant and, potentially, detri-
mental empirical challenges and may be addressed purely through qualitative work and theoretical reasoning.
Nonetheless, this work is imperative for our understanding of how what we learn about fragmentation in
one context translates to our understanding of the phenomenon elsewhere.
Fourth, greater theorizing is also imperative to better understanding the similarities and differences
between subnational fragmentation and the related political phenomena of decentralization/recentralization,
redistricting, and gerrymandering. A more nuanced understanding of the relationship between subnational
fragmentation and these topics will help scholars of subnational fragmentation to dialogue with those working
in other related literatures, project important findings to a broader audience, and better understand the
contrasts in the forms of territorial restructuring taking place in developed and developing countries.
Fifth, and finally, future work should prioritize collecting and analyzing fine-grained data below the level
of analysis of the fragmenting units that permit assessments of disparate effects of subnational fragmentation.
Through assessments of the relationship between fragmentation municipality type (i.e. parent versus child
municipalities) and education infrastructure quality, my dissertation suggests that the effects of subnational
fragmentation may be disparate for different types of units involved in fragmentation. Future work would
be well-served to continue to investigate the dynamics of fragmentation for these different types of units.
If contemporary demands for fragmentation in Brazil, for instance, are realized and new municipalities
materialize, it will be possible to study the disparate effects of fragmentation on political participation using
electoral section- and zone-level data that is presently accessible but was not available during the prolific
waves of subnational fragmentation in the late-twentieth century. This would undoubtedly prove to be an
important step forward in enhancing our understanding of the distinct effects of fragmentation on political
participation.
In sum, recent scholarship has profitably advanced our understanding of an understudied, yet important,
phenomenon reshaping local politics across the developing world. In spite of the knowledge accumulated, our
understanding of the causes and consequences of subnational fragmentation remains in its infancy. Given
the important implications that subnational fragmentation holds for political and economic development
in the developing world and the prospects it holds for generating development as it did in the Brazilian
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Participation in Local Elections
Table A.1: Difference-in-Difference Analyses of Political Participation in Local Elections, 1992 vs. 1996
Dependent variable:
(1) Valid (2) Blank (3) Null (4) Turnout
Fragmented −0.017 (0.020) 0.007 (0.006) 0.010∗∗∗ (0.002) −0.013 (0.017)
Post-Treatment 0.112∗∗∗ (0.019) −0.039∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.014∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.071∗∗∗ (0.016)
Post-Treatment*Fragmented 0.109∗∗ (0.049) 0.001 (0.007) −0.013∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.052 (0.071)
Constant 0.694∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.060∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.010∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.780∗∗∗ (0.015)
Observations 307 416 415 294
Log Likelihood 266.117 764.694 963.652 313.440
Akaike Inf. Crit. −524.235 −1,521.388 −1,919.304 −618.880
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.2: Difference-in-Difference Analyses of Political Participation in Local Elections, 1992 vs. 2000
Dependent variable:
(1) Valid (2) Blank (3) Null (4) Turnout
Fragmented −0.017 (0.020) 0.007 (0.006) 0.010∗∗∗ (0.002) −0.013 (0.017)
Post-Treatment 0.160∗∗∗ (0.018) −0.047∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.027∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.124∗∗∗ (0.015)
Post-Treatment*Fragmented −0.028 (0.020) −0.009 (0.006) 0.002 (0.003) −0.017 (0.017)
Constant 0.694∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.060∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.010∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.780∗∗∗ (0.015)
Observations 693 752 751 683
Log Likelihood 787.366 1,650.107 1,769.769 892.213
Akaike Inf. Crit. −1,566.732 −3,292.213 −3,531.537 −1,776.426
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table A.3: Difference-in-Difference Analyses of Political Participation in Local Elections, 1992 vs. 2004
Dependent variable:
(1) Valid (2) Blank (3) Null (4) Turnout
Fragmented −0.017 (0.020) 0.007 (0.006) 0.010∗∗∗ (0.002) −0.013 (0.017)
Post-Treatment 0.160∗∗∗ (0.019) −0.046∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.028∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.125∗∗∗ (0.015)
Post-Treatment*Fragmented −0.010 (0.021) −0.011∗ (0.006) −0.0005 (0.004) −0.004 (0.017)
Constant 0.694∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.060∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.010∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.780∗∗∗ (0.015)
Observations 693 752 751 683
Log Likelihood 770.122 1,654.191 1,515.194 925.865
Akaike Inf. Crit. −1,532.244 −3,300.382 −3,022.388 −1,843.729
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.4: Difference-in-Difference Analyses of Political Participation in Local Elections, 1992 vs. 2008
Dependent variable:
(1) Valid (2) Blank (3) Null (4) Turnout
Fragmented −0.017 (0.020) 0.007 (0.006) 0.010∗∗∗ (0.002) −0.013 (0.017)
Post-Treatment 0.128∗∗∗ (0.019) −0.040∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.037∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.109∗∗∗ (0.015)
Post-Treatment*Fragmented 0.006 (0.022) −0.014∗∗ (0.007) −0.002 (0.006) 0.008 (0.017)
Constant 0.694∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.060∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.010∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.780∗∗∗ (0.015)
Observations 692 752 751 682
Log Likelihood 679.182 1,582.834 1,224.336 916.984
Akaike Inf. Crit. −1,350.364 −3,157.668 −2,440.672 −1,825.967
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.5: Difference-in-Difference Analyses of Political Participation in Local Elections, 1996 vs. 2000
Dependent variable:
(1) Valid (2) Blank (3) Null (4) Turnout
Fragmented −0.018 (0.017) 0.001 (0.004) −0.006 (0.005) −0.028∗∗ (0.013)
Post-Treatment 0.017∗ (0.009) −0.003 (0.003) 0.002 (0.005) 0.016∗∗∗ (0.003)
Post-Treatment*Fragmented 0.010 (0.011) −0.003 (0.004) 0.012∗∗ (0.005) 0.023∗∗∗ (0.008)
Constant 0.836∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.016∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.023∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.875∗∗∗ (0.006)
Observations 234 242 242 234
Log Likelihood 280.656 627.796 580.604 344.136
Akaike Inf. Crit. −553.311 −1,247.593 −1,153.208 −680.273
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
140
Table A.6: Difference-in-Difference Analyses of Political Participation in Local Elections, 1996 vs. 2004
Dependent variable:
(1) Valid (2) Blank (3) Null (4) Turnout
Fragmented −0.018 (0.017) 0.001 (0.004) −0.006 (0.005) −0.028∗∗ (0.013)
Post-Treatment 0.023∗ (0.012) −0.001 (0.003) 0.008 (0.008) 0.030∗∗∗ (0.006)
Post-Treatment*Fragmented 0.025 (0.016) −0.0002 (0.005) 0.010 (0.009) 0.039∗∗∗ (0.010)
Constant 0.836∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.016∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.023∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.875∗∗∗ (0.006)
Observations 234 242 242 234
Log Likelihood 267.205 610.834 469.867 332.135
Akaike Inf. Crit. −526.410 −1,213.668 −931.735 −656.270
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.7: Difference-in-Difference Analyses of Political Participation in Local Elections, 1996 vs. 2008
Dependent variable:
(1) Valid (2) Blank (3) Null (4) Turnout
Fragmented −0.018 (0.017) 0.001 (0.004) −0.006 (0.005) −0.028∗∗ (0.013)
Post-Treatment −0.012 (0.017) 0.015∗ (0.008) 0.013 (0.008) 0.016∗∗∗ (0.006)
Post-Treatment*Fragmented 0.054∗∗ (0.021) −0.013 (0.010) 0.007 (0.009) 0.052∗∗∗ (0.011)
Constant 0.836∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.016∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.023∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.875∗∗∗ (0.006)
Observations 234 242 242 234
Log Likelihood 238.791 451.811 458.173 340.043
Akaike Inf. Crit. −469.582 −895.622 −908.346 −672.086





Table B.1: Difference-in-Difference Analyses of Education Infrastructure Quality, 1996 vs. 1998
Dependent variable:
(1) Sanitation (2) Electricity (3) School Index
Fragmented −0.159∗∗∗ (0.023) −0.114∗∗∗ (0.024) −0.081∗∗∗ (0.012)
Post-Fragmentation 0.049∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.094∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.046∗∗∗ (0.004)
Post-Fragmentation*Fragmented 0.048∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.041∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.024∗∗∗ (0.005)
Constant 0.626∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.602∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.430∗∗∗ (0.009)
Observations 1,660 1,660 1,660
Log Likelihood −536.556 −565.057 577.545
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,081.112 1,138.115 −1,147.090
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table B.2: Difference-in-Difference Analyses of Education Infrastructure Quality, 1996 vs. 2000
Dependent variable:
(1) Sanitation (2) Electricity (3) School Index
Fragmented −0.159∗∗∗ (0.023) −0.114∗∗∗ (0.024) −0.081∗∗∗ (0.012)
Post-Fragmentation 0.081∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.152∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.075∗∗∗ (0.004)
Post-Fragmentation*Fragmented 0.064∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.080∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.040∗∗∗ (0.006)
Constant 0.626∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.602∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.430∗∗∗ (0.009)
Observations 1,662 1,662 1,662
Log Likelihood −498.075 −479.727 606.417
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,004.151 967.453 −1,204.834
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B.3: Difference-in-Difference Analyses of Education Infrastructure Quality, 1996 vs. 2002
Dependent variable:
(1) Sanitation (2) Electricity (3) School Index
Fragmented −0.159∗∗∗ (0.023) −0.114∗∗∗ (0.024) −0.081∗∗∗ (0.012)
Post-Fragmentation 0.087∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.073∗∗ (0.029) 0.051∗∗∗ (0.007)
Post-Fragmentation*Fragmented 0.047∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.140∗∗∗ (0.038) 0.060∗∗∗ (0.010)
Constant 0.626∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.602∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.430∗∗∗ (0.009)
Observations 1,660 1,660 1,543
Log Likelihood −541.972 −473.196 841.726
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,091.944 954.392 −1,675.452
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table B.4: Difference-in-Difference Analyses of Education Infrastructure Quality, 1996 vs. 2006
Dependent variable:
(1) Sanitation (2) Electricity (3) School Index
Fragmented −0.159∗∗∗ (0.023) −0.114∗∗∗ (0.024) −0.081∗∗∗ (0.012)
Post-Fragmentation 0.209∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.310∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.268∗∗∗ (0.005)
Post-Fragmentation*Fragmented 0.100∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.104∗∗∗ (0.020) 0.052∗∗∗ (0.008)
Constant 0.626∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.602∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.430∗∗∗ (0.009)
Observations 1,666 1,666 1,666
Log Likelihood −353.591 −236.105 702.652
Akaike Inf. Crit. 715.182 480.210 −1,397.305
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table B.5: Difference-in-Difference Analyses of Education Infrastructure Quality, 1996 vs. 2008
Dependent variable:
(1) Sanitation (2) Electricity (3) School Index
Fragmented −0.159∗∗∗ (0.023) −0.114∗∗∗ (0.024) −0.081∗∗∗ (0.012)
Post-Fragmentation 0.201∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.305∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.253∗∗∗ (0.007)
Post-Fragmentation*Fragmented 0.126∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.121∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.070∗∗∗ (0.010)
Constant 0.626∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.602∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.430∗∗∗ (0.009)
Observations 1,546 1,546 1,546
Log Likelihood −335.522 −246.312 687.518
Akaike Inf. Crit. 679.044 500.624 −1,367.035
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B.6: Difference-in-Difference Analyses of Education Infrastructure Quality, 1996 vs. 2010
Dependent variable:
(1) Sanitation (2) Electricity (3) School Index
Fragmented −0.159∗∗∗ (0.023) −0.114∗∗∗ (0.024) −0.081∗∗∗ (0.012)
Post-Fragmentation 0.244∗∗∗ (0.011) 0.340∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.281∗∗∗ (0.006)
Post-Fragmentation*Fragmented 0.131∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.120∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.069∗∗∗ (0.008)
Constant 0.626∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.602∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.430∗∗∗ (0.009)
Observations 1,674 1,674 1,674
Log Likelihood −271.930 −168.561 798.092
Akaike Inf. Crit. 551.859 345.122 −1,588.185
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table B.7: Difference-in-Difference Analyses of Education Infrastructure Quality in Minas Gerais, 1996 vs.
1998
Dependent variable:
(1) Sanitation (2) Electricity (3) School Index
Fragmented 0.123∗∗ (0.052) 0.155∗∗ (0.061) 0.078∗∗ (0.034)
Post-Fragmentation 0.023 (0.057) 0.113∗ (0.066) 0.021 (0.035)
Post-Fragmentation*Fragmented 0.644∗∗∗ (0.079) 0.672∗∗∗ (0.081) 0.486∗∗∗ (0.041)
Observations 184 184 184
Log Likelihood −63.890 −32.629 100.514
Akaike Inf. Crit. 135.780 73.258 −193.029
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table B.8: Difference-in-Difference Analyses of Education Infrastructure Quality in Minas Gerais, 1996 vs.
2000
Dependent variable:
(1) Sanitation (2) Electricity (3) School Index
Fragmented 0.227∗∗∗ (0.064) 0.104∗∗∗ (0.031)
Post-Fragmentation 0.155∗∗ (0.069) 0.045 (0.033)
Post-Fragmentation*Fragmented 0.388∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.672∗∗∗ (0.081) 0.486∗∗∗ (0.041)
Observations 43,388 184 184
Log Likelihood −12,891.330 −12.773 111.546
Akaike Inf. Crit. 25,786.660 33.547 −215.091
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B.9: Difference-in-Difference Analyses of Education Infrastructure Quality in Minas Gerais, 1996 vs.
2002
Dependent variable:
(1) Sanitation (2) Electricity (3) School Index
Fragmented 0.129∗∗ (0.055) −0.102 (0.130) 0.052 (0.042)
Post-Fragmentation 0.050 (0.060) 0.340∗∗ (0.142) 0.070 (0.044)
Post-Fragmentation*Fragmented 0.644∗∗∗ (0.079) 0.672∗∗∗ (0.081) 0.486∗∗∗ (0.041)
Observations 184 184 184
Log Likelihood −58.314 −31.920 131.516
Akaike Inf. Crit. 124.628 71.840 −255.031
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table B.10: Difference-in-Difference Analyses of Education Infrastructure Quality in Minas Gerais, 1996 vs.
2006
Dependent variable:
(1) Sanitation (2) Electricity (3) School Index
Fragmented 0.187∗∗∗ (0.050) 0.320∗∗∗ (0.080) 0.241∗∗∗ (0.031)
Post-Fragmentation 0.133∗∗ (0.059) 0.237∗∗∗ (0.087) 0.093∗∗∗ (0.034)
Post-Fragmentation*Fragmented 0.644∗∗∗ (0.079) 0.672∗∗∗ (0.081) 0.486∗∗∗ (0.041)
Observations 184 184 184
Log Likelihood −45.895 14.273 128.055
Akaike Inf. Crit. 99.790 −20.546 −248.109
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table B.11: Difference-in-Difference Analyses of Education Infrastructure Quality in Minas Gerais, 1996 vs.
2008
Dependent variable:
(1) Sanitation (2) Electricity (3) School Index
Fragmented 0.201∗∗∗ (0.050) 0.322∗∗∗ (0.080) 0.264∗∗∗ (0.030)
Post-Fragmentation 0.152∗∗ (0.060) 0.245∗∗∗ (0.087) 0.089∗∗∗ (0.033)
Post-Fragmentation*Fragmented 0.644∗∗∗ (0.079) 0.672∗∗∗ (0.081) 0.486∗∗∗ (0.041)
Observations 184 184 184
Log Likelihood −42.935 15.355 128.844
Akaike Inf. Crit. 93.870 −22.711 −249.688
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table B.12: Difference-in-Difference Analyses of Education Infrastructure Quality in Minas Gerais, 1996 vs.
2010
Dependent variable:
(1) Sanitation (2) Electricity (3) School Index
Fragmented 0.211∗∗∗ (0.051) 0.326∗∗∗ (0.081) 0.260∗∗∗ (0.030)
Post-Fragmentation 0.159∗∗∗ (0.061) 0.247∗∗∗ (0.088) 0.096∗∗∗ (0.033)
Post-Fragmentation*Fragmented 0.644∗∗∗ (0.079) 0.672∗∗∗ (0.081) 0.486∗∗∗ (0.041)
Observations 184 184 184
Log Likelihood −38.684 15.814 129.745
Akaike Inf. Crit. 85.368 −23.627 −251.490
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table B.13: Difference-in-Difference Analyses of School Index Scores, Parent/Child
Dependent variable:
School Index
(1) 1996-2000 (2) 1996-2004 (3) 1996-2008
School Switch - Child Mun −0.060∗∗∗ (0.010) −0.060∗∗∗ (0.010) −0.060∗∗∗ (0.010)
Post-Fragmentation 0.059∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.141∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.343∗∗∗ (0.005)
School Switch - Child Mun*Post-Fragmentation 0.018∗∗ (0.008) 0.039∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.039∗∗∗ (0.008)
Constant 0.317∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.317∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.317∗∗∗ (0.006)
Observations 82,835 74,112 72,211
Log Likelihood 17,748.170 23,342.900 26,792.500
Akaike Inf. Crit. −35,488.340 −46,677.790 −53,576.990
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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